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4 MARCH 1991



# ***JPRS Report***

## **Soviet Union**

### ***Political Affairs***

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# FBIS 50th Anniversary Note

To Our Consumers:

This year the Foreign Broadcast Information Service observes its 50th anniversary.

The service, first called the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, was established in 1941 prior to the U.S. entry into World War II. At the time, a number of U.S. Government officials were concerned about the content of foreign radio broadcasts—a relatively new means of conveying information and propaganda across borders. On their advice, President Franklin D. Roosevelt in late February 1941 allotted money from his emergency fund to institute the recording, translating, transcribing, and analyzing of selected foreign broadcasts for the U.S. Government. During World War II the service demonstrated that monitoring was a fast, economical, and reliable way to follow overseas developments.

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We members of the current staff of FBIS extend our thanks to consumers for their interest in FBIS products. To past staffers we extend our thanks for helping the service reach this anniversary year. At the same time, we pledge our continued commitment to providing a useful information service.



R. W. Manners  
Director  
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

# Soviet Union

## Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-91-012

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### Problems Seen in Introducing, Coordinating New Legislation

91UN0778A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 24 Jan 91  
Union Edition p 3

[Article by Professor Yu. Tikhomirov, doctor of legal sciences: "Opposition to the Law"]

[Text] Today almost all of us are involved in legislative work. Some people are criticizing current laws, others are submitting proposals concerning the enactment of new ones, yet others are participating in their formulation or discussion. Many people are in the grip of a kind of law-making euphoria—they would like to overcome many of our problems with the aid of laws.

But this is the problem: More than 70 laws of the USSR and hundreds in the republics have been enacted in the past 18 months, and they are being realized inadequately. Even now it has become fashionable to criticize the absence of mechanisms of the laws' operation on the one hand, and, on the other, the phenomenon of legal opposition to the law has emerged. Rules of law contrary to the meaning thereof are frequently promulgated deliberately.

What is going on? Where are the roots of this phenomenon? There are several. The main one, however strange, is the freedom of thought and action, which has afforded scope to the individual. Our traditional low legal culture has been unable to curb the willfulness, egotism, and pressure of individual and group interests. An interesting observation: Citizens, plant outfits, public organizations, and state authorities are actively taking part in the legislative process. How could it be otherwise—the law contains measures pertaining to satisfaction of acute public need. After lengthy discussion, all agree on its formulas—accord is obtained and a balance of interests is achieved and, it would seem, this predetermines the binding nature of the law for everyone.

Alas, achieving consensus at the stage of realization of the law is more difficult. Here group, national, professional, and territorial interests once again gain the ascendancy over the law. Few people feel bound by its provisions and the obligation to operate within their framework. Each has his own standards, although at the time of enactment of the law common ones had seemingly been found. As a result the law is violated and circumvented, and its provisions are not accommodated. We do not have a keen sense of the following association: It is profitable to live and act according to the law. Contrary to it, unprofitable.

Let us see, in fact, what is concealed behind deviations from the law. Markedly worse decisions, and not at the proper level, are adopted. Information flows are diverted. The officially recognized relations of the participants in management are broken. Instead of the rhythmic nature of actions, there is chance, huge losses of time, the disruption of product supplies, and a breakdown in production and trade, the loss of partners'

interaction, and a deterioration in their relations. How are we to measure the moral losses and the defenselessness of many citizens before the law?

The principle: A law is in force until it is revoked, has been known since time immemorial, it would seem. But what is happening in reality is this. In some republics their own laws have become a means of weakening Union laws under the open pressure of national forces, contrary to the wishes of the strata of the population that speak a different language. Of course, there have been successful legal decisions also. But, for all that, what is the point of enacting in unconcerted fashion one's own laws governing enterprises, business, and so forth, markedly complicating the movement toward the market on a common road?

The consequence of this is big economic damage and a severance of managerial relations. Growing separatism, on the other hand, is nurturing nationalism and pushing persons of different nationality further away from one another. This is hardly contributing to the spiritual enrichment of the peoples and their natural rapprochement.

The declarations of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and others have introduced the principle of the supremacy of the republic constitutions and laws. How should we view this? We should not, I believe, be introducing a new legal procedure before the change and revocation of the current one. It would be more expedient to create a parity conciliation commission for the preliminary study of questions of the prevention of collisions. A new solution of the question is, however, truly inevitable within the framework of the new Union treaty. We may introduce new forms of Union enactments—"prescriptive principles" and "agreements with the association of the republics"—and promulgate fewer "fundamentals" to allow more scope for law-making. In our opinion, the treaty determination of the exclusive spheres of the Union and republic authorities will outline—within the limits thereof—the corresponding legislative jurisdiction also. The concept of the priority of laws will disappear since they will not intersect. Although joint legal regulation, by mutual consent, of some spheres cannot be precluded either.

One further sphere of confrontation is recognition of the extraterritoriality of the effect of a law. On the wave of the growing independence some regions and territories have begun to reject the application of this law or the other within their borders, although the law is binding throughout the territory of the USSR and the Union and autonomous republics. A number of cities in Moldavia do not recognize the republic laws on languages, the national flag, and others. City soviet decisions or citizens' local referendums have created something akin to "power vacuums of the law," substituting for it their own. The Daugavpils City Soviet has deemed inoperative on city territory the Declaration on the Restoration of Latvia's Independence and reserved the right to suspend republic laws that are contrary to the USSR

Constitution and the Latvian SSR Constitution. Municipal authorities of northwest Estonia have declared the primacy of Union laws, and Otepää considers binding only decisions of the Congress of Estonia, elsewhere, however, of the republic Supreme Soviet.

Territories' autonomization is being manifested in a certain confrontation with the law on the part of local authorities also. It has to be acknowledged that some legal basis for this was provided by the USSR General Principles of Self-Government Act, in which the ties of soviets of different components are virtually severed. And these are the consequences. Many oblast soviets of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic have imposed a state of emergency with strict measures, and new economic levers (contracts and such) have remained unused. In Leningrad and the oblast the executive committees have required the enterprises to conclude contracts with priority for the region. But what about freedom of activity in accordance with the Enterprise Act? The "trade war" which is under way is giving the residents of different cities a hard time.

Manifested in all this, obviously, is not simply a clash of acts but primarily the different understanding of power and self-government and relationships in the systems. Different interests are clashing. While recognizing this to be natural to a certain extent, I would nonetheless note the need for the republic laws to regulate more precisely the relations of the soviets and the methods of the concerted solution of common concerns. After all, the needs of the countryside and environmental disasters (forest fires and so forth) do not recognize administrative boundaries.

There is one other aspect. Enterprises and cooperatives have an inadequate comprehension of their new status and are seeking success meanwhile in the field of distribution. But use of the provisions of the laws governing contracts and joint production would undoubtedly produce a spurt in the integration of relations in production. There would also be increased results given the intelligent use of the provisions stimulating scientific and technological progress. Alas, they are going unnoticed. Yet only a good producer with a commodity of the highest quality will be up to the demands of market relations.

The number of infractions is, on the whole, not diminishing but growing. Citizens with a poor knowledge of the law often break it. And frequently deliberately, in their own interests. We often affirm this phenomenon without attempting to reveal and explain the motives for the illegitimate conduct. Yes, this is primarily an ignorance of the laws and a persistent reluctance to assimilate them in intelligible forms. Legal information is currently organized very inadequately. This an avowed counterpoise of one's own interests to the priority which is officially recognized and reflected in the law. It is irresponsibility, which makes for impunity as the dominant of behavior. It is an attempt to take shelter behind one's own "legal" shield in defiance of the "diktat" of a law

which has allegedly replaced the "diktat" of party-administrative system rules. But is boundless local rule-making a pass into a state based on the rule of law?

Distortion of the meaning of a law and its inactivity spell disaster. It is bad when people easily transgress. I would not want to reduce my arguments to an affirmation of the present catastrophe concerning realization of the law. This would now be manifestly insufficient. Today everyone needs to learn lessons and act constructively.

A common lesson is that the action of a law (both Union and republic) should be regarded on the same scale of importance by which we judge and evaluate all the phases of law-making. With the realization of rules of law and legal provisions we need to link the accomplishment of tasks and a change in situations and public behavior. Then the level of legality would directly influence the level of any activity and its results. It would be unprofitable, economically included, to act outside of the framework of the law. Under market conditions this is particularly important for curbing possible spontaneity. For state authorities, enterprises, the work force, and public organizations the time has come to change priorities and consider realization of the laws the first priority of their activity. Each law which appears should not only be studied and assimilated in depth but also realized in planned manner. Otherwise the inactivity of official structures prompts the creation of informal bodies and unrest.

There is a lesson for legal experts—scholars and practitioners—also. They should devise mechanisms for declaring invalid, repealing, and suspending acts and, what is particularly important, the consequences of these acts as well—legal, economic, financial, and so forth.

A revitalization and broadening, on the other hand, of civil rights procedures in court, in arbitration, and in the system of constitutional and procuracy oversight would help in the timely settlement of legal collisions and their prevention. We are virtually unaccustomed to legal disputes in defense of the individual, and it is necessary to expand more rapidly the space protected by law. Meanwhile, however, the slackness of the law enforcement authorities involuntarily connives at nonapplication of the law and sanctions.

Lessons for the citizens: knowledge of the law and its application is a most important duty of theirs, and it would be naive to wish for the "advent" of a state based on the rule of law without a breakthrough in legal consciousness and behavior proper. The Russian legal expert L. Petyazhitskiy saw the individual's recognition of his right as active ethical motivation. Recognition of his duty is strengthened, he wrote, thanks to the consciousness of its enshrinement for other citizens. How we lack such an understanding today!

There is one further aspect of the problem—professional. Legal qualifications should serve as a most important indicator of professional qualifications. However, this is seldom recalled as yet at the time of the

selection of specialist leaders for government, department and business administrative systems. This criterion "disappears" altogether at the time of evaluation of the labor and certification of employees. The USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems and the Ministry of Justice could do much here.

Finally, a lesson for the law-maker. Difficulties in the realization of laws frequently come from their low quality and mistakes. Of what kind? The provisions of different laws, particularly along the "Union-republic" axis, are not always strictly coordinated. The slow realization of the Property Act, for example, is being held up by the manifest "variant readings" of the concepts and forms of ownership in this law and analogous laws of the republics and in the laws on land, self-government, and others. The provisions concerning the rights of individual subjects, decision-making levels, and responsibility are imprecise in a number of cases. And, of course, it is better to regulate the procedure of their operation in the laws themselves, not in decrees and supplements. In this case substantive rules and rules of procedure are not divorced from one another and are combined more easily.

If defects and lacunas have been discovered in them, laws are still being revised and supplemented too slowly as yet. Thus amplifications to the laws on the state enterprise and the cooperative system were made belatedly. And what, for example, about the law on labor collectives? Yet we are talking about a legal method of the amendment of laws. The localities would not then, understandably, need to make their "own" law.

The legislative authorities of the Union and the republics could develop their supervisory functions more extensively even now. The committees and commissions are capable of promptly analyzing information on how laws are being realized in the sectors and regions and of regularly receiving reports and accounts of the organs of administration. Incidentally, the need for interpretation of the laws is great, and it would spare us many "variant readings."

Life may be imparted to a law not only at the time of its birth—its very existence should be a concern of society and its citizens.

## Baltics

### Baltic Army Association Issues Appeal to USSR Deputies

91UN0817A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
22 Dec 90 p 1

["Appeal to the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies From Delegates of the Extraordinary Congress of the Army Community of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Kaliningrad Oblast"]

[Text] Esteemed People's Deputies!

The sociopolitical and economic situation that has taken shape in the sixth year of perestroika in our country and its individual regions—particularly in the Baltic region—cannot be tolerated any longer! The progressive idea of a national rebirth of the peoples of the Baltic republics has been utilized by separatist forces to further their mercenary aims and has already put in jeopardy the rights and lives of hundreds of thousands of USSR citizens.

The constant calls of the extremists who forced their way to power: "Latvia for the Latvians!", "Lithuania for the Lithuanians!", "Estonia for the Estonians!", nonacceptance of others' way of thinking, imposition of what are in fact pro-fascist authoritarian regimes, attempts to resolve economic problems at the expense and to the detriment of the interests of workers—have exacerbated the environment of instability and led to an explosive situation in the region.

Especially alarming to us, professional military people, is the creation of militarized formations.

The Army community cannot simply observe these processes from the sidelines. Especially since the politicians of the Baltic governments continue their attacks on the Soviet Army and Navy, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and USSR KGB, are adopting anticonstitutional laws, and are grossly trampling upon the rights of servicemen and their family members, workers and other employees of the Soviet Army, and veterans of the USSR Armed Forces.

Events taking place in the country and in the Baltic region have forced us, representatives of the Army community, to assemble at our first extraordinary congress and announce formation of the Union of Baltic Servicemen, whose goals are:

- to defend the integrity of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the form that we, having taken an oath to the Motherland, have sworn to defend with our lives;
- to defend and unswervingly observe the USSR Constitution;

—to defend the lives, honor, dignity, social, and political rights of servicemen and veterans of the USSR Armed Forces, employees of the Soviet Army, and members of their families.

Our congress unanimously advocates the signing of a new Union treaty by all the Baltic republics.

In the event republic governments refuse to conclude a treaty, we entrust the signing of this historic document to the Baltic people's deputies, who stand on the position of a united Union and express our will and interests.

Rejecting groundless assertions accusing the USSR Armed Forces of striving to achieve a military dictatorship, we express our support for measures taken by the USSR president to strengthen executive power and to restore law and order in the country.

The First Extraordinary Congress of Representatives of the Army Community of the Baltic Region appeals to you, esteemed people's deputies, and calls upon you:

- to undertake decisive measures to sever the activities of separatist and nationalist forces directed towards the disintegration of the USSR, and to not permit the further escalation of ethnic strife, or deterioration of the lives and security of Soviet people;
- to resolutely condemn any defamation of or discrimination against the USSR Armed Forces.

We call upon you to keep in mind the fate of millions of Soviet citizens of the Baltics who might tomorrow be added to the ranks of refugees.

Do not believe the hypocritical statements of newly arisen leaders that they express the will and views of the majority of the people. The truth can be shown only through a referendum, the conduct of which we fervently support.

Our common mission is not to allow further bloodshed, a task that requires immediate decisions—for tomorrow will be too late!

The First Extraordinary Congress of Representatives of the Army Community of the Baltic Region asks you to take into account the fact that, in the event decisive, concrete actions are not taken to provide order and political stability in the country as a whole, you compel us in the Baltic region to undertake all measures, up to extraordinary measures, to defend our rights and human dignity.

Adopted at the First Extraordinary Congress of Representatives of the Army Community of the Baltic Region.



### **Baltic Army Association Congress Focuses on Political Role**

91UN0817B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
24 Dec 90 p 1

[Article by V. Varlamov: "A Decisive Statement of the Military"]

[Text] The final accord of the First Extraordinary Congress of Representatives of the Army Community of the Baltic resounded, unfortunately, on a sad note. Several hours after the Congress closed, there rang out another in the series of explosions that have rocked Riga in recent weeks. This time an explosive device was detonated at the Higher Military-Political Institute imeni Marshal Biryuzov.

Major General A. Sidorenko, the director of this institute, was one of the 20 individuals who delivered a presentation to the Congress. And it is a curious thing that one of the points of his speech elicited an entirely disapproving reaction from the audience. This occurred when the director of the educational institution proposed that the Army Community Coordination Center established by the Congress of the Union of Baltic Servicemen operate just about "under the roof" of the Military Council and Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District. Naturally this proposal did not go forward. The response resounded from the hall: "If we need assistance from the generals, we will ask them for it and they will not refuse." (Members of the Center—the highest leading organ of the Servicemen's Union during the period between congresses—comprise more than 30 individuals, none of whom are generals.)

The Servicemen's Union and its Coordination Center formed by the Congress are disposed towards specific, constructive work. What work? This, too, was discussed at the representative forum of servicemen.

Major V. Lukin delivered a detailed report on the complex sociopolitical situation that has taken shape in the Soviet Baltic republics. In particular, he stressed that one obstacle remained in the path of an actual change of regime in the territory of the Baltic republics—the Army. It is precisely for this reason that in final months of last year, taking into account nuances in the external and internal life of the country, the Armed Forces have taken center stage in the political game of the newly emerged politicians in the Baltic republics.

We must present things in their proper perspective—there is the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a state, for which the Armed Forces exist to protect its territorial integrity. We demand that the USSR Government and those of the Union republics proceed from this. All matters involving the state structuring of the country must be resolved according to procedure as established by its laws. Only then will the Army and law enforcement organs be able to fulfill their duty obligations in accordance with the law. The Armed Forces do not interfere in the internal affairs of another state, but participate in the

political life of their own country as citizens enjoying full rights. And the actions of legislators contrary not only to the USSR Constitution, but to normal, sound, human logic as well, have compelled them to actively engage in this.

An analysis of events in the region shows that we are heading straight for armed conflict. Explosions are ringing out in various regions of the country that, for the time being, are affecting people only in a moral sense. A hatred has arisen in a portion of the population of everything Soviet and communist. This has become the norm on the governmental level. It is our duty to prevent the further development of events in this direction, to demand in the interests of the entire population that the country's leadership, the president, establish law in the territory of the state. The Armed Forces are ready to act as guarantor of the tranquility and security of the entire population regardless of nationality, social origins, or religious beliefs.

The question of separation of the Baltic republics from the Union must be resolved by the people residing in the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, and not by their Supreme Soviets.

The address of Senior Warrant Officer P. Ubelitis, which devoted central attention to the present situation in Latvia and characterized it as explosive, was received with great attention. The anti-Army hysteria we see today sets as its aim, in the final analysis, placement of the Army and the people in confrontation with one another. It is according to precisely this design that most of the Latvian mass media are presently operating. Journalists representing the media present their views as the absolute truth, the verdict of final instance. Any competing pronouncement is immediately met with obstruction. But the ordinary person is not always capable of delving into swift-moving events and may, under the influence of emotions, give in to those appeals, which turn out to be false in the final analysis, not bringing the people anything but disaster.

Major General A. Vodopyanov, first deputy director of the Political Directorate of the Baltic Military District, noted especially in his address the fact that the Congress of the Army Community was not an ordinary, regular assembly of military servicemen, but a special form of political protest. The initiative for its convocation issued not from the district leadership, but from below—from officers and warrant officers, cadets and enlisted men. Things are so painful, so agitating, that we cannot be silent any longer. We must act. And not only to protect ourselves, but also to prevent the collapse of the state—the USSR.

One speaker after another took the podium. Captain A. Ganzhenko, Colonel V. Kostin, Lieutenant A. Talanov, Major General V. Filatov, Captain V. Degtyarev, and other officers were unanimous in one point—that today it has become evident that we are too close to the border

beyond which the concept of "life" is to be understood in its absolute literal meaning. To further be silent—would be criminal.

Militia Colonel **N. Goncharenko** and OMON [Special Missions Militia Detachment] Militia Captain **Yu. Chigvintsev** addressed the congress concerning the complex state of affairs Latvian Militia personnel find themselves in as a result of the splitting of MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] organs.

Also among those speaking before the Congress of the Army Community were **I. Lopatin**, chairman of the Coordination Council of USSR Intermovement; retired Major General **I. Osadovskiy**; **A. Kasmytnina**, former Hitler death camp prisoner; **S. Marinkevich**, Armed Forces veteran; and others. All these individuals expressed their solidarity with and support for the actions being taken by the Army community.

Congress participants adopted a resolution that, in particular, echoes the military's demand to the Supreme Soviets of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia: to suspend all adopted anti-Army legislative enactments; to conscientiously fulfill all provisions and decisions previously adopted jointly with organs of the Army community; to put an immediate stop to the campaign underway in the mass media of blackmail, defamation, and abuse directed towards the Army and Navy, MVD, and KGB troops, veterans of the Great Patriotic War, and of the USSR Armed Forces; and to not discuss in the future acts and decisions that directly or indirectly affect the fate of servicemen, members of their families, workers and other employees, or veterans, without the participation of authorized representatives of the Army Community Coordination Center of the Union of Baltic Servicemen.

The Army Community also adopts Appeals to the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies (published in the 22 December issue of SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA), to military servicemen of the USSR, and to the inhabitants of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

#### **Savisaar Interview On Civil Rights, Reform, Prices**

91UN0841A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA  
in Russian 29 Dec 90 pp 1,3

[Interview with Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar: "Twelve Questions For The Prime Minister; Edgar Savisaar Answers Questions For SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA"]

[Text] [Question] 1. Judging by the letters received by the editors of SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA, our readers are most concerned about two problems: One is purely political—who can today give reliable guarantees to the Russian-speaking population that their civil rights will not be infringed upon in a sovereign Estonia, and that people will not be classed by national indicator? The other is essentially a socio-economic problem—how to

get along in view of the current growth of prices? What would you like to say about this?

[Savisaar] I would not consider the question of guarantees of civil rights to be a purely political problem. After all, five years ago any person in the Soviet Union, where the "most democratic Constitution in the world" was in effect, would, as a rule, find himself in jail for the very fact of formulating the problem of civil rights. Therefore, in my opinion it would be naive to seek these guarantees solely in the state order, the Constitution, the laws, or in the activity of some parties or movements.

The sources of guarantees of human rights lie deeper. They must be sought in the history, traditions, or culture of any people. Estonia has never waged any aggressive wars. Estonian society has never been divided into classes. We have never had our own kings, just as we have never had our own slaves. The blood which courses through the veins of today's Estonian is that of his ancestor—a peaceful laborer. I believe this is where we must seek the primary guarantees of the fact that a truly democratic civil society will be created in a free Estonia. Moreover, the experience of the Estonian Republic speaks of the fact that in the 20's and 30's Estonia was one of the most democratic countries in Europe in regard to the rights of national minorities. If we speak of the formal attributes of guarantees of human rights, I have no doubt that the republic's Supreme Soviet will ratify international pacts on human rights, while the government will see to it that authoritative international human rights organizations are represented in Estonia.

We must distinguish civil rights and human rights. These things are often confused. The principles of human rights have been formulated in UN documents. Civil rights regulate the interrelations between the citizen and the state, and vice versa. Any democratic state has responsibilities to its citizens. But often it happens that not all the residents of a given country are also citizens of this state. Then they are under the protection of that state whose citizenship they hold. For example, citizens of the Soviet Union in Sweden are under the protection and patronage of the Soviet consulate in that country. The same thing should happen when the Estonian Republic achieves independence. If part of the republic's residents do not want to assume Estonian citizenship or will be unable to do so for some reason, then Russia may assume the responsibility for them.

As for prices, with the current rise we will all have to live economically. Under conditions of a total deficit, any government has two choices: Either low prices and empty shelves, or high prices and gradually filled shelves. Our government has selected the second variant. Yes, it is unpopular, but then the government is not a theatrical troupe which works for the sake of applause.

[Question] 2. For two months already we have been living under the new food prices. Does the government

have some analysis? What has the increase in retail prices given us? What problems has it allowed us to solve?

[Savisaar] We tried to conduct a weekly analysis (after 15 October) on the results of the price increases. We cannot say that the price increase has been successful in all respects. Commerce has not been fully ready to reorganize its work. It still essentially does not know how to conduct trade. It only knows how to act under deficit conditions. I was in one store where, after they were once unable to sell beef quickly, they stopped ordering it altogether in order to rid themselves of unneeded bother.

However, we must note that food products which were in short supply began to appear on the shelves. This applies first of all to the rayon centers. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the situation will also soon improve in Tallinn. Goods have become more accessible to the consumer. This is evidenced by the surveys conducted in the republic.

Now let me say a few words about what this price increase has done. First of all, food products have begun to be used more rationally. Few people today throw bread away in the trash. Secondly, more goods have appeared on the shelves, and thirdly, the state monopoly on trade has been weakened. Before, when purchase prices were higher than retail prices, trade could be conducted only through state trade. Today, prerequisites have appeared for the emergence of a market in food products. However, we must explain that this system works only under conditions of control over the economic boundary. Today the economic boundary must also take effect in railroad transport. We recognize the fact that this is necessary for all of us.

In general, the question of retail prices still requires development. Evidently, the proportions of prices on beef and pork must be reviewed. The question of prices on dairy products also "hangs in mid-air", since the producers are demanding (evidently with some justification) higher purchase prices.

[Question] 3. The increase in prices, as some of our readers write, was implemented in a severe commissar's manner. Does the government intend to continue to act in bolshevist methods? What does the new year hold in store for us?

[Savisaar] I do not believe that the comparisons which you have made are valid. For decades the bolsheviks considered artificially reduced prices on food to be their greatest achievement. I would sooner say that our government acted in an anti-bolshevist manner. Moreover, those who believe that decisiveness is a sign of bolshevism are mistaken. In many states where there has never even been a hint of bolshevism, the governments act quite decisively when they need to. Our error was sooner that we implemented these reforms too democratically. Premature announcement of our plans caused a buying frenzy among the citizens and allowed the speculators to

warm their hands. Evidently, we should have implemented the price increase through a one-time action, overnight.

[Question] 4. At the official level there has long been talk of reform and price regulation. In other words, it was presumed that along with the increase in prices on certain goods and services (which were operating at a loss) there would also be a reduction on prices which were overly expensive. Will we live to see the day when we hear the words: "Prices have been reduced"?

[Savisaar] In general, I fully share the apprehension resounding in this question. Why did we have to raise prices? We have embarked upon bringing about order in our economy. It is impossible to create a normal economy with production based on frozen low prices and state subsidies. The producer must feel the pressure from the market. As a result of this the supply and demand must be balanced, and the prices must correspond to the actual cost of the goods. For example, I also do not consider artificially reduced rent to be justified. Only properly compiled tariffs on rent can put an end to the vegetation of municipal management.

Unfortunately, I cannot reassure you of the fact that this year prices will not increase. As of 1 January, wholesale prices in the USSR on raw goods and materials will increase several times over. This will inevitably also affect us, and as a result retail prices will also increase. For this reason, the government has developed an extensive program of compensation to the population in case of price increases. Naturally, Estonia, having few resources, cannot fully compensate all the price increases along the entire spectrum. However, compensation will be paid to those who are unable to provide themselves with additional earnings. You may acquaint yourselves with the principles of compensation in the newspapers.

Nevertheless, the day of "reduction of prices" is perhaps not so far off. For this we need the emergence of competition between producers, with those whose products are too high being edged out of the market. Today the consumer must pay all the producer's expenditures out of his own pocket, while the government cannot force anyone to manufacture cheaper goods. Until we are able to demonopolize the enterprises which operate for the domestic consumer market, they will also be monopolists in price formation. Nevertheless, I believe that if the processes of a transition to the market continue to proceed as they are proceeding now, we will live to see the day when prices will begin to decline. For example, I do not believe that the price of potatoes will for long continue to be as high as it is today.

[Question] 5. Any prediction is a thankless task. Nevertheless, we cannot operate without predictions. How do you see the development of Estonia's economy in six months, in a year, and in five years? What are the possible variants? How do you substantiate your prediction? And to what degree is the government able to influence the processes which are taking place?

[Savisaar] It is very good that I am asked to make predictions. As you recall, in the recent past we had only plans—five-year and annual. A plan was a figure, and a figure was law, which the enterprises and union republics were obligated to fulfill without question. No one cared whether the plan figure had any economic content.

Today we are developing predictions and scenarios of economic development. There are many of them, and they compete with each other. However, this competition is quite useful, since it forces us to think and to critically evaluate the present day and the tendencies to which we today give a negative evaluation.

The preparation of real prognoses is too serious a matter for such a short interview. I can only say that the government does have a specific program of action for the next six months. The situation is not yet entirely clear, and therefore we must be very careful and flexible so that we may react quickly to any changes in the major systems.

As for long-term predictions, in the last three years we have clearly understood what we want to achieve and what we must do for this. We have a general conception—the IME [Self-Managing Estonia] program. We also have a governmental program, which we have developed and presented to the Supreme Soviet in May, immediately after formulation of the new cabinet.

Another matter is how quickly we are approaching our goals. Much depends on how we will be able to integrate Estonia's economy into the world economy, and on the capacities of good neighborly economic cooperation with the union republics.

However, your question also contains the answer. Prediction really is a thankless task. We depend largely on the global processes taking place in the Soviet Union and can influence them to the extent that Estonia is independent, and to the extent that our independence is secured by our capacities.

[Question] 6. When, in your opinion, can the Law on Estonian Republic citizenship be adopted? And how do you see its initial positions? Are you in favor of the zero variant?

[Savisaar] The government's positions on the presented questions are synonymously reflected in the governmental program, according to which the goal of the government is to enhance the sense of confidence of representatives of the non-native population who intend to firmly tie their future with Estonia. The independence of the Estonian Republic may be restored only under conditions of confidential cooperation between peoples.

Our government is taking measures toward concluding agreements between the governments of the Estonian Republic and the USSR, as well the governments of the union republics. These measures, along with the established international standards, guarantee the protection of the interests and social rights of the non-native

population living in Estonia but not wanting to assume the citizenship of the Estonian Republic. By these same agreements, the government of the Estonian Republic agrees to assume certain responsibilities for compensation of material expenditures to those who wish to leave Estonia for another place of residence. Such a decision would serve as a basis for a guarantee and would establish the legal status of national minorities in the restored Estonian Republic in full accordance with the statutes which have attained the force of international law.

The government has still not engaged, either directly or indirectly, in the preparation of a draft law on citizenship. We must deal with more prosaic questions now. It seems to me that the political atmosphere is not yet ripe. There is clearly a great divergence of opinions on this question between the various political forces. However, I am convinced that in time these differences of opinion will be overcome.

[Question] 7. The draft of the "Law on the Register of Voters" contains a point according to which workers of enterprises controlled by the USSR Ministry of Defense, as well as members of their families, are not included in the register of voters... Thus, for example, if a woman works as a teacher or even as a cleaning woman at the kindergarten of the "Dvigatel" Plant, neither her husband—whoever he may be, nor her children have the right to be included in the register of voters. In connection with this it seems that any person, no matter how loyal he is to the Estonian Republic, and no matter how much he sympathizes with the aspirations of the Estonian people to be free (we are referring to loyal representatives of the non-native population), cannot evaluate such a law in any way other than being discriminatory. Does it not seem to you that with such drafts the proponents of independent Estonia are merely pushing away the most tolerant part of the republic's Russian population and angering even more the right-wing radicals—the proponents of a "unified and inviolable" USSR?

[Savisaar] The draft law on the compilation of the register of voters in the Estonian Republic is presently being prepared by the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet. Since the indicated draft law is not being presented to parliament by the government of the Estonian Republic in the order of a legislative initiative, my commentaries on this question would be premature. In this situation the authors of the draft law could give a specific answer. In the general plane, and proceeding from the principles of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet resolution adopted on 16 May 1990 and entitled "On the program of activity of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet in the transitional period to restoration of independence of the Estonian Republic and on the temporary order of administration", we may conclude that our goal is to build an open society and a legal state, where all human rights will be guaranteed, and where social protection will be ensured regardless of nationality and citizenship. And furthermore, I am not exaggerating



the importance of those four or five enterprises of the Ministry of Defense which are located here. The discussion here centers primarily around the military servicemen, who live according to other rules which differ from the civilian.

[Question] 8. As we know, there is an Estonian government in exile abroad. What should our attitude toward it be? If it is legitimate, then we should invite it to come to Estonia. However, if it is illegitimate, then how can we allow it to create a militarized formation in Estonia and to appoint its commanders?

[Savisaar] The government of the Estonian Republic abroad symbolically embodies the ideas of juridical succession of the Estonian Republic. It has clearly declared that it does not intend to exercise state power in Estonia. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Estonia and the restoration of legal state formations by democratic means, it is ready to hand over its powers to the new organs of authority. Such a situation occurred in Poland, where the government, which was located abroad, in recent days handed over its powers to the president of Poland who was elected by legal and democratic means. The emigre government of Estonia agrees to act in the same way. We view this government dispassionately, and watch its activities with interest. The members of this government visit Estonia as private individuals. The government of the Estonian Republic abroad does not have any militarized formations in Estonia.

[Question] 9. Are anti-monopoly laws being developed within the Estonian government? What, in your opinion, must their conception and mechanism of application be?

[Savisaar] We share the viewpoint that an inevitable prerequisite for the transition to a market economy is competition between producers or sellers. Under the auspices of the Ministry of Economics, an Estonian Republic draft law on competition has been developed. This draft law was discussed at the government meeting in December. I hope that in January we will be able to submit the draft of this law for review by the Supreme Soviet. An explanation of the content of this entire law would be too long. However, as the most significant moments, we should note those such as the prohibition of dishonest competition, the suppression of financial abuse of position by monopolist-enterprises, and the strengthening of state control. The violation of this law would entail civil, administrative and criminal responsibility. The attitude toward monopolies also depends on whether they will act on the foreign or domestic market. If Estonia wants to be strong on the foreign market, then our producers must unite. There is nothing terrible about the emergence of trusts or cartels whose activity would be directed at increasing our export volumes. There may be a definite monopolization for the concentration of funds. The domestic market is another matter. Here competition of producers is necessary, and therefore anti-monopoly steps are necessary. Otherwise we will never overcome the growth of prices.

[Question] 10. There has long been talk here about the transfer of union enterprises to republic management. Specifically, what sense do you place in this? Can you conceive of the transfer of union plants to the hands of the labor collectives in the form of stockholding societies, with the priority right to buy stock granted to those who work there?

[Savisaar] We believe that all enterprises and organizations which are currently under so-called union subordination are the property of the Estonian Republic. Today we have over 170 such "disputed" enterprises and organizations. These enterprises have never been the property of either the USSR or the union government, or of the union departments. Most such enterprises were "born", as we know, during the elimination of the system of sovnarkhozes in 1965. We may also speak about this in specific figures: While at the beginning of 1960 the enterprises under republic control accounted for 78-79 percent of Estonia's industrial production, in 1965 they accounted for only 14 percent. While at the beginning of 1960 the enterprises under union control yielded one to two percent of Estonia's industrial production, in 1965 they already yielded 29 percent. In retrospect we may ask what happened in 1965 as a result of the reorganization of the system of national economic management in the USSR? Today many speak about the fact that widespread discussion and approval of the labor collectives is needed to transfer the enterprises to republic subordination. However, in 1965 there was no discussion. By a simple directive from the center, the enterprises were transferred over to the subordination of the union departments.

As we know, on 7 February of this year a joint resolution was signed by the governments of the USSR, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, known as Resolution No 120. On the basis of this resolution, 40 enterprises and organizations of union subordination are to be handed over to Estonia. In the Summer, the USSR Council of Ministers unilaterally stopped the transfer of the enterprises to republic administration. Up until the present time, only 10 such enterprises and organizations have been handed over to republic management.

The transfer of these enterprises to republic management does not mean their directive subordination to republic departments. We foresee that these enterprises will act as independent legal persons in accordance with the legislation of the Estonian Republic. As for subsequent denationalization and privatization of these enterprises, we do not see any principle differences here as compared with the denationalization and privatization of other state enterprises. This relates also to the right to buy stock by the workers of these same enterprises.

[Question] 11. Finally, what is your view of the "Eastern policy", the strategy and tactics on this question. Do you not think that the self-estrangement of the deputies from Estonia from the work of the USSR Supreme Soviet and from the definition of the conception of a Union Agreement, at least at the level of consultation, was a mistake?

How, in your opinion, will the conflict between the republic and the center be resolved?

[Savisaar] The government's "Eastern policy" pursues two strategic goals. First of all, it is the realization of the course adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet toward restoration of independence of the Estonian Republic and the non-participation in the signing of the Union Agreement. Secondly, it is the goal-oriented policy of the government in implementing a course toward preserving, and in some cases even intensifying, the economic, political and cultural ties with the sovereign republics of the Soviet Union.

You evidently know that regular non-governmental consultations on a wide range of questions have been arranged at the initiative of the Estonian government. Many union republics participate in them, as well as representatives of the Mossovet [Moscow Soviet] and Lensovet [Leningrad Soviet]. At the last December meeting, a decision was adopted to create a working organ for these conferences in Tallinn—the governmental Consultative Committee Buro. I believe that these meetings themselves, as well as the organizational structures which we will create in the future, will lead us to the development of a Common Market. In other words, the government's "Eastern policy" is active and directed at establishing friendly, mutually beneficial and stable relations with our neighboring states. Therefore, to speak of breaking economic and cultural ties with the East as a consequence of the restoration of an independent Estonian Republic is tantamount to an absolute misunderstanding of the processes which are going on around us.

Undoubtedly, the conflict between the republics and the center will sooner or later be resolved in favor of the republics. It is impossible to preserve the Union as a unitarian state. The idea of sovereignty and independence is not an Estonian invention. It is today the will and the real policy of the majority of peoples living on the territory of the USSR or in the Baltic republics.

[Question] 12. Today there are many grim scenarios presented for the development of the USSR and Estonia. People are frightened by the indeterminacy of the transitional period, the general instability, and the decline in the living standard. Can you say anything optimistic about this? Do you personally see a light at the end of the tunnel? And how far away is it?

[Savisaar] I am not a prophet to name specific dates. One thing is clear: Any transitional period always represents a certain instability, be it the transition of the Soviet Union to a market economy or the transition of Estonia to independent statehood. The main thing in such situations is that each one must make his civil choice.

Our matters are not going that badly. Neither the economic crisis nor the political crisis have affected us as greatly as in other regions. And we are doing everything in our power to see that the chaos in the USSR is reflected on us as little as possible. Therefore, it is not

quite accurate to compare our situation with a tunnel. In a tunnel one may move only forward or backward. However, we have not yet exhausted all the possibilities for wider maneuvering. It is not only forward or backward. We will make it to the Spring, and then, I hope, things will get easier. For me, it is an optimistic fact that in time more and more non-Estonians are beginning to see themselves as real participants in building a new, independent, free and democratic Estonia.

In conclusion allow me to wish your readers the very best in the coming year. May tranquility, prosperity and love reign in your families and with you all.

### Party Secretary Annus on Prices, Riga Meet

91UN0847A Tallinn VECHERNIY TALLINN  
in Russian 12 Jan 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Lembit Annus by Lyubov Torshina; place and date not given; interview followed by Torshina commentary: "If You're Sitting on Two Chairs, You Might Find Yourself on the Floor—A Caution From Lembit Annus, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Estonian Communist Party"]

[Text] [Torshina] Lembit, it has been almost a month, following the 21st Congress, since we have seen one another. What have you been doing over this time?

[Annus] I have been engaged in organizational work. Insofar as according to the Statutes, a Communist cannot be in more than two elective positions—and I, as you know, am a member of the CPSU Central Committee and secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee—I drew up an application requesting discharge from my responsibilities as first secretary and member of the Bureau of the Kalininskiy Raykom. At the plenum on 3 January, Igor Borodin was elected my successor, and so the reins of leadership are in reliable hands.

The post-congress period coincided with days the parliament was not in session, and I was able to meet more often with Communists of the republic. I was in Narva, at the Krengolm and Baltiyets Plants. All of our structures have begun practical operation—the Leninskiy and Oktyabrskiy party raykoms are being reconstituted in Tallinn.

[Torshina] A few days ago we saw the statement of E.-A. Sillari in the press concerning increased prices. Have you gotten involved in this subject that troubles everyone?

[Annus] No. We are two entirely different parties. Each conducts its own policy and looks to its own people for support. We issued a statement on prices back during the first increase—both the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee and our deputies in the republic Supreme Soviet. But today statements alone will achieve nothing. We must engage in active efforts—which is what we intend to do in the near future.

[Torshina] I saw you recently on the "Vremya" program, at a conference in Riga of Central Committee secretaries of the Baltic Communist Parties. Your joint declaration has already been published. What remains to be done by cadre?

[Annus] Unfortunately, I did not see this broadcast myself. I was traveling by train to Moscow at the time—while in Riga there was the regularly scheduled conference of secretaries of the council, which was established a year ago. In addition to drawing up a general position on the political situation in our republics and the violations of human rights, there was a thorough search for methods to implement resolutions of the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies on concluding a Union treaty and conducting a referendum. Contacts have now shifted to another plane—a number of working groups are presently in operation. But, you are correct, something always remains for the cadre...

[Torshina] Tell me, in addition to the commonality of the situation in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, are there certain features peculiar to our republic?

[Annus] Basically, processes are moving along in the same fashion—but are being dragged out here and accelerated there. Increased prices began with us, for example, but have acquired a more dynamic nature in Latvia. Do you recall our events of 15 May? Everything has now been repeated precisely the same way in Lithuania—right out of the same scenario! And encroachments upon party assets? What took place originally in Lithuania has shifted over to Latvia, and is on the horizon for us...

[Torshina] Incidentally, no sooner was I trying to get an interview with you on the Riga conference than you departed for Moscow. We even heard rumors to the effect that you were invited, along with an economic official, to receive instructions on distributing assets...

[Annus] A very interesting metamorphosis is taking place—everyone has developed a penchant for others' property. What do we have to distribute? Look, here you and I are sitting in the party's Central Committee, and this is legally our building. All other matters must be addressed with the same degree of composure—printing facilities, for example. I think all the excessive noise is disturbing us greatly. Do you see—we were the very first ones in everything! We came up with new ideas, but we do not realize why. For example, not a single country of the 160 in the United Nations, as far as I know, has two ministers of foreign affairs. But we do. And, therefore, we have two international policies. But even a little child knows that if you're sitting on two chairs, you might find yourself on the floor. Attempts at robbing property comprise nothing short of Stalinism in its blackest elements.

[Torshina] So, are you supposing that we will serve as an example for the Baltics and distribute things without any help from OMON [Special Missions Militia Detachment] personnel or assault troops?

[Annus] Our divorce proceedings will take place peacefully under one condition—if each side manifests mutual understanding and claims a portion of the assets corresponding to its contribution. But if someone wants to get rich at the expense of the other, or take advantage of the situation to hold out over a longer period of time, then we cannot rule out the Lithuanian or Latvian variant.

[Torshina] One final question—what does the Central Committee intend to be doing in the near future?

[Annus] The first-priority mission of our party is to come out in defense of workers' interests. Recently at six in the morning one day I met with workers of the Tallinn Machine Building Plant at their demand—as a deputy of the Supreme Soviet. The catastrophic decline in standard of living is calling them to action. After all, who were the first to proclaim the famous slogan "Poor, but Free"? Those very deputies of our parliament. And as their first matter of business they opened up a special store for themselves in Vyshgorod—because they are not about to go hungry. And then they hastened to use 2.5 million rubles to set up economic borders instead of giving it to those in need. The people know all this. They see it. And therefore the republic is standing on the threshold of social upheaval. I am often forced to blush in front of workers, although our adherents are few in number in the parliament and it is difficult for us to move the mountain. But, as the people say, a single drop eats away at the stone.

[Torshina] Thank you for finding time for our discussion.

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The First Plenum of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee convened yesterday. Also present, in addition to Central Committee members, were party committee secretaries and leaders of major industrial enterprises of the republic and Leningrad Obkom functionary N. Korablev.

The plenum adopted a resolution on stabilization of the economic situation in Estonia, which envisages a number of specific measures. One of these is the exchange of production in excess of plan fulfillment for consumer goods, mixed fodder, and other production items from other regions of the country necessary for reliable functioning of the agriculture and industrial enterprises of the republic.

Party organizations are called upon to act as the initiators in collecting materials for rendering assistance to children's homes and homes for the aged and disabled, using dues from Communists and labor collectives, as well as party funds. It was proposed that the Central Committee Secretariat monitor the "Social Protection Fund" and the results of this effort be examined in the second quarter of this year.

The plenum organized four commissions, altering the style and operating methods of the Central Committee:

Ideological Commission (chairman—L. Annus); Commission on Socioeconomic Policy (chairman—A. Gusev); Commission on Organizational-Party Work (chairman—V. Malkovskiy); and Commission on Work With Communist Deputies of All Levels (chairman—P. Panfilov). Upon the recommendation of several Central Committee members, a commission was also formed on youth policy. It will be headed by I. Borodin.

A proposal to discuss the matter of protest action scheduled for 15 January not being on the agenda, the plenum was limited to information provided by P. Panfilov on preparation for it. The plenum declared its support for the demands of labor collectives of Tallinn and the republic for the resignation of the government and dissolution of the Estonian Supreme Soviet.

### Latvian CP Issues Program Statement

91UN0818A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
14 Dec 90 pp 1, 3

[Latvian CP Program Statement: "Protection for the Interests of Working People Is Our Party's Goal"]

[Text] As it defines the basis for its policy at the present stage the Latvian Communist Party sets itself the goal of **ensuring the victory of the socialist choice and overcoming the crisis in our society by building a rule-of-law, humane and democratic state.** Following a path of self-renewal, the Latvian Communist Party sees its task as becoming a party of civil harmony and ensuring constructive cooperation between various social and political forces which are interested in the democratic transformation of society.

The Latvian Communist Party is an **independent political organization**, the successor of the Latvian Social Democratic Workers' Party founded in 1904, with its own program and standardizing documents. It is a part of the CPSU and bases its activities on organizational and ideological unity with the CPSU.

**The Latvian Communist Party is the party of the socialist choice.** While acknowledging the contradictory nature and drama of its history, the Latvian Communist Party resolutely rejects all attempts to malign socialist values and to supplant the socialist goals of perestroika.

Our party favors the building of a society based on the principles of democracy, humanism and equal opportunities for the free development of each individual, a society which will develop through a diversity of forms of ownership and labor toward greater freedom for each person, i.e. toward socialism.

We urge the working people and all the honest people of Latvia regardless of their nationality or religious beliefs to block the revival of a capitalistically oriented totalitarian state in Latvia.

The Latvian Communist Party bases its activities on the creative application of the theory and methodology of

Marxism-Leninism, on the achievements of progressive social thinking and on critical interpretation of practical experience with the building of socialism in the USSR and other states around the world.

The Latvian Communist Party expresses and protects the vital interests above all of those people who are directly engaged in productive activity: workers, peasants and the scientific-technical and creative intelligentsia. It urges them to work together and close ranks around the party. The Latvian Communist Party regards it as its duty to defend the interests of poorly protected segments of the population: young people, military personnel and their families, the handicapped and retirees.

Active as it is within the territory of Latvia and comprising an inalienable part of Latvia's political system, the Latvian Communist Party works to protect the vital interests of the Latvian people and to develop their culture and ethnic distinctiveness, while at the same time protecting the rights and interests of all the people living in Latvia.

### The Latvian Communist Party in Society

While recognizing the fundamental role of the state in resolving all social matters, the Latvian Communist Party favors a **sovereign, internationally recognized Latvia which will form a part of the USSR on the basis of a new Union Treaty**, which should be in the best interests of the republics, the citizens living in them and the Union as a whole. Voluntary transfer to Union jurisdiction of banking regulation, planning and realization of mutually advantageous Union-wide programs, management of key transportation routes, communication, defense and the defense industry, protection of the state border and state security, the customs service and coordination of the republics' foreign policy activities while leaving their full authority in all other areas of political, economic, social and cultural building inviolable: this is our view of the development of the Latvian State, development of which will assure Latvia of a worthy place in the world community.

While recognizing the right of peoples to various forms of self-determination, the Latvian Communist Party feels that a **decision to withdraw from the USSR may be made solely on the basis of a general vote (referendum)**, with consideration given to the interests of all the citizens living in Latvia.

We favor the socialist path for national revival of the Latvian people and revival of the Latvian State and democratic relationships between individuals, society and the state based on internationally recognized standards and common human values. The Latvian Communist Party feels that **human rights and common human interests take priority over the interests of a class, nation or other social group.**

On the question of citizenship the party resolutely defends **full equality** in regard to civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights for all people living in Latvia.

The Latvian Communist Party strives for broad application of the forms of direct democracy: the most important issues in the life of the state and society (changes in the existing social system, establishment or dissolution of federative or confederative relations with other states, etc.) should be decided solely by means of a general vote (referendum).

In view of the emerging multiparty system in our republic the Latvian Communist Party cooperates with and creates political blocs with social and sociopolitical organizations whose goals and means are not contrary to Latvian Communist Party goals.

**Our party is a party of a vanguard type.** It conducts political work in labor collectives and at places of residence through its organizations. It employs parliamentary methods and strives to win a majority of seats on soviets of people's deputies. The Latvian Communist Party defends the interests of working people through its deputies on soviets and requires that deputies be responsible to their constituents for fulfillment of their election platforms.

We oppose any monopoly on power by a single party and **favor creation of a republic coalition government.** Exercising its right to legislative initiative, the Latvian Communist Party puts forward alternative versions of draft laws, other standardizing acts and state programs in the interests of the working people.

In this multiparty system our party opposes suppression of public and individual opinion by certain parties and social movements both within ethnic circles and in the republic at large.

**The Latvian Communist Party is open to dialogue and constructive cooperation with any social association or movement,** except for those which promote fascist, nationalist, chauvinist and anti-socialist ideas or violent methods.

The Latvian Communist Party regards youth organizations which support the socialist choice as its allies and bases its mutual relations with them on common ideology, mutual respect and comradeship while recognizing their organizational independence. Our party supports young people's efforts to revive the Komsomol. The party will strive to win government passage of a state youth program.

Mutual relations between the Latvian Communist Party and trade unions and other workers' organizations will be based on partnership; the Latvian Communist Party will strive to achieve unity with them in the struggle for justice and equal rights and socioeconomic protection for working people.

Recognizing freedom of conscience, the Latvian Communist Party is ready for dialogue with believers and church organizations, defends continued preservation of separation of the church from the state and schools from the church and citizens' constitutional right to profess any religion or none at all, and condemns any and all illegal actions in regard to the church and believers, as well as in regard to atheists.

Our party is concerned by the social problems of women, war veterans and labor veterans and the Armed Forces and intends to work together with women's and veterans' organizations to overcome those problems. We condemn the campaign which has been set in motion in our republic against the Armed Forces. The Latvian Communist Party will defend the civil and social rights, honor and dignity of military personnel in the Soviet Army and Navy.

#### **The Economy: In the Interests of Each and for the Benefit of All**

The central task of the Latvian Communist Party in the socioeconomic realm is to **raise the standard of living of all people living in the republic** and ensure social and legal protection for every person.

The Latvian Communist Party is in favor of **real Latvian economic independence** and qualitative renewal of economic relations with the USSR, the union republics and foreign states on a mutually advantageous basis. We favor democratization of economic relations, diversity of forms of ownership with priority given to collective forms, development of people's initiative and commercial activity, transition to a state-regulated market economy, and strict measures to combat the shadow economy.

The Latvian Communist Party is opposed to economically unjustified denationalization of industry and agriculture and substitution of the arbitrariness of republic and local authorities for the dictates of all-union agencies; it is opposed to decisions to eliminate or restructure enterprises which are dictated by transient political motives. All enterprises should be independent.

The Latvian Communist Party deems it essential to bring about immediate destatization of property and transfer it to labor collectives. Small enterprises operating without exploitation of hired labor (mainly in the trade and consumer service sectors) may be turned into the private commercial property of individual citizens or families.

The Latvian Communist Party favors **development and implementation of a state employment program** and introduction of payments to cover periods of temporary unemployment and vocational retraining.

The Latvian Communist Party is in favor of consistent implementation of the principle "from each according to his abilities, to each according to his labor" and is opposed to **exploitation of one human being by another,**



expropriation of the fruits of another's labor, restoration of enterprises and housing to their former owners and revival of the parasitic landlord segment of society.

The party is in favor of meeting the republic population's needs for food, consumer goods, a variety of paid services and housing, ensuring a guaranteed minimum standard of living, particularly for members of society who are unable to work and large families, improving the situation of the handicapped, veterans and the families of deceased military personnel, and complying with the principle of social justice.

During the period of transition to a market economy the party favors a guaranteed (through the issue of coupons or cards) food and manufactured goods supply of primary necessities at reasonable fixed prices, as well as the opening of special stores for poorly provided-for categories of working people for this purpose.

The Latvian Communist Party favors compensation to the public for losses incurred in connection with reassessment of retail prices for goods and services, as well as introduction of a flexible system for increasing income in proportion to price increases. The Latvian Communist Party condemns a policy of arbitrary price increases on goods and services, especially primary necessities, expansion of trade at commercial prices and reduction in the volume of housing construction.

The Latvian Communist Party is opposed to the newly emerging trend toward swelling of the administrative apparatus, establishment of privileges for it and a rising salary rate based on higher taxes on the people and elimination of social programs.

The Latvian Communist Party is in favor of wise and rational use of nature, protection for the Baltic Sea, river basins and lakes, and restoration of the environment, as well as dependable legal protection for public health.

In the field of agricultural policy the party feels that the land should belong to those who work it with their own labor. The Latvian Communist Party is opposed to the sale or transfer of land as private property. Nor can land be the object of a gift, mortgage, independent exchange or sublease. A decision as to the forms of land ownership should be made by means of a general vote (referendum).

The Latvian Communist Party defends the priority option of those who are presently working on the land to receive ownership rights to it and use it. All others wishing to do so should receive those rights on the usual terms.

The Latvian Communist Party is opposed to economically unjustified liquidation of kolkhozes, sovkhoses, agrofirms, agrocombines and cooperative farms and favors the extension of equal protection of the right to work the land to collective, tenant, peasant and private farms.

The Latvian Communist Party demands protection for the interests of agricultural workers through introduction of a price policy which will provide an incentive to produce, fair taxation and improvement in the mechanism for self-administration and cooperation.

The Latvian Communist Party feels that proper conditions should be created for peasants to freely (without financing) obtain building materials, the latest equipment, motor vehicles, spare parts, fuels, lubricants and fertilizers.

The Latvian Communist Party favors comprehensive provision of housing, schools and medical, cultural and consumer facilities to rural areas, as well as implementation of programs of land reclamation and improvement, road construction, telephone access and electrification on peasant farms and in rural settlements; these tasks should be performed using state funds.

The Latvian Communist Party favors equal and mutually advantageous cooperation between city and country and equivalent exchange between industry and agriculture.

The Latvian Communist Party deems it appropriate to establish a machine building complex in the republic which will serve agriculture and the agricultural processing industry.

The Latvian Communist Party supports the concept of social, economic and cultural development of the eastern region of Latvia (Latgale), with consideration given to the unique features of that region and the needs of the multiethnic population which lives there.

Communists urge other social and political movements to assist actively with the social restructuring of rural areas, support for and development of the uniqueness of the rural way of life, and the spiritual and moral development and fulfillment of the cultural needs of rural residents.

The Latvian Communist Party deems it essential to submit a government program for the republic's transition to a market economy for public discussion.

#### What We Favor in Interethnic Relations

The Latvian Communist Party regards improvement of relations between nationalities in the republic as the main condition and prerequisite for renewal and progress in society. **The sovereign Soviet State should serve as the guarantor of free and equal development of the Latvian people and all the ethnic communities of Latvia.** It is impossible to found the well-being of one nation on the denigration of another.

The Latvian Communist Party favors preservation, development and enrichment of the Latvian people's ethnic culture, a conserving attitude toward its traditions and cultural heritage, and creation of proper conditions

and guarantees for a full-fledged cultural life for members of all the nationalities and ethnic groups which populate Latvia.

The Latvian Communist Party feels that organs of state authority and administration must constantly take ethnic distinctiveness and the needs of the people living in our republic into consideration. Every legislative and legal act in Latvia should correspond to international human rights standards.

While condemning the Stalinist concept of "blending" of nations, the Latvian Communist Party by the same token rejects theories, views and actions which make an absolute of nationality and lead to national egocentrism and chauvinism. It favors internationalism, which expresses a free, equal and mutually respectful attitude of people of all races, nations and ethnic groups, and urges every citizen to oppose nationalism or chauvinism, above all in one's own nation.

While acknowledging the historical justice of reestablishing the status of Latvian as state language, the Latvian Communist Party rejects the idea of humiliating, discriminatory gradations of citizens according to their degree of knowledge of the state language. A state program to encourage fluency in Latvian must be carried out. The Latvian Communist Party deems it necessary to improve substantially the teaching of Latvian in schools and provide instruction in it at preschool facilities. The Latvian Communist Party favors recognition of Russian as the official language of the USSR.

The Latvian Communist Party favors a guaranteed right to education in preschool facilities and general educational schools in Latvian and Russian and to preservation of essential conditions for obtaining higher and second specialized education in the republic in Russian. The Latvian Communist Party favors establishment of schools with the languages of other nationalities living in Latvia as their languages of instruction.

The Latvian Communist Party is in favor of equal opportunity to participate in political life for all the people of Latvia regardless of their nationality. The Latvian Communist Party favors fair representation of various nationalities in the republic's organs of state authority and administration.

The Latvian Communist Party supports efforts by all the ethnic groups living in our republic to develop their cultural ties with their historical homeland, to find out about their history and to preserve and multiply their national cultural values.

#### **In Favor of Developing Latvia's Intellectual and Cultural Potential**

The Latvian Communist Party will aid in the free intellectual and spiritual development of each individual. The Latvian Communist Party favors development and passage of a state program for development of

public education and an immediate and substantial increase in payment for intellectual labor.

The Latvian Communist Party is opposed to the cultural and scientific isolation of our republic and the breaking of cultural and scientific ties between Latvia and the USSR and the union republics.

The Latvian Communist Party supports and encourages efforts by the public and the state aimed at creating moral and legal preconditions which will guarantee the free and natural development of all areas of science and higher education. The Latvian Communist Party favors autonomous operation of scientific institutions and VUZs and diversity in their organizational forms.

The Latvian Communist Party favors restoration and strengthening of the prestige of the humanities and their development under conditions of free scientific inquiry, as well as creative application of the materialist world view in the social sciences.

The Latvian Communist Party favors businesslike cooperation with those who put forward progressive initiatives and principles in the field of education. Yet at the same time it does not support the introduction of paid higher education and the transfer of academic institutions to private ownership.

Though regarding the so-called principle of depoliticization and deideologization of education and youth indoctrination as false and deceptive, the party will at the same time consistently support the natural desire of every young person to free choice of world view and spiritual guideposts. The Latvian Communist Party will work actively to protect students' interests.

The Latvian Communist Party feels that the principle of commercialization cannot be made a basis for development of culture and science. Culture and basic science cannot exist on a self-financing basis; they must have state support, including financial support.

The Latvian Communist Party deems it essential to ensure access to culture for all segments of the population and to protect and multiply the people's cultural heritage.

Laws should be passed to protect the honor and reputation of people who defend society against propaganda for immorality and the cult of violence.

In order to reinforce the people's moral and intellectual health the Latvian Communist Party favors development and implementation of programs to organize public recreation at the republic, city, rayon and labor collective level; these programs should provide for the development of diverse forms of amateur activity, physical culture, sports and tourism, devoting particular attention to healthful recreation for young people.

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The present Program Statement of the Latvian Communist Party reflects the essence and content of the work of a party which is in the opposition, and is intended to stabilize the political and economic situation in our republic.

### **Latvian Interfront Congress Seeks Unified Leftist Bloc**

*91UN0819A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
18 Dec 90 pp 1,2*

[Article by V. Dubrovskii: "For a Bloc of Leftist Forces: This Idea Became the Leitmotif of the Third Interfront (International Front of Latvian Working People) Congress, Which Was Held in Riga"]

[Text] It was already sounded in the introductory or opening speech made by A. Aleksejevs, chairman of the IF [Interfront] Republic-Level Council Presidium, and in the report by I. Lopatin, chairman of this sociopolitical organization's republic-level council. It ran like a red thread through all the work done by this congress.

Amid the complicated political circumstances which have evolved throughout the country as a whole and in this republic in particular, the Interfront delegates elected by the IF rayon and primary organizations gathered together for their third forum. These circumstances were also concisely expressed in the preamble to the Interfront Declaration, as adopted by the congress. There, in particular, it is noted that, behind the mask of perestroika and the rebirth of the people's self-awareness, as well as basing their efforts on the betrayal of the ideals of socialism by the former leadership of the Latvian Communist Party and this republic, the separatist-nationalist forces are continuing the process of staging a counterrevolutionary coup. Created as the result of an antidemocratic election, this republic's Supreme Council rubber-stamps laws which restore the bourgeois system and its procedures in the political, economic, social, and other spheres.

A widescale offensive has been unleashed against the socialist option. A campaign of slander is continuing, aimed at the Latvian Communist Party, the Marxist-Leninist heritage, V.I. Lenin, the Armed Forces of the USSR, as well as veterans of the party and the Revolution. The rights of participants in the Great Patriotic War and those of labor veterans are being infringed upon and flouted; differences of opinion with the prevailing views are being suppressed. The Constitutions of the USSR and the Latvian SSR have been declared inoperative or invalid. Commonly accepted international norms are being violated.

The extremists who have broken through to positions of power are forcibly turning up the pressure and tension in this republic. As a result of their poorly thought-out actions, the economic crisis has become sharply worse, prices have risen, and the threat of unemployment has become more and more obvious or evident. The extreme rightist elements are pushing our republic toward civil

war, and this is attested to by the appeal or call for action by the NFL [Latvian People's Front] Duma, as linked to a certain "X" hour.

Under these conditions, as stated in the above-mentioned declaration, Interfront, by way of expressing the interests of a significant portion of this republic's population, regardless of national origin or social status, proclaims its own chief task at the present-day stage to be ensuring the victory of the socialist option and, based on this, building in Soviet Latvia a state based on the rule of law, a state that will be humane and democratic.

It was specifically to clarifying its own platform for carrying out this task that the Third Interfront Congress was devoted. In contrast to the two previous congresses, it was conducted at a carefully regulated, businesslike pace. Just one day was sufficient for the delegates to discuss all the problems. Of course, in no small degree, this was helped by the work which had been done by the members of the republic-level and several rayon-level soviets during the period of preparing for this congress. But it seems to me that the main thing consisted precisely in the fact that the headlong, precipitous development of events in our republic had simply no longer left any time for empty, vacuous conversations or discussions.

I. Lopatin's report (which will be published in full in the YEDINSTVO information bulletin) provided an analysis of the situation which has evolved, as well as the practical deeds of Interfront for the accounting period involved. It also cited the weak spots in the work and proposed specific ways to eliminate them.

During the period which has elapsed since the Second Congress a great deal has changed in the activity of the IF. This was confirmed by the speeches of the congress's delegates and guests. First of all, and this, as they say, was visible even to the untrained eye, this time a feeling of unity was to be seen. Moreover, this was not merely within the framework of our own organization (which was natural), but also on a scale of consolidating the republic's leftist forces throughout the entire country.

It is possible that far from everybody will agree with the idea which resounded in I. Lopatin's report to the effect that—at the moment it came into being and subsequently—the Interfront went "one-on-one" against the mounting force of the separatist and nationalist types of organizations. But it is difficult not to agree with the words that if the party leadership of that time had not left the communists and all working people of this republic to the mercy of fate but could have rallied all the patriotic and internationalist forces, many negative phenomena would scarcely have been possible—phenomena which blossomed out under the aegis of the People's Front which seized power in our republic.

Indeed, many people will recall the conditions under which the Interfront was founded. The future IF had hardly managed to form itself organizationally, when it was immediately confronted with a massive attack of lies



and with furious sallies by the mass media, which had already almost all come under the control of the NFL. How much mud was then poured upon the followers of the IF! But threats, blackmail, and sometimes even direct, out-and-out persecution and discrimination could not break persons who had decided to band together in a spontaneous protest against nationalism, which was raising its ugly head.

To be sure, not everyone withstood the pressure. Some persons quit the IF because of certain personal circumstances, while others were "broken" ideologically, and still others simply lacked sufficient strength and courage to continue the struggle which had been begun. And the IF went through a period of factional strife—a natural process for any newly emerging sociopolitical organization. To be sure, here it was complicated primarily by the circumstance that the Interfront was de facto denied access to the press, radio, and television. To defend their own viewpoints, the members of Interfront could only use rare opportunities to place items in certain newspapers, and then in the pages of their own bulletin entitled YEDINSTVO. The latter was formerly published and still is being published in Daugavpils. And despite this, its members continued to struggle for equal rights for all persons, as well as against discrimination for reasons of nationality or language.

On more than one occasion they proposed dialogue and cooperation with the NFL leaders. But it was all to no avail. Remember how many hopes began to manifest themselves among the inhabitants of this republic after direct meetings between representatives of these two movements on Latvian television. It seemed that, with just a bit more effort, the ice of mistrust would begin to melt. The image of the "enemy," which had been zealously drawn in the person of the Interfront by the ardent pseudo-democrats and demagogues, who were trying to instigate inter-ethnic strife and thereby make careers for themselves, began to dissipate and dissolve. But this could not be allowed by those persons who had broken through to attain positions of power. And again they tightened the pressure—coil by coil—around the IF.

But simultaneously with the onslaught by the rightist forces, the leftists were proceeding to consolidate their own forces. The new leadership of the Latvian Communist Party adopted a course aimed at restoring the party's authority. The labor collectives which had banded together in the OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives] began to proclaim their own rights with more and more determination. The councils of Veterans of Labor and the USSR Armed Forces, as well as representatives of the Army Society of Veterans of the Afghanistan War, began to conduct joint actions with increasingly greater frequency. And a dialogue began between the Interfront and this republic's farm laborers.

That which we can achieve only by jointly opposing the raging violence of the rightists was likewise shown in the runoff elections to this republic's Supreme Soviet, when the Interfront support the candidates nominated by the

leftist forces. Furthermore, the latter also attested to the active and positive response to the founding of the All-Latvian Committee for Public Salvation. By the way, the growth of the IF's authority was likewise attested by the fact that the present congress was attended for the first time by 35 delegates from our republic's rural rayons. An extremely important detail is that they specifically brought along with them thousands and thousands of signatures from their fellow-countrymen in support of signing a new Union treaty (who, most likely, testifies once again to the unacceptability in rural areas of those methods by means of which the People's Front collected signatures against such a treaty).

Yet another aspect was touched upon at this congress. After a certain decline in its activity, the Interfront has begun to gather strength again. While justly and fairly criticizing themselves for their weak work in labor collectives and with young people, the speakers noted that—literally in the last few months—there has been a sharp turnabout in the awareness of many working people. Even those who all this time have tried to remain on the sidelines, hoping that none of this would affect them have finally woken up, having seen the present-day realities and sensed the direct threat to their own future and that of their children. Nowadays the Interfront encompasses a membership of 450,000 persons—a fact which was proclaimed at the congress. But, in my opinion, the number of its followers is considerably higher. This was affirmed once again in the speeches delivered at the congress by A.P. Rubiks, first secretary of the Latvian CP Central Committee; A. Litvinenko, chairman of the Latvian OSTK Ispolkom; as well as leaders of the Liberal-Democratic Party of the Soviet Union, the Russian People's Front, and representatives of the country's other parties and organizations.

It should be noted that during the elapsed period the Interfront has been able not only to break through the information or news blockade, but also to find its own followers virtually throughout the entire country. This is also attested by the following figures: The present congress accredited about 50 radio and television journalists, as well as staff members of the republic- and Union-level press and foreign mass media. In attendance as guests on that day at the Social and Political Center of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee were representatives of the Ukraine and Moldavia, Lithuania and Estonia, Belorussia and Kazakhstan, Moscow and Leningrad, Kursk and Voronezh, Stavropol and Irkutsk, as well as some of the country's other cities.

A bloc of leftist forces. Life itself has placed on the agenda the question of creating it on a nationwide basis. Recent times have witnessed the founding of the Coordinating Council of the USSR International Movements, and I. Lopatin has been elected its chairman. There is a centrist bloc of political parties and movements, which also advocates the unity of our state (by the way, V. Voronin, the chairman of this bloc's ispolkom, spoke at the IF Congress. As a member of his delegation, he is making a trip through several Union republics). In

mid-February of next year [1991] a meeting will be held in Moscow at the Kremlin's Palace of Congresses among representatives from all those parties and groups which are opposed to the disintegration and dissolution of the USSR. This meeting will be attended by representatives from all the republics, including the Latvian SSR.

Unity or solidarity is taking place under extremely difficult conditions. In several regions communists are being fired from their jobs and persecuted. The USSR Armed Forces are being subjected to constant attacks. Moral and sometimes even physical terror tactics are being used against those who think or speak differently (moreover, the "handwriting" of the extremists is so similar in the various republics that one cannot help feeling that there is only one scenario for all of them). The delegates and guests of the congress also spoke about this.

But the following idea also resounded with some persistence in the auditorium: The events of the last few weeks and even days testify to the utter failure of the policy espoused by the so-called democrats, separatists, and extremists of various stripes. The people are tired of lies, of the violence and force employed by the new bureaucracy, of the instability and uncertainty about the morrow. In our republic, moreover, it is becoming increasingly clear that the defeat of the still-ruling People's Front is inevitable. Therefore, the delegates emphasized, it is necessary even now to prepare to hold new elections to the soviets at all levels. Furthermore, we should act in these soviets only as a unified bloc of leftist forces. And, meanwhile, we must go into the labor collectives and expose the falsehoods and hypocrisy, the incompetence and time-serving of the "kings for a day." The complicated part of this, as was emphasized more than once at the congress, is that restoring what has been destroyed by the People's Front must be done by all of us acting together—Latvians, Russians, Poles, Jews, and all patriots of Soviet Latvia. But no matter how difficult it may be, we must extricate ourselves from this crisis.

This was a working congress with its humdrum circumstances (specifically humdrum even despite the fact that—a few days before it began—there was a thunderous exposition at night at the entrance to the Social and Political Center, an explosion which certainly could have been a warning to the IF Congress). The delegates consisted of the following nationality groups according to data of the Credentials Committee: 67 percent—Russian, 5.6 percent—Latvian, 15.7 percent—Ukrainians, etc. They discussed the accountability report, approved new versions of the Interfront Declaration and Charter, and adopted a series of resolutions.

Then, at a closed session of the congress they elected Interfront's leadership organs. The congress expressed gratitude to I. Lopatin for the work which he has done. By an open ballot the delegates elected Latvian SSR People's Deputy A. Aleksejevs as chairman of Interfront's Republic-Level Soviet.

In conclusion, let me mention one more small detail. In contrast to the preceding congress, this time accreditation was freely accorded to journalists, without any kinds of restrictions. But, strangely enough, not so many representatives of our "democratic" press desired to utilize or avail themselves of this opportunity. Although, on the other hand, everything was in accordance with the usual principle: They will scarcely write the truth, whereas lies will hardly be believed any more.

It merely remains for me to add that a live, broadcast of the congress was carried by Sodruzhestvo radio station of the OSTK. And during breaks in the congress the Interfront's own video-studio entitled "Alternativa" showed its own films.

For those readers who are interested in the specific speeches by the delegates, let me say that, as we were informed at the IF Press Club, they will all be published in the YEDINSTVO information bulletin.

The congress came to an end late in the evening with a performance of "The Internationale."

#### **Latvian CP's Rubiks Addresses Interfront Congress**

*91UN0819B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian  
18 Dec 90 pp 1,2*

["Speech by A.P. Rubiks, first secretary, Latvian Communist Party Central Committee at the Interfront Congress"]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! Internationalists!

I am glad that I am among you today and that I am able to greet your congress in the name of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. Your congress is a congress of internationalists, who—together with the communists—are struggling for a socialist path of development for Latvia—a Soviet Latvia!—and who are demanding that the government sign a new Union treaty granting equal rights to all citizens of this republic.

The documents which were adopted at the concluding session of the Latvian Communist Party's 25th Congress (they have been promulgated and published), as well as the circumstances and the tone of the discussion of affairs in our republic at your congress have relieved me of the need to set forth in detail the Communist Party's views regarding the situation which has evolved down to the present day in this republic or to speak once again about our mutual relations. I merely wish to emphasize that amid the extremely tense confrontation of political forces in this republic we are acting as reliable allies, and, in contrast to the recent past, we are not concealing this.

Why is this the case? **In the first place**, we are building our work on a methodological and theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism, as well as on the philosophical and economic views of mankind's other progressive thinkers. **In the second place**, we distinctly and clearly

recognize the extreme danger for all people of the destructive, and furthermore—irresponsible—forces, teetering on the brink of overt adventurism, which are pushing our republic into a catastrophe—toward a break from the Soviet Union and toward a restoration of a nationalistic, totalitarian regime.

I firmly believe that the communality of the goals which both our groups advocate, the international and humane nature of our organizations will consolidate our ranks to an even greater extent.

I also believe that more and more of our fellow-citizens, deceived by those persons who promise freedom and independence in words but who, in fact, persistently vote for laws which infringe and trample upon human rights, will seek protection and salvation in our ranks—the ranks of the internationalists. No, these are not simply emotions or good wishes. These are realities which are confirmed by the facts. The ranks of your organization are growing. It and its followers are banding together on a nationwide scale throughout the Soviet Union. Those persons who during the past year for various reasons quit the ranks of the Latvian Communist Party have now begun to return to it. This is a completely natural process. And it is conditioned not only by the fact that these party members have finally resolved their own doubts. The fact of the matter is that the following clearly distinct picture is taking shape and being outlined against a common background: The Communist Party has a firm point of view and position, as well as precise and clear principles; nowadays it does not dash from side to side. And its chief task is to take all measures to protect people's access to jobs. And, this, after all, is your task as well, Comrades.

By the letters which arrive at the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and the All-Latvian Committee for Public Salvation we see how public opinion among rural inhabitants is swinging around in favor of our Communist Party. This has been especially so after the anti-popular law on land was recently adopted by this republic's Supreme Soviet, and after the appearance of the initial applications by masters of various stripes or types who wish to get their former land back. Of course, everybody who is now working these hectares would be chased off such plots or portions of land.

Also seeking our protection are pensioners and young persons who are frightened and confused by the unceasing rise in prices on goods and products of prime or basic necessity.

Finally, moral and practical support is expected from us by those persons who, albeit intuitively sense the submerged rocks under the very contradictory current to the side of the so-called privatization. These are workers who ask: To whom shall we bend our backs and for the sake of what? These are peasants who ask: Will we not be forced to become hired farm laborers? And these are simply residents of houses which are still owned by the state who ask: How much will we have to pay for an

apartment or a room in a communally owned house? And can we be simply thrown out onto the street?

In a very short time we will be confronted with the following situation: After the adoption of the Law on Public and Political Organizations, neither the Latvian Communist Party nor Interfront will be able to register themselves. And, therefore, they will prove to be outside the law. It would be interesting to know how we will be put down and "neutralized." Will Stalin's methods be utilized or those of Hitler? There is only one way in which such threats can be answered: **"Spare yourselves the trouble, gentlemen! But we ourselves will take care of ourselves, our own rights, and the future of our children."**

To my way of thinking, a no less essential or important factor in uniting our forces will be the exacerbation of the struggle to prevent the revival of a pro-fascist regime in Latvia.

Herein lies the complexity and responsibility of our common efforts. Herein also lies their energy and effectiveness. For effectiveness has only one reliable foundation—the truth and only the truth.

Aside from our organizations, Latvia has no other political force capable not only of proclaiming the slogan of equal rights of peoples, for their security, for the free development of the indigenous nation and all nationalities, but also to ensure its implementation within the framework of a new Union treaty. This was recently demonstrated in all its force by the congresses of the Latvian Communist Party and the All-Latvian Committee for Public Salvation.

If the delegates to your congress share this point of view, then it remains for me merely to wish that all of us may spare neither strength nor time in seeking out new forms of cooperation for justifying the people's trust.

Here too I would like to dwell on certain questions which are, in my opinion, of great public significance. People are impatiently waiting for answers to them.

Possessing top priority among these questions is the following: "Will the Soviet Union exist or not in the future, and what will happen if our republic's Supreme Soviet refuses to sign a new Union treaty?"

The answer was given in the decisions of the 25th Latvian Communist Party Congress, the Congress of the All-Latvian Committee for Public Salvation, and the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee which was held a few days ago. They all declared themselves unambiguously in favor of our republic's participation in the preparation and signing of a new Union treaty. Perhaps someone will say: Rubiks is again citing or referring to official documents, resolutions, and directives.... But here is an absolute fact of life; it was not born in some forum or other, but in the very midst of the people themselves. By now more than 700,000 Latvian citizens have already unambiguously specified their own attitude

toward a Union treaty. They have signed a demand that a referendum be held and that a Union treaty be concluded. It is in vain that the "gentlemen" from the Citizens' Congress and the NFL [Latvian People's Front] are attempting to oppose this crushing figure with "fake" lists containing 820,000 signatures of citizens who allegedly oppose such a treaty. I say "fake" because, in contrast to our lists, those documents submitted by the Citizens' Congress and the NFL have many signatures of children, repeated signatures, signatures with home addresses of places of residence, and, finally, signatures which were literally forced by various methods of compulsion.

It is not necessary to enumerate all the examples of this. Included here is the zealotry of schoolteachers who, after collecting signatures from the children since morning, cancel their lessons and compel these pupils themselves to run about with lists to city apartments and rural farmsteads. Is this not teetering on the brink of a moral-political perversion of minors? And what term shall we use to designate the conduct of those medical personnel who make even gravely ill patients their hostages by setting the following condition for them: "Sign here and you will get your medicine." And the purely sports type of excitement exhibited by certain followers of the NFL already knows no bounds. "I signed three times," says one person. "At home, in a store, and at a polyclinic." "And I signed four times," parries another. "In addition to those you mentioned, I also signed at work." So what kind of reliability can there be in such polls as these?

Finally, the lists with the above indicated number of signatures do not exist at all in a physical sense. They cannot be shown for verification—in contrast to the lists with signatures which were gathered by the All-Latvian Committee for Public Salvation.

The task confronting all the leftist forces of our republic is to bring to the attention of world public opinion, that of the entire country, and particularly the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies, these instances of crude, gross falsification, trick shuffling, and political juggling with the fates of millions of people by the Latvian People's Front.

A new Union treaty will be signed, and the structural organization of a Union of Sovereign Soviet Republics will be put together. Nobody should have any doubts on that score. Because there is no alternative to this politically, economically, or socially. This has already been talked about on more than one occasion. And most people have understood it. I am confident that even the gentlemen from the NFL and the Citizens' Congress understand this well. But the separation of Latvia from the USSR is necessary to them for another reason—in order to create the conditions under which they can realize their ambitious political goals. Speaking more specifically—in order to revive throughout the territory of this republic a pro-fascist, totalitarian, nationalistic regime.

We reply to this unambiguously as follows: "We will not allow it!" I am confident that we—the communists and internationalists—are not frightened by the "Ayzsargs", the special volunteer, people's guards units, their methods of hand-to-hand combat and service dogs, nor by the hirelings with which the majority faction in Latvia's Supreme Soviet attempts to scare us by discussing a decree which would grant additional rights to the staff members of a "sovereign" police under a "sovereign" Latvia. I think that it is clear to everyone what kind of a democracy these gentlemen intend to introduce, on whom they intend to set their dogs, and whose interests they intend to protect. The Latvian and other peoples of our republic have already lived through all of this. They have already lived through it and survived more than once during the present century. They have experience in struggling against and winning out over such methods of treating the people. That is why we call out once again: "Stop and think it over, gentlemen! Do not stain yourselves with the blood of innocent victims. Then you will not be saved from responsibility by lists of 'people's benefactors' sent abroad, lists which supposedly threaten us with the mysterious 'X' Day. You will not be saved or rescued from abroad. This was clearly demonstrated by the removal of the pretenders, from the auditorium where the sessions of the Conference on European Security were held. This allows us to clearly understand the attitude of the Western political leaders."

In particular, a few days ago, during the unsuccessful visit to Canada by Messrs Godmanis and Jurkans in order to request 100,000-200,000 tons of fodder grain (for which they could not pay!) and, at the same time, to seek recognition for Latvia's independence, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs unambiguously declared as follows: "I think that Canada and Latvia understand that the situation must develop gradually, within the context of the reforms which are taking place in the Soviet Union. The Canadian side is soberly evaluating the course of events in the Soviet Union and is supporting President Gorbachev in all ways." It could not be said any clearer than that. And such fiascos on the part of the home-grown diplomats from Latvia do not happen free gratis in the literal meaning of that expression. Thousands of dollars worth of hard-currency funds derived from exports and deducted from the earnings of labor collectives are zealously spent on such fruitless trips. The workers ought to give some thought to the following question: Should hard currency deducted from the incomes of enterprises be spent on such voyages? All the more so in that these gentlemen also take abroad a heavy baggage of patent lies about events and the state of affairs in Latvia? What is it worth, for example, to have the following statement made by Mr. Jurkans to a Radio Canada correspondent—a statement broadcast on 6 December 1990: "In Latvia, you know, there are now such troops, special troops which are called 'Black Berets.' These 'Black Berets' defend the old

regime; they attempt to hamper the implementation of our government's decisions. We have had a great many bloody clashes in Latvia."

What is being said here?

It is obvious that lying nonsense was an inherent trait of this former worker at a first-aid station. And deceit also led him to the post of Latvia's minister of foreign affairs. And this is likewise the way that Mr. Jurkans evidently perceive his subsequent path.

If we are to speak on a larger scale, then deceiving the people and attempts to shape public opinion with the help of shameless lying comprise one of the keystones in the tactics of the Latvian People's Front. Let's recall how the gentlemen from the NFL during the elections for the office of people's deputy advocated and spoke out for perestroika and for M.S. Gorbachev's policy as a whole, how they promised the peoples of Latvia a speedy solution to all problems, how they branded with shame the Communists, party bureaucrats, and local soviets for the polluted water in the sea and rivers, for the lack of purification, i.e., sewage-treatment, facilities, for privileges and large administrative apparatuses. And they branded them for a great many other things. And the good-hearted people, the naive voters, believed them, and they voted for many such "promisers." And what turned out to be the truth upon verification? It turned out that these gentlemen were operating in accordance with the following principle: "Tell the people what they want to hear, and your success will be guaranteed." And when the harvest of voters' ballots was gathered—on time and without losses—when in most of the local soviets and the Supreme Soviet the radicals had obtained their necessary number of seats, then work began on implementing a policy which was openly anti-people. From this point on they began to suppress persons with a difference trend of thought and to promulgate slogans such as "The rights of the nation are higher than the rights of an individual person," and "Latvia for the Latvians."

While speaking out in words as protectors and defenders of the Latvian nation, these gentlemen, in point of fact, became a brake on the road of its development. Here is just one instance of this. Those persons who had broken through to the steering controls of state power in Latvia piled up their own political capital while noisily speaking out in favor of protecting the prosperity of the Latvian nation (within the Union, they, said, it would be threatened with extinction). Ipso facto, the assertion about extinction is without proof. Attempts to ascribe an anti-Soviet ring to it are ill-intentioned. The demographic problems of a low birth-rate and a slow natural growth of the population were observed in Latvia long before the Soviet regime came to power. At the same time, the population censuses show, for example, that in 1959 there were 1,298,000 Latvians living in Latvia; in 1979 there were 1,344,000; and in 1983 there were 1,388,000. That is to say, growth, albeit slow, was occurring. By the period of the mid-1980's there was a

marked recognition that the demographic indicators were improving in this republic, and hope began to appear for a strengthening of this trend. But what has been irrefutably proven by historical experience was confirmed once again: Amid circumstances of socioeconomic crises, instability in the economy, and a lack of confidence in the morrow, there is an inevitable worsening of the demographic indicators as well. Let's take a look at the "achievements" of the last two years: during the year 1989 the growth rate of Latvia's population declined by almost one-third in comparison with 1988, and during the first nine months of the current year [1990] the birthrate declined by three percent, while the mortality rate increased by eight percent. As a result, the natural increment during this period was reduced by more than half, i.e., it fell almost to zero. Therefore, let those persons who have consciously drawn Latvia into inter-ethnic tensions, as well as an economic and political impasse, reply to the following question: How will the despair engendered by their policies turn out for the future of the Latvian nation?

Here are some other examples. Latvia's Supreme Soviet recently adopted a decree which not only violates the rights and freedoms of a large number of citizens but also directly threatens the vital activity of the families of military service personnel, the personnel staff of the OMON [special purpose militia detachments], and their families. The President of the USSR has abrogated this unprecedented decision, but Latvia's Supreme Soviet has rejected the President's ukase. Combative speeches and articles have begun to appear in the press by the leaders of various organizations in the NFL. But right away, as if nothing had happened, a shameless, impudent, and loutish (it cannot be termed otherwise), as well as hypocritical appeal was published by the Latvian Committee of the Citizens' Congress, addressed to the soldiers. In an openly lying, sickly-sweet form it invites the military personnel to nothing less than a revolt. They are called upon to demonstrate against the existing state system, a structure which is in accordance with the constitutions of the USSR and the Latvian SSR. They are also incited to desertion. I have no doubt that we and you, along with the staff members of the political organs of the USSR Armed Forces, have sufficient intelligence and capabilities to completely expose the true goals of the authors of such calls.

Is it worthwhile to continue enumerating instances illustrating the duplicity of the NFL's policy? I think not. Otherwise, I would have to speak for much more than one hour. But perhaps it is worth mentioning that these gentlemen have completely forgotten what they voted for at the All-Latvian Peoples' Forum. At the very same forum where its Resolution No 1 included the following words: "The sovereignty of Soviet Latvia, like that of any other republic within the body of the USSR, requires not only its proclamation, but also the inclusion or incorporation in the USSR Constitution of the legal guarantees ensuring its actual existence." The people believed this. But now, when there is a genuine possibility for carrying



out this intention by concluding a new Union treaty, these gentlemen are rejecting their own words, words that were reinforced by singing the hymn "God Bless Latvia!" on that very same day.

Nowadays the NFL and its coalition have different words and melodies. They are contained in the declaration issued by the NFL Board to all advocates of Latvia's independence. The gist of this declaration is a de facto call for a physical confrontation on "X" Day with those who view matters differently, as well as a refusal to execute ukases issued by the President of the USSR with regard to political adventurers.

The aggregate of such factors permits me to draw several serious conclusions.

1. Calls of such a nature attest to a gradual loss by the NFL and its coalition of a dominant position in this republic's political life. These calls stem from powerlessness. They are dictated by an instinct of self-protection and self-preservation. It would not be at all surprising if some of the authors of such calls, fearing the wrath of the people whom they have deceived, abandon the shores of the Baltic Sea like certain of their predecessors from the Helsinki-86 Group.

2. We are fully justified in saying that what we are dealing with are not simply political **opponents** in the persons of the NFL and its coalition, but with clearly designated political **enemies** with all the consequences which flow from that.

3. The Latvian Communist Party must do away with the slogan: "All Power to the Soviets!" Because the present-day soviets, under the cover or masks of democratic laws and procedures, have turned out to be, by deceitful means, filled with those persons who have replaced the word "Comrade" with the word "Mister." Their power and their regime will bring nothing good to the people. Everybody knows that the local "parliaments" have become so fouled in political squabbles, in the struggle for portfolios, that they have completely forgotten about essential and daily matters, in particular, about building new housing or at least repairing the old housing! Power in the hands of such "soviets" spells ruination for the population. Nowadays our task is—by using our own representation within the soviets in the role of opposition—not to encourage the threat of dissolving the soviets, as has already been resoundingly advocated by the Citizens' Congress. But in the event that they are dissolved, we should not cease our work but instead prepare for election campaigns in those same electoral districts from which the deputies derive their powers of office. Thereby the soviets would be restored to their true role. And then would be the time to grant them power.

4. Under the conditions of the increasing activization of the nationalists and the pro-fascist circles in running down "those who think differently from them," such as the Russian-speaking groups, our moral position remains as a firm faith in the people and its wisdom. It

is precisely for this reason that we unconditionally call for a civil peace and a consensus. We reject confrontation as a path; it would lead to a political impasse and to bloodshed.

Rejecting the stance taken by the "politicians" from the NFL, we say the following: This republic's leftist forces are internationalists, concerned for Latvia's future—for people of all nationalities living in our republic.

5. As before, our common task remains as follows: to expose the nature of the activities being undertaken by the republic's Supreme Soviet and local soviets—activities which are anti-popular in form and content—as well as the undemocratic and unconstitutional nature of the decisions being adopted by Latvia's parliament and its government.

We have already spoken about the failure of the NFL deputies to soviets at all levels to carry out their own election programs. These deputies have stopped receiving or listening to their voters. A situation has been created whereby a person who needs a solution of his everyday, housing, and social problems has essentially nowhere to turn. Either he is not received at all, or he is refused a solution to his problems because of his nationality, official place of residence, etc.

I would like to remind you about another fact, one which should not be forgotten when Mr. Gorbunovs and the other advocates of a "sovereign" democracy refer to the majority of seats in the Supreme Soviet. A majority is a majority, but this one was obtained by an undemocratic and deceitful method. I have already spoken about the deceit, whereas the undemocratic quality consists of differing numbers of deputies from the NFL and the Latvian Communist Party in the electoral districts. That is in the first place. And in the second place, this majority of seats does not represent a majority of the voters. Only 35.3 percent of all the voters in this republic voted for the seats of the NFL deputies.

So don't be in such a hurry, gentlemen, to speak in the name of the people. If you want to know their opinion, agree to hold a referendum. The Latvian Communist Party, together with its allies and other likeminded persons, have been advocating this way to solve the problem of signing a Union treaty since the very first days when this problem arose.

In concluding this speech, I would like to address my fellow Latvians. During the many centuries of its history the Latvian people have experienced many sufferings. There were better times, and there were times—let the truth be said—which were worse. And so let's not allow a new disaster and new sufferings to occur.

We need to free ourselves from the fear of being tagged as "kangars" [migrants]. As a person who has lived through and survived all this, I can say that having all sorts of tags or labels pasted on you by the mass media does not really mean that you will be scorned by the

people. Such "tagging" is being done by the super-ideologists and other journalists of Latvia's radio and television who are shamelessly taking advantage of their own service positions. They wish to atone for their own guilt vis-a-vis the people. Because, after all, it was not so long ago that they were "singing for their bread," singing hymns of praise to Brezhnev, the system of stagnation, and all that went with it.... Now, moreover, they must serve those gentlemen who have seized power; and they must do this on radio, television, and in a number of newspapers. In this case, our wise forefathers left us a fine Latvian proverb, which I will translate freely as follows: A cat's curses do not reach the heavens.

Let's not deceive ourselves with promises of a rich life outside the Soviet Union. There is only one way to create such a life—and that is by conscientious labor, the labor of one and all, the labor of the worker, the politician, the physician, the judge, the journalist, and even his reader or listener.

Thank you, comrades, for your attention. Permit me to wish you success in achieving the humane goals specified by this congress and in defending common human values. I wish happiness, health, and persistence for each of you!

### 1990 Trends in Latvian Public Opinion

91UN0834A Riga ATMODA in Russian No 2,  
22 Jan 91 p 2

[Latvian Information Center and ATMODA opinion poll: "Public Opinion in Latvia in 1990"]

[Text] Today we present to you the results of a public opinion poll. The poll was conducted by the Latvian Information Center in conjunction with ATMODA. The tables reflect people's assessment of social and political organizations as surveyed at the end of February and June, in mid-September and at the end of November 1990 as reported to poll takers. A dash indicates a lack of information regarding the organizations in question in June or February, i.e. that those organizations were not evaluated at that time.

Assessment of Social and Political Organizations\*

Organiza- tion	Entire Population				Latvians				Russians				Other Nationalities			
	2/90	6/90	9/90	11/ 90	2/90	6/90	9/90	11/ 90	2/90	6/90	9/90	11/ 90	2/90	6/90	9/90	11/ 90
Environ- mental Pro- tection Club	+47.5	+53	+44	+50.5	+56.5	+68.5	+57.5	+67.5	+34.5	+35.5	+29	+28.5	+36.5	+40	+32.5	+43
National- Cultural Societies	+41.5	+49	+42	+48	+52.5	+68	+52.5	+62	+52.5	+26	+28	+26.5	+38	+38	+38.5	+46
Green Party	—	—	+33	+47	—	—	+53	+65	—	—	+15.5	+19.5	—	—	+13	+40.5
Women's League of Latvia	—	+40.5	+37.5	+41.5	—	+69	+61	+63.5	—	+10	+13	+14	—	+19	+17	+32.5
Peasants' Union	—	—	+16.5	+28.5	—	—	+29.5	+40.5	—	—	+6.5	+10.5	—	—	+4.5	+22
People's Front	+36.5	+31.5	+21.5	+26.5	+61.5	+64	+47	+59	+3	-9.5	-9.5	+16.5	+9.5	+9	+3.5	+4
Balto-Slavic Society	+16	+23	+18	+22	+14.5	+23	+14.5	+21	+16	+22.5	+28.5	+21	+17.5	+22	+20	+27.5
Agrarian Union	+29	+22	+6	+16	+38	+26.5	+6	+19.5	+19	+14.5	+5.5	+7.5	+20.5	+15	+0.5	+15.5
National Indepen- dence Movement of Latvia	+16.5	+22	+6	+10	+37	+52	+29	+47	-11.5	-13	-26	-35.5	-7	-7.5	-22	-20
Union of Latvian Workers	+25.5	+11.5	+7	+8	+23.5	+9.5	+4	+2.5	+28	+13.5	+11.5	+16	+21.5	+13	+4.5	+10
Union for the Progress of Latvian Youth	—	—	+4.5	+5.5	—	—	+9	+8.5	—	—	+3	-0.5	—	—	-3	0

## Assessment of Social and Political Organizations\* (Continued)

Organiza- tion	Entire Population				Latvians				Russians				Other Nationalities			
	2/90	6/90	9/90	11/ 90	2/90	6/90	9/90	11/ 90	2/90	6/90	9/90	11/ 90	2/90	6/90	9/90	11/ 90
Center for Democratic Initiative	—	+4	+4.5	+4.5	—	+4	+7	+2.5	—	+7	+6.5	+5.5	—	+2	+5.5	+8.5
Democratic Labor Party of Latvia	—	+1	-10.5	-3	—	+18	-2	-1	—	-19	-17	-8	—	-13	-20	-2.5
Party of Rebirth	-7.5	-6	-5.5	-6	-1	-0.5	-0.5	+2	-16	-13	-12.5	-15	-12	-11	-14	-16.5
Social Democratic Workers' Party of Latvia	+3	+2.5	-11	-8.5	+14.5	+13	-2.5	-3	-12.5	-11	-20.5	-15.5	-6.5	-5.5	-22	-16.5
Republic Party	-7.5	-7.5	-10	-9.5	-1	-2	-4.5	-3.5	-17.5	-14	-15	-17.5	-18	-12	-18	-19
Social Democratic Party of Latvia	—	+1.5	-11.5	-10	—	+11.5	-4.5	-2.5	—	-12	-18.5	-17	—	-5.5	-21	-16
Socialist Party (formerly CPSU on a Democratic Platform)	—	—	-22.5	-16.5	—	—	-31.5	-17	—	—	-13.5	-15.5	—	—	-15	-13.5
Latvian CP	-9.5	-45	-45	-53	-20	-79.5	-77	-85.5	+6.5	-1.5	-9	-14.5	-3.5	-26.5	-24	-31.5
Interfront	-56	-59.5	-54	-60	-88.5	-87	-87.5	-88.5	-12	-22.5	-18.5	-17	-34	-41.5	-28	-45.5

\* The popularity index ranges from +100—"like very much, support fully"—to -100—"do not like at all, am opposed to this organization."

## Trust Rating of Political and State Figures at the end of November 1990\*

## Persons whom all citizens of Latvia—

—trust most:	—trust least:
1. Raimonds Pauls (+50.5)	1. Igor Lopatin (-53)
2. Anatolijs Gorbunovs (+49.5)	2. Alfreds Rubiks (-49)
3. Janis Peters (+45.5)	3. Anatoliy Alekseyev (-48.5)
4. Ivars Godmanis (+43)	4. Viktors Alksnis (-43.5)
5. Mavriks Vulfsons (+35.5)	5. Arnolds Klaučens (-43.5)
6. Edvins Inkens (+35)	6. Tatyana Zhdanok (-40.5)
7. Romualds Razuks (+35)	7. Sergejs Dimanis (-18.5)
8. Alfreds Čepanis (+31.5)	8. Alberts Kauls (-16.5)
9. Viktors Skudra (+31)	9. Mikhail Gavrilov (-11.5)
10. Dainis Ivans (+3 [sic])	10. Aleksey Zotov (-3.5)

## Persons whom Latvians—

—trust most:	—trust least:
1. Janis Peters (+79.5)	1. Alfreds Rubiks (-88)
2. Raimonds Pauls (+79)	2. Igor Lopatin (-84)
3. Anatolijs Gorbunovs (+77.5)	3. Anatoliy Alekseyev (-81)
4. Mavriks Vulfsons (+74.5)	4. Viktors Alksnis (-77.5)

## Trust Rating of Political and State Figures at the end of November 1990\* (Continued)

5. Edvins Inkens (+71.5)	5. Arnolds Klaučens (-74)
6. Ivars Godmanis (+71.5)	6. Tatyana Zhdanok (-73.5)
7. Dainis Ivans (+67)	7. Sergejs Dimanis (-43)
8. Alfreds Čepanis (+62)	8. Alberts Kauls (-29.5)
9. Romualds Razuks (+62)	9. Mikhail Gavrilov (-21.5)
10. Viktors Skudra (+57)	10. Aleksey Zotov (-12.5)

## Persons whom Russians—

—trust most:	—trust least:
1. Raimonds Pauls (+16)	1. Dainis Ivans (-16.5)
2. Sergejs Dimanis (+14.5)	2. Eynars Repše (-15.5)
3. Anatolijs Gorbunovs (+9.5)	3. Ivars Kezbers (-14)
4. Aleksey Zotov (+9)	4. Eduards Berklaivs (-14)
5. Ivars Godmanis (+7.5)	5. Juris Bojars (-12.5)
6. Janis Peters (+5.5)	6. Anatoliy Alekseyev (-12)
7. Mikhail Gavrilov (+5.5)	7. Juris Dobelis (-12)
8. Tatyana Zhdanok (+2)	8. Igor Lopatin (-10.5)
9. Viktors Alksnis (+1)	9. Mavriks Vulfsons (-10.5)
10. Alberts Kauls (0)	10. Edvins Inkens (-10.5)



**Trust Rating of Political and State Figures at the end of November 1990\* (Continued)**

**Persons whom citizens of other nationalities—**

—trust most:	—trust least:
1. Anatolijs Gorbunovs (+26.5)	1. Igor Lopatin (-32)
2. Janis Peters (+22.5)	2. Alfreds Rubiks (-25)
3. Raimonds Pauls (+22)	3. Anatoliy Alekseyev (-24.5)
4. Ivars Godmanis (+18.5)	4. Arnolds Klauzens (-18.5)
5. Alfreds Chepanis (+10.5)	5. Viktors Alksnis (-16.5)
6. Viktors Ckudra (+10.0)	6. Tatyana Zhdanok (-12)
7. Romualds Razuks (+9.5)	7. Valdis Steins (-6)
8. Juris Bojars (+9)	8. Mikhail Gavrilov (-5.5)
9. Edvins Inkens (+8.5)	9. Juris Vidins (-5.5)
10. Dainis Ivans (+7)	10. Aivars Jirgens (-5)

\* Bounds of the evaluation index: from +100—"have absolute confidence in"—to -100—"do not trust at all."

**Popularity Scale of Political Organizations in 1990**

**Based on Assessments by All Citizens of Latvia:**

1. Environmental Protection Club
2. National-Cultural Societies
3. Women's League of Latvia
4. Green Party
5. People's Front
6. Balto-Slavic Society
7. Agrarian League

**Based on Latvians' Assessments:**

1. Women's League of Latvia
2. Environmental Protection Club
3. Green Party
4. National-Cultural Societies
5. People's Front
6. National Independence Movement of Latvia
7. Peasants' Union

**Based on Russians' Assessments:**

1. Environmental Protection Club
2. National-Cultural Societies
3. Green Party
4. Balto-Slavic Society
5. Women's League of Latvia
6. Workers' Union
7. Agrarian League

**The Calendar Year Has Come to an End**

The same cannot be said of the political cycle, as events reached a particularly high level of tension on the eve of the new year. Nevertheless, on the basis of four public opinion surveys it is possible to define the basic trends in people's attitude toward the various political and social organizations in Latvia. It was typical that assessments

remained surprisingly stable: once an assessment is established under the influence of some authoritative act or event it changes very slowly. Therefore we will discuss only the most characteristic aspects here.

As we can see, the top of the popularity scale was held by the Greens' organization. Was this always connected with energetic political activity or more likely with the humaneness and attractiveness of the ideas they proclaim? It appears that the latter factor is the decisive one. The top position among Latvians as well as a positive assessment from the non-Latvian population fell to the Women's League of Latvia. In this case the mechanism is a completely different one: it is based on humane and energetic political activity. Honor and glory!

I think there is no doubt that the Latvian People's Front is the most significant political organization in Latvia. That is precisely because that organization is striving to resolve the most complex and most unpleasant problems of our times; its assessment, as J. Vagris would say, is "ambiguous." However, the trends in that assessment are a pleasant surprise: in all the groups surveyed the Latvian People's Front's popularity increased in comparison to September.

That popularity increased especially markedly among Russians. Considering the fact that in the "trust rating" table D. Ivans was, in the opinion of Russians, least worthy of trust, one must assume that the change in the Latvian People's Front leadership which occurred in October, and along with it the radicalization in policy (anti-communism, as our ideological opponents furiously howl), won the sympathy of the Russian population. Even the Latvian People's Front's position on the issue of citizenship could not halt the upward trend in the popularity curve.

The people no longer have confidence in the "brilliant" politicians, but rather in those who are not active players in political games. We will leave analysis of the remaining data to the interpretation and improvisation of our readers.

**Lithuania's Procurator Warns Rayons on Republic Law Supremacy**

91UN0820A Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
23 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by A. Paulauskas, procurator general of the Republic of Lithuania: "Statement by the Republic of Lithuania's Procuracy General"]

[Text] Expressing the will of the people, the Republic of Lithuania's Supreme Council on 11 March 1990 restored the sovereignty of the Lithuanian state. Lithuania became an independent state again.

Faced with the constructive processes taking place in Lithuania, all of Lithuania's honest and honorable people are trying to implement perestroika, create an

integrated or unified Lithuanian state, and observe the laws of the Republic of Lithuania. On the road to independence, however, forces are being encountered which are consciously hindering and harming these progressive processes.

People are being incited not to obey or subordinate themselves to the Republic of Lithuania's provisional Fundamental Law [i.e., Constitution] or other laws of the Republic of Lithuania. And attempts are being made to set various nationalities living in Lithuania against each other. Such a situation has created a danger for democracy, and, therefore, we cannot tolerate or put up with these phenomena any further.

The councils of the Vilnius and Shalchininskiy rayons, as well as the councils of certain towns and villages in the Trakayskiy and Shvenchenskiy rayons, have ignored the provisional Fundamental Law of the Republic of Lithuania, which approved and ratified the territorial integrity of the Republic of Lithuania. They have violated the requirements of other laws, proclaimed autonomy, and committed unlawful acts.

Thus, for example, the Shalchininskiy Rayon Council adopted a whole series of unlawful or illegal decisions by means of which it suspended the powers on this rayon's territory of staff members working for the departments of state monitoring control, environmental protection, and regional protection of the Republic of Lithuania. It also unlawfully handed over or transferred to an organization under a political party of a neighboring country structural facilities belonging to the Lithuanian state.

The Shalchininskiy Rayon Council has not obeyed the demands made by the rayon's chief procurator, and it has refused to submit or hand over to him the decisions adopted by the council. It has also ignored the procurator's right to participate in the council's sessions, thereby grossly violating the Law on the Procuracy of the Republic of Lithuania.

Since the beginning of the current year [1990] the Procuracy of the Republic of Lithuania has communicated in writing several times with the Vilnius and Shalchininskiy rayon councils. It has sent these councils messages and protests demanding that the unlawful decisions be rescinded and that laws not be violated in the future. However, the councils of the above-mentioned rayons have ignored the lawful demands of the Republic of Lithuania's procurator general and the rayons' chief procurators.

Such a situation has evoked concern and alarm among all honest and honorable persons. It is not conducive to serious work, and it disrupts public life.

The Republic of Lithuania's Procuracy General hereby states and declares that the violations of the laws and the other unlawful phenomena must be halted without delay, i.e., immediately. The Vilnius and Shalchininskiy rayon councils must rescind or reverse those unlawful decisions which contradict or are in conflict with the

laws of the Republic of Lithuania; they must ensure or see to it that the self-governing councils at the lower levels of these rayons observe the requirements of these laws. If this is not done, then all measures established by the law will be adopted to make sure that those officials who have violated the law will be held responsible.

The Republic of Lithuania's Procuracy General hereby warns the Vilnius and Shalchininskiy rayon councils that, unless serious measures are taken to eliminate the violations of the laws and to remove the road barriers for the above-indicated phenomena, the republic's Procuracy General will bring this matter up before the Republic of Lithuania's Supreme Council. This will be done so that, in accordance with Paragraph 2, Article 28 of the Republic of Lithuania's Law on the Fundamentals of Local Self-Government, the councils of these rayons may be dissolved and a halt called to the activity of their administrative organs.

The Republic of Lithuania's Procuracy General hopes that common sense will prevail and that the Republic of Lithuania's laws will be impeccably or faultlessly carried out on the entire territory of Lithuania.

#### **Lithuanian Christian-Democratic Party's Goals Outlined**

91UN0820B Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian  
30 Nov 90 p 3

[Interview with Valentinas Ardzhyunas, vice-chairman of the board, Lithuanian Christian-Democratic Party, by R. Osharov, correspondent: "Christian Democrats Accord Priority to the Individual Personality"]

[Text] [Correspondent] Your party has its own history because, of course, it did exist even before October 1917. Isn't that right?

[Ardzhyunas] Yes, the Christian-Democratic Party was formed in 1905. During the period from 1920 through 1926 it had a majority in the government, and in 1931 it had 95,500 members. Thus, on 27-28 January 1990 at a restorative congress held in Kaunas, the activity of the LKhDP [Lithuanian Christian-Democratic Party] was renewed. At the precise time of its re-creation our party had 1500 members; at present it has approximately 4,000 members.

[Correspondent] What are the goals and tasks which your party has set for itself?

[Ardzhyunas] Our principal goal and top-priority task is to restore Lithuania's independence. In a broader sense, it is to restore a full-valued life on the spiritual, cultural, and material levels. We consider that during the Soviet period a great deal of what Lithuania had inherited from the many centuries of its own history and what it had created during the first decade of its own independence was destroyed. However, by restoration we do not mean a direct return to the past. What we must develop are our own best traditions.

Above all, the LKhDP recognizes the priority of the individual human personality, and it views the social system as a community of free individuals. Based on the Christian idea and democratic principles, we want to create, in conjunction with other democratic forces, such a community and state as could function successfully in the present-day world. These positions or points of view have been specified in our program declaration. There is no complete program as yet; we are still working on preparing it.

[Correspondent] Who may become members of your party: only Catholics or persons of other religious faiths?

[Ardzhyunas] Membership in the LKhDP may be granted to any citizen of the Republic of Lithuania who has Christian convictions and is democratically minded; there are no other restrictions. He may belong to any Christian denomination or even not be a believer, but rather simply acknowledge the principles of Christian morality. Our party is political and not clerical, although its operational methods do include support of ties with the Church. Unfortunately, we still do not have close contacts with the Orthodox Church.

[Correspondent] In our troubled times the problem of inter-ethnic relations has become particularly acute. Will the LKhDP introduce any of its own proposals to solve this problem?

[Ardzhyunas] As to persons of various nationalities or ethnic groups living in Lithuania, we consider them to have equal rights. Relations between persons should be constructed, above all, on mutual respect and mutual understanding. We recognize the right of Lithuania's citizens of all nationalities to develop their own culture and language and to actively participate in sociopolitical life. We must not forget, however, that Lithuania is the historical land of the Lithuanian people; it has no other one. And, therefore, we consider that it is specifically the Lithuanian people's psychology and way of perceiving the world which must determine the basic directions or trends of social development. By way of illustration, let me cite the following example: the Lithuanian people are not inclined to collectivism; therefore, in our opinion, the socialist and partly the social-democratic ideas do not correspond to the psychology of most of Lithuania's inhabitants. Hence, one of the most important points of our economic program is private property ownership as a necessary condition—a sine qua non—of material creativity. Economic well-being, i.e., prosperity, is not a goal but rather a condition of an individual person's spiritual growth.

[Correspondent] With what parties and public organizations does the LKhDP intend to cooperate?

[Ardzhyunas] Our party maintains contacts with the Independence, National, "Green", and Democratic parties; it exchanges information with the Social Democrats. We cooperate with the "Caritas" Society, the Union of Exiles and Political Prisoners, with youth organizations—the Ateyinkini and the Scouts.

[Correspondent] And what is your position with regard to the issue of cooperation between School and Church?

[Ardzhyunas] We think that religious instruction should be mandatory in the schools. Certain parents or older schoolchildren may not agree with this. But be that as it may, we do think that it is necessary to acquaint the children at least with the history of religion and the fundamentals of Christian morality.

[Correspondent] In speaking about parties, you did not say anything about the Lithuanian Communist Party.

[Ardzhyunas] Up to as recently as six months ago our attitude toward the Lithuanian Communist Party was rather mild and easygoing; we anticipated that its representatives would conduct a more sensible policy. But now, to our way of thinking, it is the center which is organizing the former nomenklatura and which has not been completely conscientious in utilizing the trust reposed in it. As to our attitude toward certain individual communists, many of them as persons, part from their party convictions, have even impressed us.

[Correspondent] How does the LKhDP regard the activities of the government and the parliament?

[Ardzhyunas] On the whole, we favorably regard the policy which the parliament is conducting. But the activity of the government does not suit us, although we do understand all the difficulties of its work under the conditions of "semi-statehood." We consider that the government is too slow in implementing the economic and social reforms, and that this, undoubtedly, corresponds to the interests of certain persons and even specific strata of the population who desire to take advantage of the material opportunities of this "time of troubles," so to speak.

[Correspondent] In Lithuania, prior to 1940, the Christian-Democratic Party had many press organs: newspapers and journals. What about nowadays?

[Ardzhyunas] Alas, we do not have such a diversity nowadays. We still publish only the one newspaper entitled APZHVALGA.

[Correspondent] Thank you for granting us this interview.

## RSFSR

### Bashkir Official Views Local Sovereignty

91UN0896A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA  
in Russian 13 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by M. Rakhimov, chairman of the Bashkir SSR Supreme Soviet: "What Has in Fact Been 'Swallowed'"]

[Text] So on 17 March, in the course of the all-Union referendum, we have all to answer a most urgent, most important question: The USSR: To be or not to be. I will venture to maintain that the working people of Soviet

Bashkortostan will have answered unequivocally: To be. Nonetheless, I would like to express my viewpoint of both the Union and the federal treaty.

During B.N. Yeltsin's visit to Bashkiria last August the working people frequently asked him: "What is your attitude toward our republic's acquisition of sovereignty?" Boris Nikolayevich invariably replied: "Take the sovereignty that you can swallow."

This answer on the part of the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet could not have failed to have impressed my fellow countrymen. After all, the people of the republic were essentially being granted complete independence, complete independence in determination of their national-state status. No leader of the country or Russia had hitherto proclaimed such extensive rights in the choice of its fate in respect of a subject of the federation. Although the word "swallow" did not seem entirely customary in the legal sense, it is true. But this did not discourage us. The coarsish light-heartedness in respect of sovereignty was perceived by the people as the democratism of the chairman of the Russian Parliament in contacts with the masses.

I should mention that B.N. Yeltsin's visit and his encouraging statements concerning sovereignty imparted greater assurance to the public movement in the autonomous republic for the acquisition of a new official status. And shortly after, a session of our Supreme Soviet proclaimed of the former autonomy the Soviet Socialist Republic of Bashkortostan.

Bashkiria has been living with its new status for several months now. What has changed in the life of the republic? It is still too early, of course, to speak of any changes. It is necessary first of all that our declaration acquire the force of law, that is, be approved and recognized by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet or Russian Congress of People's Deputies. But the RSFSR Supreme Soviet is as yet preserving silence on this matter. The special Congress of People's Deputies kept quiet also. Will Bashkiria's sovereignty remain for long in this state of suspended animation? It is hard to tell. But it is, after all, a question not only of Bashkortostan. As you know, of the 16 former autonomous republics that were a part of the RSFSR, 11 have at the present time already adopted declarations on state sovereignty. And they also, like Bashkiria, are awaiting the legal enshrinement of their new status.

But perhaps we former "autonomy-ites" are displaying a lack of patience or are exaggerating the significance of our sovereignties? No one is about to "suppress" us, perhaps. Or perhaps the protracted silence of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet signifies a misunderstanding of the importance of this process or even a rejection of it?

The questions might seem rhetorical. But for us they are the most vital of all. Sovereignty is not someone's whim, not a personal ambition, but the realization of the cherished aspirations of the people. And, come to that, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet itself set us the example,

having been the first to adopt a declaration on Russia's sovereignty. It was on its initiative that the so-called "parade of sovereignties" began its solemn procession. This phenomenon has its pluses and minuses. Mention has been made of it increasingly often of late in connection with the growth of centrifugal processes eroding our Union. But, on the other hand, this is a realization of the peoples' right to self-determination recognized both by the USSR Constitution and international conventions. Bashkiria does not intend here to pose the question of secession from the RSFSR, from the USSR even less. It has declared itself a subject of both the USSR and the RSFSR. Because the Bashkirian people are connected by centuries-long friendship and good-neighborliness with the Russian people. My people would gain nothing and would lose much on the path of self-isolation.

While remaining true to Soviet patriotism and internationalism, we believe that the Soviet community of nations and national groups will henceforward emerge under several different conditions. To be more specific, I would put it this way: The community will have more precisely drawn boundaries of national-territorial formations. There is, I believe, no escaping recognition of this fact. On the contrary, we need to immediately comprehend the new trends in the mutual relations of the peoples of Russia, not wind them into a bunch of problems which it would then be more difficult to disentangle.

Incidentally, we are not original in our complaints about the delay in recognition of our sovereignty. Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin also reproaches, and not without reason, the center and the country's president, M.S. Gorbachev, for the USSR Supreme Soviet not yet having ratified (or officially registered) Russia's sovereignty. And this affords us grounds, I believe, for asking of the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet himself: Can you not see, Boris Nikolayevich, that you are behaving in respect of Russia's former autonomous entities in just as centrist a fashion as the Union center in respect of Russia? If the Russian leader is reproaching the center for diktat, would it not be logical for him personally to set an example of true democracy and facilitate the Russian Parliament's accelerated recognition of the legitimacy of the rights of the 11 former Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics whose peoples have as of this time declared their aspiration to occupy a fitting place in the renewal of the Soviet federation?

I should mention that at our meeting on the eve of the special Congress of People's Deputies, Boris Nikolayevich announced that it was contemplated at the congress adopting a decision on the sovereignties of the former autonomous entities. But there was no decision.

There involuntarily arises the question: Does the lack of response to our sovereignties altogether not reflect the Russian leadership's position in respect of the autonomous republics? Reason for such conjecture is afforded, for example, by the statements of R.I. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, in his

article published in IZVESTIYA of 25 September last year. I spoke about this in my speech at the USSR Supreme Soviet session on 16 November. But in the context of today's discussion what was said needs to be repeated.

Thus esteemed Ruslan Imranovich maintains that the autonomous republics are not sovereign states at all. Given today's pluralism, one may, of course, express whatever opinion one pleases. But hearing such things from the mouth of the first deputy chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet is strange, to put it mildly. Such opinions are contrary to the current constitution of the RSFSR itself, not to mention the constitutions of the autonomous republics, and for this reason sound like formal mockery in respect of the republics that are a part of the Russian Federation.

I would merely like to know whether the first deputy's opinion reflects the viewpoint of the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet also. If not, the lack of accord between them is regrettable. For this is a vitally important matter for Russian federal statehood. If so, such inconsistency is once again incomprehensible: On the one hand, take sovereignty, as much as you can "swallow," on the other, the assertion that an ASSR is not a state. There is something here that does not tie in with B.N. Yeltsin's extensively proclaimed statements concerning sovereignty during his visit to Bashkiria.

But perhaps R.I. Khasbulatov is closer to the truth when he maintains that the autonomous republics are not states? After all, it is common knowledge that the ASSR have hitherto not had actual independence in the political and economic life within their borders, although they have had formal, official attributes. If so, it is all the more understandable why the autonomous republics are one after the other adopting declarations on their official status presupposing new relations with the state of the RSFSR. However the "parade of sovereignties" may be perceived, this is a natural phenomenon born of the development of democracy, the road to which was opened by perestroika. And inasmuch, as already said, as this "parade" was begun by the Russian Federation itself, let us, comrade Russian members of parliament, think and decide together how the new soviet socialist republics which have emerged "within" the RSFSR should organize their relations with the federation. After all, we have not yet thought about this aspect properly either "at the top" or "below," having been preoccupied with the commotion concerning the adoption of declarations. Let us cool down somewhat from the euphoria of independence and self-sufficiency and together seek a common language of the building of a renewed federation.

We will not manage here, as they say, without consensus. Bashkortostan, like our neighbor Tatarstan, will uphold in the federal treaty the right to act not as a subject but as an equal partner of Russia, having treaty relations with it. It might seem to some that Bashkiria is laying claim to more than has been "authorized." But we

believe not. Because back in 1919 Bashkiria was the first to conclude with the central Soviet authorities an "agreement," which essentially laid the foundations of treaty relations between the republics. "Autonomy" at that time signified something more than today and was the equivalent of today's Union republic status. And it was not the Bashkir people's fault that this parity status with Russia was downgraded at the time of formation of the USSR in 1922. Why, one wonders, not restore historical justice today? We believe that the republics that are a part of the RSFSR are just as sovereign state formations as the Russian Federation itself.

Who, then, under such conditions should be a subject of the USSR?

We welcome the concept of the new Union treaty in the sense that it does not differentiate between the former Union and autonomous republics and defines them all as subscribers to the treaty. In our opinion, such a position on the question of the subjects of the USSR is fully in keeping with the latest Union laws, specifically the USSR law of 26 April 1990 "Delineation of Authority Between the USSR and the Subjects of the Federation," which defines the autonomous republics as soviet socialist states and subjects of the USSR. I would like to say this as distinctly as possible inasmuch as the position of the leaders of the Russian Federation on this issue is not always consistent.

I have to touch on the draft RSFSR Constitution. It is our profound belief that its publication without preliminary discussion with the participation of all the Russian republics was premature. Although it was timed to coincide with the special Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, this is the wrong time to be in a great hurry. I do not believe that the authors of the draft issued it on the eve of the congress under the pressure of a "time limit" in order that it might be easier to "push" it through. After all, it was obvious that such a maneuver, had such been the calculation, would not have succeeded. For the people of Russia will not allow the basic law to be "carried" past them like a "pig in a poke."

As far as the content of the draft constitution is concerned, here in Bashkortostan, for example, even the most extreme "radicals" did not expect of the compilers of the constitution such "super-originality" which they demonstrated. Why, one wonders, "Russian Federation," not "RSFSR?" Does this mean that Russia is abandoning the socialist path of development? And the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA did right to publish an alternative draft prepared by the "Communists of Russia" group of deputies, although the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Constitutional Commission had for some reason or other offered for the public's attention only one version of the draft.

I recall a B.N. Yeltsin news conference broadcast on Central Television. I have to say that it left me with somewhat of a feeling of embarrassment at the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Boris Nikolayevich set



out with the utmost candor and simplicity before the television camera the kind of center he envisioned. "We need a center like this," he significantly explained, displaying the palms of his hands brought closely face to face with one another, as if he was holding between them a small ball. "But it is today like t-h- is," he spread his palms to his shoulders, which were spread wide. Just as luckless anglers tell their stories: t-h-i-s kind of fish got away, and this little one was caught. I hope the readers will forgive me such a comparison. I also am for a reduction in the swollen administrative system of the center, but not for a belittlement of its role. Without a cementing nucleus no federation can function fruitfully.

Listening to the news conference, I wondered whether it was not this desire to see the center the size of a "small ball" which was driving the war of laws which the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has declared on the USSR Supreme Soviet and Government. Let us take the RSFSR law on pensions which was enacted recently. Of course, if it is compared with the current Union law, it transpires that the Russian Parliament is displaying more concern for retirees. But where, thanks to whom and what, will these additional billions be found when everyone is no longer asking but demanding: "Give, give, give!" Teachers in Ufa are preparing to go on strike, demanding wage increases. Given today's inflation and shortages, the holes in the working people's budgets cannot be patched up with any money additional to the pensions or wages. "Popular" laws could only make the country's financial situation worse.

Here in the localities we simply cannot understand the exceptional airiness and recklessness with which the Russian Parliament is fighting against the laws of the USSR. And without a moment's thought and in passing the RSFSR Supreme Soviet is thereby putting in a difficult position the republics that are a part of the Russian Federation. Some people's deputies of Russia, the sponsors of the declaration of the war of laws, simply have no idea, in my opinion, of the problems which, on account of their pretentious decisions, are being caused Bashkiria, Tataria, Yakutia, and other republics. In demanding of us that we do not comply with legislative instruments and decisions of the government of the USSR they are displaying legal ignorance or extremism.

Despite all its resolve in the rejection of Union laws, the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, incidentally, has as yet done nothing for its own republics. Russian laws laying claim to supremacy are as different as chalk from cheese in this respect from Union laws, for the worse, that is.

I sometimes have the seditious thought: What if the 16 republics which are a part of the RSFSR were to unite and declare war on the laws of the RSFSR, as the Russian Parliament is doing against the Union laws? It would be interesting to know how the RSFSR Supreme Soviet would view this. Perhaps we should follow the example of Russia's members of parliament?

I would like to conclude by saying that the soviets of Bashkortostan fully support the efforts of the country's leadership pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a new Union treaty. Whatever criticisms have been expressed in respect of it, the draft treaty has, in our opinion, one undoubted merit: It clearly exhibits a desire to take account of the declarations on state sovereignty adopted in the republics. Whereas the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has yet to adopt a definite position on this matter.

### Perm Obkom Structure Reorganized

91UN0887A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*  
in Russian 12 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent G. Bazhutin: "The Obkom Has Eliminated Its Departments"]

[Text] The Bureau of the Perm CPSU Obkom has taken a number of important steps aimed at the further development of democracy within the party.

As an example, they did away with the practice of Bureau approval of newly elected gorkom and raykom secretaries. Now the party organizations have a real (not theoretical as before) right to elect their leader without waiting for instructions from "above." During the last two years, by the way, more than two-thirds of all city and rayon CPSU committee first secretaries have been replaced.

Another major step was to eliminate the obkom departments. Instead they have set up commissions with a very small staff of consultants. This new structure will allow them to continue to reduce their personnel and shift the balance in party work to informal leaders promoted by the primary organizations.

### Western Republics

#### Malofeyev Speech to Belorussian CP Plenum

91UN0786A Minsk *SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA*  
in Russian 22 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[Speech by A.A. Malofeyev, CPSU Politburo member, Belorussian CP Central Committee first secretary: "Take Action, Without Losing a Single Day"; Belorussian Communist Party Plenum was held 14 December 1990 in Minsk]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! Today we are examining a number of questions which cannot be put off, connected with the organization of the work of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, its Bureau, commissions, secretariat and departments. I believe it would be appropriate to exchange a few ideas about what is in store for us in the near future.

The primary party organizations and working collectives are expecting specific actions from us, associated with implementing the documents of the 31st Belorussian CP

Congress, on efforts for stabilizing the socio-political situation, restoring the health of the psychological atmosphere, and most important, resolving the socio-economic questions, without which one may not speak of normalization of the processes taking place in society.

You can well imagine that these are urgent and very complex questions. A great deal of time, and willpower, and flexibility, and wisdom are required in order to resolve them, and to overcome the crisis phenomena in all spheres of our life. Therefore we consider it necessary, and I know you will support me in this, to convene another plenum of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee in mid-February next year, inviting everyone who is involved with carrying out the decisions of the party congress.

It is necessary to draw up a clear-cut program of practical actions, which embrace above all the primary party organizations. We ask the members of the central committee to get involved in this work right away, and not to wait on any kind of organizational decisions on the part of the Central Committee Bureau, although that must also come to pass. The forthcoming Belorussian CP Central Committee Plenum is a very responsible one: it must adopt a very important political document, which will define our work in all sectors.

Right now meetings are being held with party organization secretaries in a number of the rayons and cities of the republic. Taking part in them are central committee secretaries and certain members of the Belorussian CP Central Committee. Thus far these have not received a proper organizational start; therefore, the situation must be corrected as soon as possible. I believe this work must be conducted prior to 15 January, and we are asking literally all members of the central committee, no matter how busy they are, to actively take up certain of the complications and difficulties connected with the visits to the party organizations. This work will be coordinated by central committee departments and by its bureau.

The other day the CPSU Central Committee Plenum convened; materials from it have been published in the press. You are aware that the plenum has examined the question of the conception of the Union Agreement and on the tasks of party organizations. This is a stirring problem, with which the party organizations and working collectives will have to live in the future. If the Union is not established on a new basis, one which considers the sovereign rights of the republics, then as you know full well, the situation is fraught with serious complications and can fundamentally affect the fate of our large multi-national state.

M.S. Gorbachev delivered a relatively brief address, for the topic was extremely concrete and objective, and millions of people already grasped it. There are various analyses and various approaches; but in spite of the wide-ranging opinions, the overwhelming majority share the idea of organizing the Union on a new basis. Unlike past Plenums, it moved along rather evenly; although, of

course, there were many critical, and I would say biting speeches, that reflect the situation in the country. As you know, I also spoke, and the speech has been published; on the whole it contains some principled features.

At the rostrum of the last CPSU Central Committee Plenum, we once again brought up the problem of Chernobyl, and expressed the opinion of the Communists, and the opinion of the delegates of the 31st Belorussian CP Plenum on behalf of compensation for the loss which the people of Soviet Belorussia suffered in connection with the Chernobyl disaster. A number of positions were expressed along the lines of analysis of the socio-political situation. The struggle today is not right versus left, or conservatives versus radicals. There was such a struggle, but it has already passed. The shadings and colorations are now of a completely different order. The struggle is with those who are in favor of the socialist option, for the preservation of all that is valuable in the historical past of our country, and for its renovation; and it is with those who do not accept these ideals, who are employing all means and methods available to them.

Incidentally, no one is surprised by such estimations any longer. But the estimations are not of the essence now. They too set one's teeth on edge. The essential thing is to find ways out of the extraordinary situation that the country finds itself in. And yes, the reverberations of those events which are taking place outside the republic are heard more and more plainly in it.

It is necessary to state it bluntly: the most effective way out of the crisis is—to accelerate the signing of the Union Agreement. The layout here is as follows: the Baltic republics categorically refuse to take part, on any basis, in the signing of an agreement and in establishing the Union on a principally new basis. The very same declarations are heard from Georgia, although there the situation is very complex. A serious stratification of society has taken place, which is fraught with new dangers and a new escalation of negative events, which have already taken place there. And, for example, Southern Ossetia declares that if Georgia withdraws from the Union, then they cannot have any contacts with Georgians whatsoever. The Abkhazians have taken the same position.

As you can see, comrades, events are developing in a complex and confusing manner, and one must not oversimplify them at any cost. Even in our republic there are various attitudes on this plane, although the overwhelming majority of the people of Soviet Belorussia support the idea of a single Union on a democratic basis, which observes the sovereign rights of the republics. Today hardly anyone rejects sovereignty. This is the holy of holies. It is, however, important to understand these things properly, because there will occasionally be digressions here. And then a very serious blow will be dealt to the republics themselves.

There were many questions, and discussions on what to call the Union in the final analysis. Apparently they are

arising in the primary party organizations as well. We spoke out in favor of the Union of Soviet Sovereign Socialist Republics. But when they began to draw up a draft resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, they came to the conclusion that we should not define the name of the Union. This is a matter for the nation's Supreme Soviet and its corps of deputies. But the Central Committee Plenum expressed its principled positions, in order that on this basis the Communists would be able to build their own further relationships on this basis with the organs of state power, and carry on the corresponding work.

And there is going to be a great deal. The pivotal question of the agreement is—limitations on authority. The Union must have exactly as many rights as it needs to completely exercise the functions of state, in its own interests and in the interest of each of the republics as well. Each of them must have its own rights as well, and its own responsibilities. And if this is not done in the near future, there will be neither legal, nor moral, nor a factual basis by which the political, economic and other relationships may be regulated. A proposal was introduced to first adopt constitutions in each republic, and then return to the creation of a Union Agreement. But I think that it would be practically impossible to create a single Union on a healthy basis later.

In this connection it would be expedient to hold discussions of this question in the primary party organizations. Let us take counsel together. If you support it, I would think it necessary to conduct meetings in the primary party organizations in December and in January next year. All members of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, without exception, must take part. After all, this is not merely discussion of a principled political question. This is also the basis for concrete meetings among communists, and with the primary party organizations, which will express their concerns, their uneasiness, and many other things in consideration of the changing situation.

The conception of a Union Agreement will, as you know, be examined at the present session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet as well. There are materials enough for comprehension. And there is no more important document today at this stage. It will regulate everything. Either we unite with the Union on a new basis, or we will be opposed to one another, totally destroy the economy, and establish unbearable living conditions for the people.

We must also return to the question of the work of Communists in the Soviets. The position of the party in the Soviets will determine a great deal. We are becoming convinced of this by virtue of the many concrete examples of work in both the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet and the local Soviets of People's Deputies.

Take, for example, the Supreme Soviet. According to my information there are among its membership 296 CPSU members in all. But not all Communists are taking part

in the work of the party group. There are among them active people, even sharp-tongued people if you will; there are people of high political temperament; and there are comrades who are simply quiet. But there are also those who remain on the side for now, who do not clearly express their line. I do not want to cast aspersions on anyone. Here, apparently both the problem and the blame are ours in common. In foreign parliaments, for example, if a party makes up a majority in it, then it is in fact the ruling party. And everyone who joins it supports its line. But I think that this represents our future, and not the present day. And, although it is not worthwhile to "play out" the situation one-on-one, at the same time one cannot leave it without interpretation. The deputies are 86 percent Communists, but our influence is hardly felt at all. The opposition—to give them their due—with a smaller number of people displays significantly more initiative on any question. We must draw the most serious conclusions from this. We cannot simply meditate on this plane any longer.

Today, of course, one can criticize everyone and everything here. And apparently one need not limit one's criticism to the Central Committee; one needs to examine the entire chain right down to the primary party organization. I know many communist deputies. They are very proper, very responsible people, and at times they are embarrassed at our common helplessness.

Just look at how difficult and torturous the discussion of the law on property was. Opinions were delivered from the right and the left and from the centrists; everyone had his own position. But where is truth? I am more than convinced that right now the question on property is not the main question. The main thing is to receive a product. But those who advocate private property have something else up their sleeve. Perhaps even to rip the land into tatters, and then start to buy it up. Later on the landowners will be able to hire farm laborers.

And what hurts more than anything? Educated deputies, to include Communists, who mount the rostrum and shout themselves hoarse, saying that if we do not turn over the land for private ownership, we shall be hungry, and starve to death. Unfortunately, these people are not being properly refuted, nor in a timely manner.

And so it turns out that one side propagandizes, and the other passively contemplates. And the illusory impression is created among our people that, truly, private property is a panacea from all evils.

Today I must express my most heartfelt gratitude to those Communists who have worked on this law, and the Belorussian Supreme Soviet which adopted principally new approaches, which give the right to lifelong legacy [poziznennoe nasledovanie] of the land, but do not give one the right to buy or sell it. After all, it is not a question of who has the land, but who has the right to ultimately manage the product. This is where the essence of the problem lies. It would seem that a kolkhoz or sovkhaz has the right to the product produced. But, as it turns



out, that is not so; it has been divided up: so much for the Union, so much for the republic, so much for the rayon. And you get the donut holes.

And having received the land as an unrestricted lifelong legacy, the peasant or the farmer will deal with his own product, and he will not allow anyone to send it anywhere. He will sell his product for as much as he wishes, to whom and where he wishes, and when he wishes. This is the main question. I am not fighting to preserve the old relationships. They are already going out of force, and new economic relationships are coming to replace them. And let the widest variety of forms of managing the economy be taken up: the most important thing is—creating a product.

Perhaps we will even come to private ownership; but we will come to it with a knowledge of life, when life has taught us that it is our only proper way. It turns out as follows with us: 34 Communists voted for private ownership; but Metropolitan Filaret—was against it. Comrades, this is quite a paradox. The Metropolitan is a very wise man. I met with him at the session, and I said that we have common interests, even though I am an atheist. "Indeed," he replied, "and I shall also come to you."

It is disturbing that one Communist in every five did not take part in the session at all, when important and principled questions were being discussed, questions upon whose resolution the fate of the republic depends. The Session of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet is slated to continue its work for an extended period. Drafts of Important laws will be examined, which are to introduce significant changes to all spheres of our life. And if everyone proceeds according to his own feelings, God only knows what kind of laws they could create. But the people are keeping track, they are watching carefully, and they will remember both the good and the bad.

I believe that we have now begun to deal with these questions somewhat better, and to attract new forces for their solution. That is the first thing. The second thing is that Central Committee secretaries, Comrades Kamay and Tikhinya are directly engaged in the corps of deputies at the Supreme Soviet, and I would like to express the general opinion that they will in the near future find there the necessary mutual understanding with the communist-deputies. And so, Aleksey Stepanovich and Valeriy Guryevich, that will be your specific party assignment.

While the agenda of our plenum was being confirmed, as you recall, the question arose of an article in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY. I will refrain from commenting for now—I do not see the need at this time; however, along with certain facts there was also a definite concealed meaning present, since people were listed as belonging to the Central Committee who had never been members. I received one document which I cannot help but make public here. Comrade Yevstrat, party committee secretary at the Azot Production Association in Grodno,

writes that judging from the article published in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY, a number of leading officials of the Belorussian CP Central Committee and Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers are abusing their official positions, that they have received on an illegal basis apartments with an improved design and enormous living space; that they have engaged in building dachas from choice timber from the virgin Belovezhskaya Forest; that they have bought up dachas at rock bottom prices; that through the trade ministry they have acquired hard-to-get foodstuffs, and so on. Ordinary communists are indignant at all this, and party leaders are being discredited in the eyes of the people. The letter contains a demand to provide an official answer to the report in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY and, if the facts are confirmed, those who have compromised themselves before the Communists of the republic party organizations should be subjected to party discipline, right down to expulsion from the ranks of the CPSU.

What can one add to this? Knowing the people's reaction to such publications, and in consideration of the large number of telegrams, we have authorized an objective and thorough examination of this question. But we also receive letters such as this: that such and such party organization will not pay its dues until it receives a concrete answer. You yourselves understand, of course, that if we resort to ultimatums, we will never achieve the kind of political strength that has a significant influence.

I think that this is an extreme, ill-considered decision. For today as never before, we must be united. By decision of the presidium of the Belorussian CP Control Commission, a commission was created to investigate the facts contained in the article, consisting of the following: committee chairman, Comrade Nichiporovich, chairman of the Belorussian State Committee on Statistics and Analysis; deputy chairman, Comrade Chekov, secretary of the party committee at the KBVO [Red Banner Belorussian Military District]; and members, Comrade Alkhovik, technical adjutor at the Minsk Auto Works; Comrade Baday, chairman of the Belorussian SSR State Committee for Labor and Social Protection of the Populace; Comrade Vanitskiy, chairman of the presidium of the board of the Belorussian Society of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries; Comrade Gordeyeva, deputy director of Secondary School No 2, in Zhabinka; Comrade Kovzel, general director of the Belbyttekhnika Scientific Production Association in Minsk; Comrade Lishtvan, vice president of the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences; Comrade Lyshchik, chairman of the board at the Path of Lenin Kolkhoz, in Luninetskiy Rayon; Comrade Naboko, chief of the Minskpromstroy Industrial Construction and Installation Association; and, Comrade Yanchuk, Belorussian SSR finance minister.

Facts are cited in the article, and departments are named which have no relation to the Central Committee whatever. For example, the houses made from Belovezhskiy virgin timber. What about those houses? If they were built in violation of the law, then there must be a

response. Incidentally, concerning the site of the settlement, concerning the fact that dachas are being sold there: well, they would have been sold anyway, because the Council of Ministers does not intend to maintain them. It is another matter, whether they are sold in accordance with or in violation of the law. All this must be carefully checked, and precisely determined what is truth and what is slander. And we must do the very same thing in the future. If for example there is a flow of letters to the Central Committee or to the mass information media on whatever question, we must create a commission to carefully investigate all the facts, evaluate them, and then report to the Central Committee and publish its decision in the press. Thereby we will separate the truth from nonsensical and, at times, malicious rumors.

A few words on cadre matters. People are asking whether the party has already given up on this direction in its work. How can that be? After all, the cadres decide everything. Yes, that is so. We have a good many thoughtful people who are capable of analyzing the times, and looking deeply into the essence of the ongoing processes. Without such people progress is impossible. And so, should we put a stop to selecting and training cadres? Under no circumstances. That is what I think. But the party has given up the nomenklatura method. You know its attributes: the long lists; the call; the invitation; the questioning of candidates, and so on. And along with this—friendship, protectionism, and God knows what other kind of relations. That is what was, and what is. And most likely it will not go away tomorrow. We will call a spade a spade.

As far as party cadres are concerned, the determinations should be made at the level of the central committee, oblast committees and rayon party committees. I have in mind the system of working with them. And a system is precisely what I have in mind, so that there would not be any kind of chance or arbitrariness involved.

In terms of the leading cadres, at the last CPSU Central Committee Plenum, dissatisfaction was expressed on the fact that the Supreme Soviet is approving leading officials, without attempting to learn the CPSU Central Committee's opinion of them. Yes, that is the reality. These questions must be worked out beforehand with the communist deputies. If, for example, we are convinced that a particular comrade should be appointed to this or that post, then the entire party group should support him. But if such conviction is lacking, it is necessary to definitively state this as well. Then there will not be any secrets in the court of Madrid.

In other words, the plan looks like this: when cadres are selected for the appropriate state structures, it is up to us to decide whether to support them or not, and to offer any practical suggestions we might have on the question.

And now on work at places of residence. We talk about this tirelessly, but there is no progress, even though the problem is a most urgent one. What must one bear in mind concerning this? The party organizations at

housing administrations have a good many veterans, who have passed through the great school of life. They have done a great deal, and still are. But their strength is clearly inadequate. Fresh recruits are needed. From where? From what? In certain regions such experience already exists; we must look closely at it. Service enterprises are located on certain territories in a rayon (laundries, boiler-houses and so on). The Communists working there are on the rosters in various places. Perhaps they should be brought together as a territorial party organization.

It is very important to step up work in residential areas. We must take a more active role there. Practical experience at elections to the Soviets at all levels forces us to derive certain lessons. The political struggle is a reality, and it becomes sharpest during election time.

Today we know that interest in elections has fallen off. In Minsk and other places, people no longer come to the electoral precinct. And what does this signify? It means that their mistrust extends not only to the candidates, but to the Soviets as well. After attacks on the party, unrestrained criticism of the Soviets may begin. Incidentally, here and there such things are already taking place. And I agree that to a certain extent there are grounds for this. But in a number of places, it is done with no basis whatever, but purely out of the political considerations and ambitions of certain groups. I think that we must constantly take this into consideration in our work.

On questions of theory and the party itself, and socialist construction: a great many things here are worn out, a lot has been rejected by life, a lot has become hypertrophic, and a lot has been deliberately destroyed. I do not think that the Belorussian party organization is capable of renovating socialism on a theoretical plane. However, on many principled questions, including questions of party work, we must have our own clear-cut position.

A great many changes must take place here. But—with one condition: they must be concrete and consistent, and not simply emotional. We have the capabilities to do better work. A word on behalf of the collectives of the Institute of Historical and Political Research and the Institute of Political Science and Social Administration of the Belorussian Communist Party: the titles are modern ones, and modernity must permeate the content of their actions as well. This is, of course, not easy. Political science is just what we lack today in order to interpret the ongoing processes. Social administration—today, in my opinion, not even the scholars understand what that is. But there are interpretations, and individual works. And our task is—to develop all this, and make maximum use of it in our practical work.

The situation in the consumer market remains critical. If by next year there is no clear-cut program for increasing the mass of trade goods at the republic, oblast and rayon level, on the major enterprise level, we will not know where to provide growth, or where we lag behind, and

why—then the situation might become even more critical. I believe we must carefully nurture incentive factors, in order that not a single enterprise is left out. I do not want to belittle the work that is now under way; it is great, both in terms of what the Union is doing, and in the localities. But we still are not clear on many positions. And I think that, while considering of the results of the session which is examining these questions, we must take an in-depth look at the problems, and we must have our own position and our own approaches.

I consider it necessary to express the following thoughts as well: Everything that is produced in the country is being pilfered. And it is being pilfered on a grand scale. The mafia is involved here, and speculators, and petty swindlers, and God knows who all. The traditional methods are not working. And why we do not introduce to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet a draft of an extraordinary law providing the most severe methods of struggle with rascals of all hues, I do not know. The people support this. Measures are needed, including measures of a material nature, that would make teach people engaged in such things not to do it again.

Special attention is due to improving the food situation. Many of us remember the years 1979-82, when all oblasts suffered a decline in production, and a fodder shortage. And it was only thanks to Petr Mironovich Masharov, who at that time managed to turn everyone and everything around, that animal husbandry was saved, although the slump and the scanty market was felt for about four years. But then conditions were nevertheless better than they are now. Today one notes a decline in production in the countryside. Apparently we will not be able to forestall a slump in the first quarter. But for the rest of the period of the present year, if we properly organize our political and organizational work with the people, and if we in fact support the rural area, then I think we will hold our ground, or will even produce more, if only by a small amount. Doing that will be difficult. But there is no other way out: no one will ship meat and milk to Belorussia.

We support the proposal to strengthen the executive power. The system which has evolved in the Soviets is incomplete. It has not been thought out thoroughly. And the result is, a confrontation between the Union and the republics is taking place. There are objective reasons for this, and subjective ones as well. On the other hand, a similar antagonism is beginning between the republic and the oblasts. And the very same system of relations is taking shape between the oblast and the separate rayons.

Where can we go from here? We can get to such a state, that we will perceive one another in such an unfriendly fashion that we will be unable to build any kind of business or normal human relations. I see a great danger in this. We must immediately find approaches in order to halt this ninth wave.

And now about this: the military garrisons and military encampments are in a difficult situation. A large number

of people are living in them who have lost contact with the Armed Forces. They have many problems. I understand that today there are no resources to resolve this problem, in consideration of our Chernobyl disaster. I do not want to give prescriptions; it is necessary to think about this in every town and in every rayon where there are such encampments—with the participation of the leadership of the Belorussian Military District, of course. It goes without saying, that today we may also speak about the Defense Ministry's superficial attitude toward these problems. It thinks that they can be resolved by local efforts in Belorussia. This, however, is far from the case. In general, we must develop a precise and clear-cut strategic program on this plane. We cannot get away from this. I believe that a principled approach is required here.

On the whole, comrades, we must devote every effort to finding ways which would permit not only to emerge from the crisis, but also to go forward.

## Arbitration Procedures in Moldova Detailed

### Draft Law Published

91UN0731A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 27 Nov 90 pp 2-3

[Draft Law of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic on the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service]

[Text] This law, in accordance with the Moldovan SSR Constitution, defines the organization and operating procedures of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service, as well as its objectives and powers.

## Section 1. General Provisions

### Article 1. The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is an agency for the resolution of disputes that arise in the economic sphere and in the process of its management, an agency ensuring legality in these areas through legal means, and promoting the optimal functioning of the state's economic system.

### Article 2. Legislation concerning the organization, operating procedures and authority of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

The organization, operating procedures and authority of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are determined by the Moldovan SSR Constitution, this law and other Moldovan SSR legislative acts.

The procedures for the hearing of economic disputes are established by the Code on Arbitration Procedures in the Moldovan SSR.

**Article 3. Objectives of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service**

The objectives of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are:

- ensuring the protection of the rights and law-protected interests of the enterprises, organizations and other subjects of economic relations;
- promoting, through legal means, the observance of legality in the sphere of economic relations;
- preventing violations of legality in economic activities;
- drawing up proposals aimed at the improvement of economic legislation.

**Article 4. Basic Operating Principles of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service**

The basic operating principles of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are:

- the invariable observance of legality;
- independence in the examination of economic disputes, and subordination only to the law;
- glasnost in the arbitration process.

**Article 5. The Powers of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service**

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service:

- hears cases involving disputes: that arise in the economic sphere and in the process of its management between state, cooperative and public enterprises and organizations and other subjects of economic relations, as well as between bodies of state authority and administration, that in accordance with legislative acts may be parties to the arbitration process [henceforth referred to, as a rule, as enterprises and organizations];
- hears appeals that acts by bodies of state authority and state administration, cooperative and other public bodies, as well as enterprises and organizations be declared invalid;
- implements measures for preventing violations of legality in economic activities;
- develops proposals for the improvement of legislation;
- issues explanations concerning the application of legislation regulating economic activities and procedures for the hearing of economic disputes.

**Article 6. The Language in Which Proceedings Are Conducted in the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service**

Proceedings in the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are conducted in accordance with Moldovan SSR on the functioning of languages within the republic.

**Section 2. Organization of the Activities of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service****Article 7. Guidance of the Activities of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service**

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service carries out its activities under the guidance of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service regularly reports on its activities to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet and Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

**Article 8. The Moldovan SSR Chief Arbiter**

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is headed by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

The chief arbiter directs the activities of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service and organizes its work; promulgates, within the limits of his authority, orders and other acts; assigns duties among the deputy chief arbiters; approves provisions concerning structural subdivisions; appoints and dismisses employees, with the exception of those employees who, in accordance with this law, are appointed and dismissed through other procedures; adopts measures to reward and penalize employees of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service; and also performs other functions stipulated by legislative acts regulating the activities of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

The chief arbiter bears responsibility for the performance of tasks assigned to the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

**Article 9. Appointment of the Moldovan SSR Chief Arbiter and His Deputies**

The Moldovan SSR chief arbiter is appointed by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The Moldovan SSR chief arbiter has deputies, including a first deputy.

Moldovan SSR deputy chief arbiters are appointed by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of a representation by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

The term of service of the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter and Moldovan SSR deputy chief arbiters is 10 years.

**Article 10. Rights and Powers of the Moldovan SSR Chief Arbiter and the Moldovan SSR Deputy Chief Arbiters**

In their activities, the Moldovan SSR chief Arbiter and his deputies exercise the rights and powers granted to the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service, including those established by Articles 12 and 14 of this law.

**Article 11. The Moldovan SSR Chief Arbiter's Right of Legislative Initiative**

The Moldovan SSR chief arbiter has the right of legislative initiative in the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

#### **Article 12. The Arbiter**

The arbiter is a person who hears economic disputes and ensures restoration of the violated rights and legitimate interests of the parties.

The arbiter carries out work to prevent violations of legality in the sphere of economic relations, studies and generalizes arbitration practice, takes part in drawing up proposals for improving legislation, and publicizes economic legislation.

The arbiter possesses the powers necessary for carrying out his work that are defined by this law and other Moldovan SSR legislative acts.

The arbiter's demands made within the limits of the arbitration service's powers are binding on the enterprises and organizations, as well as the officials, to whom these demands are directed.

#### **Article 13. The Appointment of an Arbiter**

An arbiter of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is appointed by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet and, during the period between its sessions, by the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of a representation by the Moldovan SSR Chief Arbiter, for a 10-year period.

A citizen of the Moldovan SSR who has reached 25 years of age and has a higher legal education and at least three years of practical work may be an arbiter.

#### **Article 14. The Arbiter's Independence and Immunity**

In the hearing of cases an arbiter is independent and subject only to the law. Interference in the arbiter's work is prohibited.

The mass media have no right in their published items to prejudge the results of arbitration proceedings in a specific case before a decision has been made.

An arbiter may not have criminal charges brought against him or be arrested without the consent of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet or, during the period between sessions, the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

#### **Article 15. The Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service**

A presidium is formed within the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

The activities of the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are carried out in accordance with this law and, on issues not specified in it, according to procedures determined by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

In the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service the presidium consists of the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter (chairman),

his first deputy and other deputies, as well as other officials of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

The personnel of the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are approved by the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of a representation by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

In its regular meetings, the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service considers the basic issues in the activity of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service, discusses questions of the selection, assignment and training of personnel, and hears reports by the arbiters and executives of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service's structural subdivisions.

The presidium's decisions are implemented, as a rule, by orders of the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter. In the event of disagreements between the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter and the presidium, the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter carries out his own decision, reporting to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the disagreements that have arisen. For their part, the members of the presidium may report their opinion to the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet.

#### **Article 16. Structure, Numerical Size and Staffing**

The structure and number of employees of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are approved by the Presidium of the Moldovan SSR Supreme Soviet on the basis of a representation by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

The staffing of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is approved by the chief arbiter.

### **Section 3. The Hearing of Cases**

#### **Article 17. The Authority of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service in the Hearing of Economic Disputes**

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service hears all disputes between the subjects of economic relations according to procedures defined by Moldovan SSR legislative acts and interstate treaties and agreements concluded by the Moldovan SSR.

#### **Article 18. The Right to Appeal to the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service**

Enterprises and organizations have the right to appeal to the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service for the protection of their rights and their interests protected by law.

#### **Article 19. Arbitration**

The hearing and resolution of disputes are carried out in arbitration proceedings consisting of the presiding arbiter and the parties or their representatives. The decision is made by the arbiter and the parties or their representatives on the basis of a discussion of all the circumstances of the case in an arbitration session. The arbiter promotes the achievement of agreement between the parties.

In cases in which agreement has not been reached between the parties or their representatives, or the agreement is not in accord with legislation or the materials of the case, or a case is heard without the participation of one or both parties or their representatives, the decision is made by the arbiter.

#### **Article 20. The Equality of the Parties**

The hearing of cases in the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is carried out on the basis of the equality of enterprises and organizations before the law and the arbitration service, regardless of the form of ownership, location, subordination and other circumstances.

#### **Article 21. Glasnost in the Arbitration Process**

The hearing of cases is open, with the exception of cases in which this would be contrary to the interests of protecting state or commercial secrets, or there is a well-founded objection by one of the parties.

#### **Article 22. The Review of Decisions of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service Through Oversight Procedures**

An arbitration decision service in a case may be reviewed through oversight procedures on the basis of an appeal by one of the parties or a procurator's protest, or at the initiative of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

### **Section 4. The Prevention of Violations of Legality, the Improvement of Legislation and of the Explanation of Arbitration**

#### **Article 23. The Prevention by the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service of Violations of Legality in Economic Activities**

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service carries out work to prevent violations of legality in economic activities.

To this end, the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service:

- 1) performs the analysis of information and materials characterizing the reasons for the violation of legality in economic activity, and draws up and, within the limits of its authority, implements measures to eliminate those causes;
- 2) hears cases that are of great social importance directly at enterprises and in organizations;
- 3) publicizes economic legislation;
- 4) according to procedures established in the Moldovan SSR Code of Arbitration Proceedings, directs information concerning identified violations of legality to enterprises and organizations, bodies of state authority and state administration, and cooperative, public and other agencies.

#### **Article 24. The Drafting of Proposals for the Improvement of Legislation**

On the basis of the study and generalization of the practice of the application of legislation, the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service drafts and, according to established procedures, submits proposals for improvement of the legal regulation of the activities of enterprises and organizations in the economic sphere, as well as improvement of the arbitration service's performance.

#### **Article 25. The Authority of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service in the Coordination of Normative Acts**

Normative acts pertaining to the conclusion and fulfillment of economic contracts that are promulgated by Moldovan SSR ministries and state departments are binding on other ministries and state departments, enterprises and organizations, and are subject to mandatory coordination with the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service.

#### **Article 26. Explanations Regarding the Application of Moldovan SSR Legislation**

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service issues explanations regarding the application of Moldovan SSR legislation that regulates relations in the economic sphere and the procedures for the hearing of economic disputes.

The explanations of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are binding on ministries, state departments, enterprises, organizations and officials applying the legislation for which an explanation has been given.

### **Section 5. Other Questions Pertaining to the Organization and Activities of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service**

#### **Article 27. Statistical Record Keeping**

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service keeps arbitration statistics according to established procedures.

#### **Article 28. International Relations**

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service conducts international relations according to established procedures.

#### **Article 29. Internship in the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service**

The beginning of service as an arbiter in the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service is preceded by a one-year internship for the purpose of practical training for the arbiter's future work. The procedures and conditions for the internship are defined by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.

#### **Article 30. Certification**

Arbiters, officials and specialists of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service are subject to periodic certification in accordance with legislation. Regulations concerning the certification procedures are approved by the Moldovan SSR chief arbiter.



#### Article 31. Publication

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service publishes the magazine ZAKON I ZHIZN jointly with other Moldovan SSR agencies.

#### Article 32. Seal of the Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service

The Moldovan SSR Arbitration Service has a seal bearing the image of the Moldovan SSR coat of arms and the name of the arbitration service in the state language.

#### Draft Law Analyzed

91UN0731B Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 16 Dec 90 p 4

[Article by V. Chenusha, legal specialist: "We Will Dispute. But How?"]

[Text] The draft law that has been published can be adopted as a basis on the condition that certain fairly serious shortcomings in it are eliminated.

For example, Article 4 of the draft speaks of the principle of glasnost in the arbitration process. However, the draft does not state just what that principle consists of. Moreover, the second part of Article 14 of the draft indicates that the mass media do not have the right in their published items to prejudge the results of arbitration proceedings in a specific case. Can it be that glasnost consists in banning glasnost? Why can't a journalist express his viewpoint on a dispute that has arisen between organizations, or subject an arbitration decision to justifiable criticism? In practice there have been cases in which a judicial decision was rescinded by higher judicial bodies after it had been criticized in the press. Naturally, the judicial bodies were not ecstatic over that! Let us hope that legislators will correctly assess the arbitration service's desire to place its actions beyond the range of criticism in the mass media, and will delete the second part of Article 14 as contrary to the principle of glasnost embodied in Article 4 of the draft!

In my opinion, the principle of glasnost should be incorporated in a prohibition against the arbitration service's adopting decisions in the absence of the parties or their representatives (except for cases of a failure to appear for an arbitration session without valid cause). A corresponding addition should be made in Article 4 in order to prevent violations of organizations' rights. Such an addition would have fundamental practical significance, since cases are sometimes encountered in which decisions are issued in the absence of the parties to a dispute. In this connection the hearing of a dispute in such cases is permitted in the second part of Article 70 of the Regulations for the Hearing of Economic Disputes as ratified by the 5 June 1980 Decree No 440 of the USSR Council of Ministers (in the 16 April 1988 version of the decree). A prohibition against the hearing of disputes in the absence of the parties would eliminate conditions contributing to the violation of organizations' rights.

Article 5 of the draft stipulates the right of the arbitration service to issue explanations concerning the application of legislation regulating economic activities and the procedures for the hearing of economic disputes. I consider this an extremely flagrant violation of the principle of the separation of powers, that is, a matter of granting legislative powers to the arbitration service in veiled form. Explanations concerning the application of a law, that is, its official interpretation, are the right of the legislative body, and not the body that applies the law. Experience indicates that explanations issued by agencies applying the laws often substantially distort the meaning of the laws that are being explained. Therefore, I deem it necessary to amend Article 5 and eliminate the first part of Article 26 of the draft, where the arbitration service's right to issue explanations concerning the application of legislation is stipulated.

The meaning of Article 7 of the draft, which states that the arbitration service carries out its activities under the guidance of the Supreme Soviet, is incomprehensible. This general sentence binds no one to anything. Shouldn't Article 7 be eliminated? Article 20 of the draft, which speaks in general terms of the equality of the parties, is not needed, either. Article 21 arouses great doubts. It speaks about the open hearing of cases with the exception of cases in which this would be contrary to the interests of protecting state or commercial secrets, or there is a well-founded objection by one of the parties. However, the right of the arbitration service to conduct the closed hearing of a dispute where a well-founded objection against the open hearing of the case has been made by one of the sides may create favorable conditions for abuses by arbiters, since they alone (and no one else!) will determine whether such an objection is well-founded. I believe that the hearing of cases should be open. It is also necessary to change the wording of Article 22 of the draft, in accordance with which an arbitration decision in a case may be reviewed through oversight procedures on the basis of an appeal by a party or a procurator's protest, or at the initiative of the arbitration service.

In accordance with the Regulations for the Hearing of Economic Disputes (so far there is no other normative act regulating these matters), arbitration decisions are subject to mandatory review on the basis of an appeal by the parties submitted in good time. Therefore Article 22 should be amended to indicate that arbitration decisions are reviewed on the basis of appeals by the parties or procurator's protests, and may be reviewed at the initiative of the chief arbiter or his deputy. Article 22 should be amended by adding the indication that the submission of an appeal for the review of an arbitration decision suspends implementation of the decision until a decree has been issued by the chief arbiter. The mandatory implementation of a decision that has been appealed by the parties to a case, which is stipulated in the Regulations for the Hearing of Economic Disputes, seems incorrect. Point 4 of Article 23 of the draft contains a reference to the Moldovan SSR Code of

Arbitration Proceedings, but it does not state who will adopt this code and what the arbitration service will be guided by until it is adopted. I consider it necessary to add to Article 23 the stipulation that the Code of Arbitration Proceedings is adopted by the Supreme Soviet, and that until it is adopted the arbitration service is guided by the Regulations for the Hearing of Economic Disputes with due regard for the specific provisions of this law.

### Leader of New Moldovan Party Interviewed

91UN0810A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA  
in Russian 23 Dec 90 p 3

[Interview with George Gimpu, leader of the Democratic Party for the Revival and Progress of Moldova, by I. Vishnevskaya in Kishinev; date not given: "Is It Not Time To Put an End to the Settling of Scores?"]

[Text] Kishinev—At the Second Moldovan People's Front [NFM] Congress one of its forefathers—George Gimpu—who had been sentenced in the 1970's to six years' imprisonment under tight security (now rehabilitated) for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, announced that he was leaving the front's executive committee and sharply assailed the tactics being pursued by certain leaders of the NFM. George was supported by the opposition in attendance at the congress. He was given a standing ovation and offered honorary titles in the NFM. Gimpu turned them down. He quit the political arena and devoted himself entirely to his job of people's deputy of Moldova. This was in the summer.

But not even six months had elapsed before G. Gimpu was once again making his presence known. On this occasion as a leader of the as yet unregistered Democratic Party for the Revival and Progress of Moldova (DPVP). At a meeting of the DPVP he spoke on behalf of its initiating group, declaring: "Joining the Union by way of a signing of the treaty in the form in which it has been presented would, I believe, make us a colony of the center."

[Vishnevskaya] George, the appearance of your party has been received variously: The NFM Executive Committee, for example, has emphasized that it is for pluralism, but has complained that there is division in our ranks, whereas the communists are still strong; supporters of the Interfront have assumed that there were insufficient offices in the NFM for everyone and that for this reason you had the idea of your own formation....

[Gimpu] No, the reason lies elsewhere. The next elections will, I am sure, be different from the present ones: The electorate will vote not for a name but for a party platform, for its economic and political course. This is the first thing. Second: There cannot be democracy without a multiparty system. We are obliged, if we want to be a democratic society, to form parties. The Communist Party is strong now, there are the Social Democratic and Christian Democratic parties, and the Peasant Democratic Party is not yet registered. I personally hope that they all, God willing, strengthen and that others

emerge also. In the future, however, I believe that the parties of a democratic persuasion will merge into one.

[Vishnevskaya] Is your party an "affiliate" of the NFM?

[Gimpu] No, we want to be heirs of the traditions of the democratic movement which existed in the republic before the formation of the People's Front; the idea of the revival and progress of Moldova has excited more than just its indigenous inhabitants. Although it should be acknowledged that there is much that is good in the front's program. We have the same goals, but the methods and tactics of achievement of the goal are different. We believe that it is time to act through dialogue, through persuasion. The attempts to solve intrarepublic problems by force have not proved a success. Yes, a person may be suppressed by force, but his ego will not be conquered. It will make itself felt sooner or later.

[Vishnevskaya] How does the DPVP differ from other social and political formations?

[Gimpu] We have opted for a democratic focus, more precisely, a liberal-democratic focus. Our principle is to proceed from values common to all mankind. The DPVP does not aim at the building of a social and public formation inasmuch as this mission is fundamentally erroneous.

I believe that our program and our actions will attract to the DPVP people of various nationalities. Even now the initiating group contains Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and Gagauz.

[Vishnevskaya] I believe that the Russian-speaking population will not support your slogan concerning the refusal to sign the Union treaty.

[Gimpu] Do you really think so? I, on the contrary, believe that the Russian-speaking population will not support the slogan concerning the signing of the Union treaty in the version that has been proposed. I believe it will understand that if we sign it as it is, nothing in our life will change. The republic, like the other republics also, would remain a colony of the center. The revival of Russia, the Ukraine... as sovereign states would be made more difficult. Unless the Russian-speaking population supports Moldavians today, there could be a repetition of 1918: We would be forced, possibly, to turn to other forces to defend democracy and preserve the integrity of the republic. The center, in turn, should help all republics understand that living separately is impossible. And, then, we are not saying that we will not sign anything at all. It was said at our meeting that the treaty in its proposed form is humiliating. Signing it would mean preserving the former empire. But, following the republics' adoption of sovereignty, we have entered into confederal relations. We are for an economic community of sovereign states and for living together, but in accordance with rules proceeding from realities, from the new political situation. Today's draft has no future.

Before speaking about whether to sign the Union treaty or not, it would do no harm to publish all the current drafts, our, republic, draft included, in order that it may be seen what the center wants and what the republic wants.

[Vishnevskaya] George, you are opposed to violence, you always try to play an honest game, and have the reputation of being a supporter of a "clean hands" policy. How in this case are we to evaluate the territorial claims on the Ukraine which were heard at the very first meeting of the DPVP?

[Gimpu] I believe that in this situation also it is necessary to act through dialogue. Please understand, this is a very important issue for us. After all, who are we Moldavians without territory? I would be in favor of signing a Union treaty, but provided that we represented all Moldavian territory. It would be a good thing were the center to assist a solution of these problems, thereby removing the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. Problems of territory excite everyone. And not only because the border issue was decided in the past without the people being consulted. But now also there is an attempt being made on the part of the Gagauz and Left Bank areas to wrest primordially Moldavian land.

[Vishnevskaya] Do not you, as a people's deputy of Moldova, believe that these actions are a counteraction to the decisions being adopted by the republic parliament?

[Gimpu] I do not rule out there having been things left undone. But they should be seen as tactical, not political, errors and should be solved by the parliamentary path.

[Vishnevskaya] The starting point of the interethnic conflict was the Language Act. The confrontation has been going on for so long and so many words calling for consolidation have been spoken, but not a single letter of the law has been changed....

[Gimpu] But why are you forever saying that the Language Act is bad?! It is good, judge for yourself: Records must be kept in both Russian and Moldavian, signs in public places must also be in two languages....

[Vishnevskaya] But records in the Gagauz areas are kept only in Moldavian. How could people not become incensed? Take a look, in Kishinev the urban mass transit route boards are only in Moldavian. Is this normal?

[Gimpu] This is a violation of the law, and, in keeping with Article 30, the leaders of the corresponding enterprises should be held directly responsible. In the example you have given—the directors of the bus fleets and the trust and administration chiefs.

[Vishnevskaya] How? What, take them to court?

[Gimpu] Why not? After all, on the one hand, the law has not been understood, on the other, advantage is being taken of this.

[Vishnevskaya] And you believe that such a case could be won?

[Gimpu] Of course.

[Vishnevskaya] George, let us return to your party. Who may become a member?

[Gimpu] Any citizen who has attained 28 years of age, irrespective of nationality, religious belief, and social position, who chooses freedom and democracy, loves his people, and wishes to contribute actively to the republic's prosperity, recognizes the program and rules, and actively propagandizes the concept and ideals of the party.

[Vishnevskaya] How many persons have joined the DPVP as of the present?

[Gimpu] Just over 50. These include N. Mikhay, doctor of philosophical sciences, U. Manets, doctor of economic sciences, N. Kozhokaru, candidate of philosophical sciences and assistant professor, and S. Palazov, candidate of physical-mathematical sciences, and there are engineers, scientists....

[Vishnevskaya] What are your party's aims?

[Gimpu] The revival of the national culture of the Moldavian people and the development of the culture of the national minorities considering the Republic of Moldova their homeland and interested in its prosperity as an independent, sovereign, and indivisible state. The DPVP is based on the spiritual values of modern liberalism, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the democratic traditions of the Moldavian people. Such is our ideology, but we categorically reject the supremacy of ideology over economics.

[Vishnevskaya] And you believe that the goal you have set may be achieved only by political parties? As for me, I altogether doubt whether there should be parties in a democratic society. After all, their main task is winning power, not defending human rights.

[Gimpu] You doubt? But to whom to leave the people, who would enlighten them? The church? God grant that the church revive to such an extent. But, after all—and this is shown by history—even the church, if it has no opposition, becomes a dictator. And then, a struggle of opposites brings success, progress....

And this is what is interesting: upon a change of power an opposition party usually finds itself at the helm of government. And it begins to settle scores with those who represented the diktat prior to this. And so on ad infinitum. Today people are castigating Bodyul, Grossu.... But did it all begin with them? No. But we should not be trying to keep pace with the past. Is it not time to end the settling of scores and engage in the building of a truly democratic society?

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...The day of the meeting of the initiating group for the creation of the Democratic Party for the Revival and Progress of Moldova was unbearably cold, and the whole time it looked as though it was about to rain. About 50 persons came to the Zelenyy Theater. They had gathered to familiarize themselves with the newborn party and see its first step in its political career. This step, amazingly, was adult and assured beyond its years. The tiny party of 50 persons clearly stated its position. In an interview its leader boldly expressed his personal viewpoint. One had at some moments to agree with him, to support him in some respects, and to grow uneasy and angry even (the warning concerning a possible repetition of 1918). But Gimpu was sincere, as were, I would like to hope, all those who spoke at the meeting. A bitter truth is far better than a sweet lie.

### Crimea Vote Issues Remain Unsettled

91UN0878A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 6,  
4-10 Feb 91 p 3

[Mikhail Shimanskiy report: "Has the Choice Been Made? What the Referendum in the Crimea Has Shown"]

[Text] Simferopol-Yalta-Alupka-Simeiz—Crimean statehood existed before 1945—it was the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic [ASSR], which was abolished. There is no doubt that the events taking place in our country, particularly decisions of the Union and autonomous republics and national okrugs, which have serious and decisive intentions of achieving a radical renewal of the Soviet federation, predetermined the entire course of the extraordinary session of the Crimean Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies. It can with complete justification be called extraordinary because the agenda included a question of special importance, namely the status of the Crimea and its attitude toward the Union treaty. The deputies were talking on a very sore point. They had to define their position with respect to an issue whose solution must be found today, for tomorrow will be too late. Let us be candid: The deputies displayed true statesmanlike wisdom and were guided solely by their conscience and sense of responsibility for the fate of thousands of people of the most diverse nationalities residing in the Crimea, even though a polarization of opinions with respect to the status of the Crimea could undoubtedly be sensed in the statements made by the deputies.

### L. Grach, group leader in the organizing committee to draw up proposals on the status of the Crimea:

If we do not want the Crimea to be transformed into yet another detonator in an explosive process, or the Crimeans to become acquainted with all the burdens of a state of emergency, then we must display political sense, political wisdom if you like, and a sense of moral responsibility as we choose ways to resolve the problem of the status of the Crimea. And here I am profoundly convinced that the absolute majority of Crimeans really

do hold dear the experience accumulated in international links and do not think about a future outside the framework of the USSR. If we strive for a truly democratic rule-of-law state then the problem of the status of the Crimea must be resolved on the basis of the will of the people. The most democratic form in which, from the legal standpoint, that may be expressed is referendum.

### S. Shubaynikov, aide and secretary to a USSR people's deputy:

Today I am fully aware that we do not know the will of the people, the Crimean people—the Russians, Ukrainians, Tatars, and representatives of other nationalities. I am also aware that already today the question of the status of the Crimea has clashed with the interests of national and political forces, which is evoking alarm and the most serious concern among all sensible people. Their concern is totally justified: No one can guarantee that tomorrow some particular forces may not come to power and say: Go to Moscow.

### Yu. Osmanov, acting chairman of the oblast executive committee Committee for Matters Pertaining to Deported Peoples:

For more than 30 years the Crimean Tatars have been constantly and persistently raising the question of the need to change and enhance the status of the Crimea. And we still hold to this viewpoint today. We believe that in any disposition of forces when an autonomous unit becomes part of any republic, all relations with that republic should be built on a treaty basis. What else do our people think? They think that the program for the return of the Tatars sets a compact area for them to live: no more than 24 percent of the rest of the population. But why dispense with the historical reality?

Some of those who spoke thought that a referendum will not resolve the problem of the status of the Crimea. The chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet, L. Kravchuk, also spoke at the session. For me personally, he said, the problem of whether or not there should be a Crimean ASSR does not exist. Of course there should. Hold a referendum? That is a matter for the oblast soviet of people's deputies. I personally believe, Kravchuk continued, that a referendum will not resolve the question of Crimean autonomy and is unnecessary.

So what conclusion was reached by the stormy and far from simple session of the oblast soviet? It adopted a declaration to hold a referendum on the state and legal status of the Crimea.

The fewer the days left until 20 January the more tense the situation became in the Crimea. The author of these words happened to be in Yalta, Alupka, and the tiny resort settlement of Simeiz on the southern coast at that time, and everywhere I sensed just one thing: The alarm and concern of the Crimeans had reached its limit. What was going on? For every inhabitant of the oblast was

ready to act on referendum day according to his conscience and with a sense of responsibility for the fate of the Crimea and for his own fate. Alas! It was not so simple.

On the eve of the referendum in the Crimea the various political forces were very active. However, they have not left the arena even now as they try to sow doubt among the Crimeans about the correctness of their choice. And this is a direct attack on the national consensus in the Crimea and is destabilizing the situation to a considerable degree. First of all, we should name the organization of the Crimean Tatar National Movement. Its leaders agitated for the Crimean Tatars to boycott the referendum. This kind of position in no way promotes national unity in the Crimea. For any national political movements have as their foundation the idea of the priority of the indigenous nation. The situation in various parts of the country convinces us what this produces.

We must give the Crimean press its due. It, first and foremost the newspapers KRYMSKAYA PRAVDA and KURORTNYY KRYM, did an enormous amount of work associated with the preparations for and holding of the referendum. They printed a great deal of material in which, it seems, it was possible to find an answer to any question connected with this far from simple event. In particular, an article entitled "The Referendum: Who Will Gain From It?" was published, in which it was stated very loudly that opponents of the referendum had united in their joint desire to frustrate it, and had chosen as their main slogan "Do Not Vote Because This Is an Intrigue by the Party Apparatus." This piece made a thorough analysis of the position of opponents of the referendum, in particular Rukh [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika]. The newspapers cited excerpts from Rukh appeals in which it is stated bluntly that "the Crimea has been Ukrainian land since time immemorial," "the referendum is an encroachment on the territorial integrity of a future separate Ukrainian power," and "any Ukrainian who takes part in the referendum will be damned by our people as a traitor."

The People's Front of the Crimea, the Democratic Alliance, "Good Will" and other organizations, on the other hand, argued that the referendum is deception of the people since there is no question of its return to Russia. Well, they touched on a very sore issue. With whom should the Crimean ASSR go? Should it be part of Russia or of the Ukraine? This is the question that has been of concern to the inhabitants of the peninsula. And the lack of legal knowledge among a considerable proportion of the population is undoubtedly a hindrance here. From the legal standpoint this is how the situation looks. According to legal enactments passed earlier and being passed now, the territory of the republic cannot be changed without its agreement. And the treaty signed at the end of last year between the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian SSR fixed the mutual recognition of the borders now existing between Russia and the Ukraine for at least the next 10 years.

Notwithstanding, in conversations with Crimeans, particularly Russians, I repeatedly heard: We are closer to Russia. It will always defend us, and the events taking place in the Ukraine are such that no one knows what may happen. The talk is not idle. We might add to this the language problem. The process of the entry into force of the law "On Languages in the Ukrainian SSR" is producing a mass of censure in the Crimea, particularly the part concerning compulsory teaching of the Ukrainian language in schools (even though, according to the 1989 census, Ukrainians make up only about 26 percent of those residing permanently in the Crimea).

I have before me a report from the oblast (central) commission on the results of the referendum on the state and legal status of the Crimea. The lists for the referendum contained 1,770,841 people. A total of 1,441,019 people voted, which is 81.37 percent of the total number of citizens included on the list. A total of 1,343,855 votes was cast in favor of creating a Crimean ASSR as a subject of the USSR and a signatory to the Union treaty. This is 93.26 percent of those taking part in the referendum.

Thus, the inhabitants of the oblast have made their statement: There will be a Crimean ASSR. But... debate on the referendum is not dying down and many questions are being raised.

Literally on the fourth day following the referendum the fifth session of the Crimean Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies opened. Among the items on the agenda particular attention was paid to the results of the referendum, and to the state and legal status of the Crimea. An appeal to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet was adopted. It states the following in particular: "The reconstitution of the Crimean ASSR is a significant event in the history of the Crimea. It is designed to guarantee human rights in every possible way, promote the rebirth of spirituality and the national cultures of all the peoples, and the successful building of a rule-of-law state, and become a powerful impetus for economic prosperity and social progress."

Proceeding from the results of the referendum, the Crimean Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies has appealed to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, proposing that it review and make appropriate changes to the Republic's Constitution to underpin the will of the population of the Crimea, and to make representations to the USSR Congress of People's Deputies concerning making corresponding changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution.

How will further events unfold? In what channel will the debate of the referendum results flow within the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet? How will the republic parliament react to this appeal from the Crimean Oblast Soviet? There are no legal grounds for refusal. In short, the referendum is behind us, and the Crimea is waiting. We are also waiting for the referendums in which we shall participate. What will they bring?...



## Caucasus

**Armenian CP Members on Future,  
Depoliticization of Party**

91US0259A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian  
13 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[Unattributed report: "News Conference in the Communist Party of Armenia Central Committee"]

[Text] As already reported, a news conference was held on 6 December in the Armenian CP Central Committee in which S. Pogosyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, Ark. Sarkisyan, second secretary of the Central Committee, Central Committee secretaries A. Sarkisyan and Ye. Ananova, and Central Committee member Kh. Sarkisyan took part.

The news conference was opened by G. Ambaryan, deputy chief of the Central Committee Ideology Department. He recognized first S. Pogosyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, who said, inter alia:

"The 29th Armenian CP Congress was in both its content and its form unlike any preceding congress. The first singularity was the political situation in which not only the country but Armenia also have found themselves. I refer to the economic condition. It is no secret that never since the war has the position of our people been so grim. The situation is worsening with every passing day, and this could not, naturally, have failed to have made its mark on the congress.

"Second, the Armenian Communist Party had, since the day it was formed, been the governing party—the Communist Party and Soviet power were formed in parallel. So it was for the first time after 70 years of government holding a congress not as the governing party. For 70 years the Armenian Communist Party not only had a monopoly of power but a monopoly of criticism also. But today it personally is being subjected to criticism on all sides. Certain forces have succeeded in creating around the Communist Party an atmosphere of intolerance, to use a more precise word, an atmosphere of hatred. Whereas earlier people joined the Communist Party en masse and its ranks were frequently penetrated by people lacking the moral right to be Communists, the 29th congress was held in a period when people are leaving the ranks of the party. And, furthermore, together with careerists many honest people are quitting the party also, unfortunately.

"The current situation dictated to the congress a revision of the basic propositions of the party's activity. The Communist Party was born and built on a class basis. Its purpose from the earliest years of its formation up to, at least, the 1960's was the building in the country of a socialist and communist society. The Communist Party initially expressed the interests of the working class, more precisely, undertook to express the interests of the working class. It was then declared that it expressed the

interests of the workers and peasants and, subsequently, the whole people. Life has shown that parties cannot survive on a class basis inasmuch as their aims are quite indeterminate. The Communist Party had to be reformed. In addition, the Armenian Communist Party had until this day been a detachment of the CPSU. It had not had any, even internal, independence. The Communist Party could not continue thus. This would have had serious consequences, and for this reason the question of the Communist Party's independence was raised also.

"Was the congress able to resolve these questions? Experience needs to be accumulated so that the Communist Party might change from a class into a national party. And this was reflected in the congress' decisions. The organization of the congress in two stages and the not entirely precise decisions showed that we are, on the whole, not yet ready for an abrupt change of course and extensive democratization. It is clear, however, that the Armenian Communist Party cannot exist unless it pursues this path consistently.

"Ultimately the congress was not concluded, the authority of its delegates holds good and, if need be, it may assemble anew to decide questions of great significance for the party affording it new prospects."

The participants in the news conference then answered journalists' questions.

[Question] Have you spoken with M. Gorbachev and about what?

[Pogosyan] I have not yet met or spoken with Gorbachev. The most important question for the leaders of the Armenian Communist Party, you know, in conversations with the country's leadership is that of Karabakh. I have to tell Gorbachev that if there is a people, a nation, its party should be national and independent and should serve only its own people. If the center believes this is possible—and the CPSU, as a single political organization, does not now, as a whole, exist, inasmuch as all the Union republic communist parties have their own programs, which not only differ strongly but are also contrary to one another—there cannot be a single Communist Party with polar-opposite programs. The CPSU may exist on the principles of a confederation, federation, or union of communist parties.

[Question] Could the Communist Party be an opposition?

[Pogosyan] Yes, the Communist Party could be a constructive opposition. I would like to mention three factors, as a consequence of which the Communists in parliament have found themselves in such a position.

First, this is in a sense a consequence of the not very high morale of the party cadres. When membership of a party is by conviction, a change in the party's status cannot be of such serious significance. Consequently, people joined the party without faith and conviction, but to achieve some goal or other.

Second, I believe that in the question of parliament the Armenian CP Central Committee made a crude mistake. The Central Committee simply abandoned its deputies to the whim of fate and did not work with them, did not unite them, did not orient them.

Third, even today there is not in parliament a normal, civilized attitude toward the communist deputies that would enable them to work constructively.

[Question] Does the Armenian Communist Party aspire to restore its authority?

[Pogosyan] I have already said that, given any regrouping of forces in the republic, the Armenian Communist Party cannot today assume office once more—nor do we aspire to this at this time. We simply want consolidation for the accomplishment of the serious and complex tasks confronting parliament to be a possibility.

[Question] Is it possible that the Armenian Communist Party might in the future create its own youth organization? And, second: your attitude toward women's organizations.

[Ananova] I have to say that work with the youth and the women's organizations is quite a complex sphere of the activity of the Armenian CP Central Committee, but I hope that we will be able to do a great deal with the help of representatives of the various youth and women's groups. There is no need for the creation of a new youth organization, such an organization already operates in Armenia. As far as women are concerned, it has to be said that we have long lived under conditions of a patriarchy, but I would like to caution all men that this is an apparent patriarchy. We have in fact a matriarchy. Men very often simply lack women's gentleness and love of their fellow men.

[Question] The people are of the opinion that the Communists are against independence. Please clarify this matter.

[Pogosyan] Independence is the age-old dream of each individual and each people, and the Communist Party cannot fail to aspire to independence. But desire is one thing, political events, circumstances, and realities are quite another. Yes, some Dashnaks were formerly opposed to independence, but not because they did not want it, it was simply that the political situation did not afford an opportunity for this. There has now been a fundamental change in the situation, and the opportunities for the achievement of independence are now immeasurably greater than at that time.

It seems right to me that we have confronted the people with the goal of achieving independence. The Communist Party supports it.

[Question] What is your opinion on the attitude toward historical monuments?

[Pogosyan] If people demolish the monument to Abovyan, defile the monument to Chekhov, and tear

down the portrait of Andranik, what is this if not vandalism? Even the Bolsheviks, when they took power, preserved the monuments to the tsars, this is history.

It cannot be decided by paying heed to incidental people which kind of monument to erect in Yerevan, and which, not. It is simply astonishing: What did Nelson Stepanyan, whose monument is being defiled, do wrong? He went off to fight as a young man and died. Can his monument be defiled? It seems to me that we should all fight against this together. If monuments are defiled with the advent of each new leadership, where will we end up? We must, ultimately, give thought to the younger generation also.

[Question] What must those applying to join the Armenian Communist Party now write on their applications: "I request acceptance as a member of the CPSU" or otherwise?

[Pogosyan] They must write: "I request admittance to the Armenian Communist Party." A commission for drawing up the Armenian CP program is at work currently, and when the program is completely ready, we will once again bring up for discussion the question of the party's name. Preparatory work is under way currently, and we will soon have Armenian CP membership cards.

Please understand that the independence and self-sufficiency of the Armenian Communist Party that we have declared is not a game. But the question of the party's independence is one thing, the problem of political orientation quite another. We are for an independent party, but will remain in positions of a Russian orientation.

[Question] There is a bust of Lenin in this room. Does this mean that we will remain a Leninist party?

[Pogosyan] It seems to me that our attitude toward Lenin and Lenin's legacy is in need of fundamental revision, but I am not prepared today to say what shape this would take. I believe that any legacy, whether of Marx, Hegel, Feuerbach, or Lenin, means riches. That we might disagree with this legacy is another matter. I believe that if we alter the essence of our party and change from being a class-based into a national party, that is, we do not set ourselves, today, at least, the task of building socialism (not to mention communism), we should, correspondingly, reconsider our attitude toward Lenin's teaching.

[Question] On 7 December it will be two years since the earthquake. I would like to know what has become of the Politburo commission formed in connection with the natural disaster? Who has replaced it and why has it terminated its work?

[Pogosyan] I believe that the Armenian leadership made a most important mistake on the question of the disaster zone. When my home is destroyed, it is I who should build it up primarily. A different approach was manifested with us: Let someone else build it, and we will then

continue it. And what happened in Leninakan remains on the conscience of the Armenian leadership.

As far as the Politburo commission is concerned, when the Communist Party relinquished leadership of economic matters, this commission lost its purpose and functions.

Today the situation is further complicated by the fact that the republics are becoming independent and starting to count each kopek. They are doing so in the disaster zone also. And were it not for the great material interest of the guest construction workers, the situation would be far worse. I remain convinced that we must throw everything aside and swiftly get Leninakan back on its feet. The republic cannot move forward without this.

[Question] You have said that by the 1960's the Communist Party had exhausted itself. Does this mean that prior to this, in the period of mass punitive measures, it had not exhausted itself and was thriving?

[Pogosyan] You misunderstood me. I said that up to the 1960's the Soviet system was developing; it subsequently exhausted itself. If we trace the development of the economy, it is clear that prior to the 1960's we were developing dynamically; at the end of the 1960's this development stopped and subsequently stagnation and standstill began. It was a question not of the Communist Party but, I repeat, of the Soviet system. Whoever knows the history of the development of our society cannot deny this.

[Question] Please give us figures on the numbers of employees of the Communist Party administrative system and their wages.

[Pogosyan] The Armenian CP administrative system today numbers 2,400 persons, 800 of whom work in primary organizations, the rest, in administrative systems. There are currently 130 persons in the Central Committee administrative system. We want to reduce it by 40 percent, and the administrative system of the rayon party committees, in half: six or seven people will work in the rayon party committees, and in the Central Committee, 80-85.

The wages are pretty good and have risen even compared with 1988. The salaries of Central Committee officials are on a par with the wages of employees of the corresponding level in the Council of Ministers or Supreme Soviet administrative system.

[Question] The Communist Party's attitude toward other national political parties. Is an agreement between them and the Communist Party possible?

[Pogosyan] Totalitarian power, particularly if dictated not from the localities but from the center, had a wrong attitude not only toward national political parties but also toward other national values.

As far as a coalition and agreement between political parties is concerned, this ensues from their political programs. If they contain points that coincide, cooperation is possible.

I am opposed to opportunism. But, for example, on the "Armenian question" we and the Dashnaks have every reason to cooperate. The "Armenian question" requires the unification of all political forces, it cannot be the monopoly of one party....

[Question] Is the Armenian Communist Party preparing to engage in business activity to improve its financial situation?

[Pogosyan] We are opposed to petty trading. If we do engage in business, it will be such as is directly connected with satisfaction of people's socioeconomic requirements. This is very important for us.

We will continue to reduce the number of full-time party officials. We do not want Moscow to help us materially because financial assistance is a sign of dependence. We will take the last money from Moscow in 1991, since the accumulated total contains our share also. And, generally, we need to be thinking about how to keep ourselves. Particularly if it is considered that the numbers of the party continue to decline and we are not receiving subsidies.

The Armenian Communist Party is clogged up considerably, and we cannot exist unless we rid ourselves of this ballast. We have no need to fear, therefore, that the numbers of our party will diminish considerably. We need clean, honest Communists.

[Question] The congress presidium, which represented the leadership of the party in the period between the two stages of the congress, categorized the decree on depoliticization adopted by the parliament as a decision that will destabilize the situation in the republic and lead to totalitarianism. I would like to know the opinion of all secretaries of the Armenian CP Central Committee: Do they agree with this evaluation by the congress presidium?

[Pogosyan] I disagree with parliament's decision and do not understand how the word "totalitarian" appeared in the document of the congress presidium. Where did it come from?

In our student years we dreamed: Why should there not in the higher educational institution be several political parties in order that the young people may attend a school of political education there?

This decree applies not only to our party. It is a political enactment, and we should see how useful it is to our society.

[Sarkisyan] The fact of the matter is that I presented this document to parliament on behalf of the congress presidium. I share S.K. Pogosyan's opinion of this decree

inasmuch as neither people working at industrial enterprises nor trainees may be kept apart from political life. Particularly in our day, when all strata of society are displaying great interest in politics.

The point being that it was initially assumed that, in accordance with the Declaration on the Independence of Armenia, only the law enforcement authorities and army subunits would be depoliticized. And suddenly, after half an hour's break, both the draft and the title of the decree are essentially changed, and the law extends to almost all organizations. In our opinion, the sole operating party should certainly have been consulted, at least.

[Ananova] I believe this decision was adopted by parliament under the influence of emotions, not as a result of deep reflection. After all, if people of like mind wish to associate in an organization and its activity is not in conflict with the policy being formulated and pursued in the republic, putting obstacles in their way is a flagrant violation of human rights.

As far as the activity of the primary organizations is concerned, I am of a different opinion. They could be barred from interfering in economic activity for this factor plays a negative part in the republic today. And as far as the congress presidium's statement to parliament is concerned, it contains wording with which I disagree.

[Sarkisyan] Mention should be made primarily of the democratic mood that reigns in today's Central Committee Secretariat. Obviously, such news conferences will, if you wish, become regular. We will not hide anything from anyone.

[Question] What should the mutual relations of the republic's political forces be? How and around whom should they unite?

[Sarkisyan] I will answer, if you will allow me. It is not the first year we have been speaking about unity, but we do not know, it seems, how this is achieved.

People unite not around some individual or body—people unite around an idea. When the Armenian people united around the idea of Artsakh's reunification with Armenia, this was the foundation that led us to unity. Now the Karabakh idea is not the sole one, unfortunately, there are other ideas also. And disagreements have arisen here. We believe that under the conditions of political dialogue and pluralism it would most likely be right to create a council of national accord. This idea emerged long since, but has yet to find an expression. For the achievement of complete national accord the efforts of parliament alone are insufficient since it is impossible in parliament today to defend the rights of the minority. So political forces not represented in parliament cannot defend their interests. For this reason a council of national accord, in which everyone would have equal rights, is essential. In this case we would see a possibility of agreement being reached around the solution of national problems.

The participants in the news conference answered other questions from the journalists also.

### Armenian CP 17 Dec Plenum on Party Organization

#### Information Report

91US0278A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian  
19 Dec 90 p 1

[Text] The plenum of the Armenian CP Central Committee convened 17 December 1990. Secretaries of party gorkoms and raykoms who are not members of the CC, members of the Armenian CP Control Commission, and key staff officials of the Armenian CP Central Committee took part in the proceedings of the plenum.

The plenum took up the question: "Tasks of Party Organizations in Carrying Out the Decisions of the 29th Armenian CP Congress." S.K. Pogosyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, delivered the report on this topic.

The following took part in the discussion: A.K. Yegiazaryan, department head in the Institute of Literature imeni M. Abegyan of the Armenian Academy of Sciences; L.L. Karchikyan, scientific associate of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Electrical Equipment Systems; V.B. Agayan, second secretary of the Yerevan Gorkom of the Armenian CP; S.M. Movsisyan, director of the publishing house LUYIS; A.Sh. Petrosyan, first secretary of the Moskovskiy Raykom of the Armenian CP in the city of Leninakan; Kh.T. Sarkisyan, lathe operator in the leading enterprise of the production association "Yerpassazhtranz"; M.A. Minasyan, first secretary of the Ordzhonikidzevskiy Raykom of the Armenian CP in the city of Yerevan; R.S. Yepremyan, secretary of the party committee of the Yerevan "Bazalt" Plant; Dzh.I. Asratyan, director of the Yerevan Scientific Research Institute of Pedagogical Sciences; G.O. Papanyan, first secretary of the Shirakskiy Raykom of the Armenian CP in the city of Leninakan; N.L. Akopyan, chairman of the Presidium of the Republic Council of Armenian Women; M.Gr. Zakaryan, first secretary of the Myasnikiyanskiy Raykom of the Armenian CP in the city of Yerevan; A.V. Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Masisskiy Raykom of the Armenian CP; and T.A. Aloyan, first secretary of the Aparanskiy Raykom of the Armenian CP.

The plenum took up organizational matters.

The plenum elected the Bureau of the Armenian CP Central Committee consisting of the following: S.K. Pogosyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee; Ye.M. Ananova, secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee; A.V. Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Masisskiy Raykom of the Armenian CP; S.G. Badalyan, secretary of the party committee of the Yerevan Physics Institute; N.A. Grigoryan, first secretary of the Kirovakan Gorkom of the Armenian CP; Kh.P.

Meloyan, worker in the Yerevan Tire Plant; Yu.I. Mkrtumyan, head of the Ethnography Department of Yerevan State University; V.A. Oganessian, docent in the Department of Constitutional, Administrative, and International Law of Yerevan State University; T.G. Sargsyan, first secretary of the Leninakan Gorkom of the Armenian CP; A.G. Sarkisyan, secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee; and A.G. Sarkisyan [sic], second secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee.

The plenum formed commissions of the Armenian CP Central Committee. The following were made chairmen of the commissions of the Central Committee: the Commission for Party Construction—S.K. Pogosyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee; the Ideology Commission—A.G. Sarkisyan, secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee; the Socioeconomic Commission—L.I. Gustin, first secretary of the Leninskiy Raykom of the Armenian CP in the city of Yerevan; the Commission on Issues in Youth Policy—Yu.I. Mkrtumyan, department head at Yerevan State University; the Commission for Work With Women—Dzh.I. Asratyan, director of the Yerevan Scientific Research Institute of Pedagogical Sciences; and the Commission for Legal Policy and Legislative Initiatives—V.S. Darbinyan, deputy minister of justice of the Republic of Armenia and cochairman of the Union of Armenian Lawyers.

That concluded the plenum of the Armenian CP Central Committee.

#### **First Secretary on Party Structure, Union Treaty**

91US0278B Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian  
20 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[Report delivered by S.K. Pogosyan, first secretary of the Armenian CP Central Committee, in its plenum held 17 December 1990: "On the Tasks of Party Organizations in Carrying Out the Decisions of the 29th Armenian CP Congress"]

[Text] He said: He would like to briefly set forth certain basic tasks which our party must immediately tackle.

First of all, a few words about the results of the second stage of the 29th Armenian Congress. The main result of the congress is adoption of the Basic Principles of the Program of the Armenian Communist Party and party bylaws. As has already been reported, the Armenian CP will in future operate as an independent party. Proceeding specifically from those principles and also taking into account the new sociopolitical realities, we must today take up the problems of a fundamental improvement of the activity of party organizations and restructuring the party's staff organization.

"What will happen to the party, will it be rescued?" These questions are being asked by thousands of party members and people outside the party.

It seems to me that the answers to them depend entirely on us, on our vigorous, efficient, and well-thought-out effort. And in doing that, I emphasize this, we do not need a party of the previous "composition." We need a party that is pure.

Everything that is dishonest and corrupt must be wrenched from the party.

The Communist Party today, acting as a political force, is above all an ethical phenomenon, and the success of the party's effort depends above all on the purity of its rank and file. We all understand that we have to change the forms and methods of party work.

New approaches have to be worked out, recommendations on structural transformations, on the use of a straightforward mechanism based on those sociopolitical conditions which surround the party.

The decree of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia dated 5 November 1990, which in a sense caught the party by surprise, creating many difficulties in its activity, also needs to be taken into account.

In short, we can express dissatisfaction, but we should also become accustomed to the new conditions, respect the decisions of the parliament, and act in accordance with the situation that has come about. The Central Committee has already worked out recommendations for the coming months. Essentially, today we need to create everything from scratch because there is no experience and it is up to us to work out the new approaches.

First of all, we need to ascertain once and for all how strong our ranks are, to find out who is still with us. Incidentally, in this effort we must display both vigilance and sensitivity so as not to aggravate even more the serious difficulties that already exist and to offer no occasion for honest party members to leave the party.

Structural transformations in primary party organizations and creation of conditions that would impart a new content to party work and broaden its scope are important to us.

Now, about clearing up the makeup of party ranks.

Party committees at all levels must immediately organize re-enrollment of party members. We can assume that a number of problems will arise in this effort, that serious difficulties will even be created deliberately, and overcoming them will take determination, an ability to avoid provocations, and an explanatory effort.

I hold to the opinion that this difficult process, full of unexpected things, should be divided into two stages.

First, we need to register party members, which will make it possible to clear up the figures on the composition of the ranks of the Armenian CP and the primary party organizations. In many organizations, this effort has already begun and will be completed, apparently, over the next 40-45 days.



This effort will become particularly complicated in the second stage: First, we need to complete the creation of primary party organizations on the basis of the new party bylaws. This will put the conditions in place for the exchange of party credentials.

In the period between the two stages, structural transformations need to be carried out in primary party organizations. I will present for your examination certain considerations concerning the changes that have been proposed.

The first reality. The decree of the republic's Supreme Soviet on depoliticization of the bodies of government, government agencies, state enterprises, institutions, and organizations, and educational institutions, and also military *podrazdeleniya* has been adopted and has taken effect. This means that party organizations must now be created on the geographic principle. It is, of course, indispensable to organize things in this way so as to create opportunities for political work, to develop appropriate activity during elections to the supreme soviet and local soviets, and to play a vigorous part in the discussion and resolution of socioeconomic and political issues.

Working conditions and the existence of buildings also have to be taken into account. It is clear that the need to be economical in spending the party's money resources is also becoming acute now.

What alternatives are possible for primary party organizations? First of all, you know that those primary party organizations that operate in *kolkhozes*, cooperative enterprises, creative unions, and public organizations are being retained. Everything there remains as it was before. It makes no sense to change that form of party organizations, although even here other alternatives are not precluded.

Second. Large party organizations which want to preserve their structural integrity can operate in association with the respective rayon committee of the party. If necessary and advisable, of course, party members from other organizations may also be enrolled here. It is not precluded that some members of a given party organization will express a desire to be enrolled in other party organizations, for example, the organization where they live.

A third alternative is primary organization by election districts. The election districts used in elections to the supreme, city, and rayon soviets, and so on, might be the basis for creating such organizations. Pensioners and housewives not working at present, deputies for the given election district, and also party members who by the nature of their official duties are associated with the population of a given district could be enrolled in the regional party organizations. It is not precluded here that certain party members would want to be enrolled in another party organization on the basis of where they live.

A fourth alternative is a possibility for professional and sectoral organizations. Such organizations might be created in cities, rayon centers, and large villages, the line of activity and occupation of party members being taken as the basis. Moreover, in the rayon, in that same settlement, several organizations of that same type might be created if necessary. For instance, it is possible that there might be several organizations of educational personnel in one rayon.

And finally, the last and fifth alternative: organizations embracing all party members living or working in small settlements.

In our view, these are the alternatives for structuring primary party organizations whose creation is possible under the new conditions. It is not precluded, and this is understandable, that during the exchange of opinions different points of view might arise, there might be other approaches, and that means that new alternatives will be proposed. In the final analysis, life will show which of the proposed forms is viable and which new methods can be applied. But one thing is obvious: Party committees must in no case dissolve on their own initiative some particular primary organization, but must make full use of every opportunity to preserve it.

A few words about public associations associated with party organizations.

Pursuant to Point 15 of the bylaws, on the initiative of members of the Armenian CP public structures may be created and may operate which do not have the functions of primary party organizations: for example, councils of secretaries of party organizations, party clubs, seminars on theory, discussion centers, councils of party veterans, workers, engineering and technical personnel, representatives of the intelligentsia, other associations of party members, and so on.

The professional party administration, which today has become the target of criticism that is sometimes just and sometimes biased, has always been given a large role. One of the reasons for this lies in the fact, Comrade S.K. Pogosyan continued, that down through the years the professional party apparatus has become intolerably inflated. And in spite of the reduction accomplished in the last two years, such a reduction also has to be carried out today. It is a question both of the Central Committee and also of the raykoms and gorkoms. I think that this should be spoken about even today.

These are the approaches to this issue: The professional staff of the Central Committee is to be reduced by 40-45 percent, that of raykoms and gorkoms slightly more—45-50 percent. Once the structure of the professional apparatus has been essentially improved, later, for understandable reasons, a large place in it should be given to structures operating on voluntary principles.

Allow me to briefly set forth certain particular aspects of the report and election campaign. As you will already have guessed, it will not be possible to hold report and

election meetings in all organizations within a short period of time. The report and election meetings are being held in those local party organizations to which the decree of the Supreme Soviet on depoliticization does not extend, and then in those organizations which are being preserved because they have been attached to raykoms and gorkoms.

The proper thing would be in the election meeting for members and responsible officials of raykoms, gorkoms, and the party Central Committee to speak on the pivotal issues raised by the congress and to help the broad party masses arrive at the correct orientation in the present complicated situation.

Of course, the organization of the campaign calls for great efforts from raykoms, gorkoms, their bureaus and secretaries, especially on the matter of the correct election of personnel and the aktiv. In the searching and finding process, militant party members have to be found who will be ready to work under the unusual, not to say extremely difficult, conditions that have been created. There is no doubt that we must put this demand first of all on secretaries of rayon and city committees. I am convinced that the moment is ripe when we should soberly compare the political situation with the innate capabilities of some of them and make a responsible choice. One gets the impression that in the performance of certain secretaries of raykoms the main thing has been merely to lament and to disguise their own inaction with demagogy.

The need for radical renewal of ideological principles, for development of theoretical thought in line with present-day development, the rejection of dogmatism and stereotypes, and other aspects of ideological activity of the Armenian CP were discussed at the 29th congress. The basis of our ideological activity, the speaker emphasized, must be those causes which are contained in the Basic Principles of the Program of the Armenian Communist Party. The main thing that is new here is that our ideology is already based not on the class principle, but on the priority of ethnic, popular, and general human values, and consequently, that ideology entirely suits and serves the national interests of our people, reflects its traditional conceptions of life, honor, dignity, and morality, and expresses its economic and social aspirations, its program for the future.

The following are the tasks we face in that area. The first of them is broad popularization of the Main Principles of the Program, which unfortunately is not being done as yet. Series of articles need to be published in the press on all the principles of the program, and the purpose of each of its proposals revealed.

Today, the role of the party program is quite different. The program is becoming not only the main axis of party activity, but also its reference point. In working out the Basic Principles of the Program, we have provided a response to the question of what to do, what goals to pursue. The program must also answer the question of

how those goals are to be achieved, which is far more problematical and requires more strenuous work than working out the basic principles. It is a question of creating mechanisms for the activity of the party.

In my opinion, the Program of the Armenian CP must differentiate the short-term from the long-term tasks, because only a clear exposition of the short-term tasks can help party organizations to get out of the difficult situation that has been created. Consequently, work on the program must continue without interruption so that the opportunity arises in June or July to organize its partywide discussion and adoption.

Declarations concerning the independence of the Armenian Communist Party will remain mere declarations and will not win confidence until they are filled with the appropriate content.

We need to activate dynamic forms and methods of propaganda in the most vigorous way. Lively dialogue, debates, analysis of the specific situation, sociopolitical lectures and roundtable discussions, meetings and talks with diverse audiences—these and other forms of explanatory work must become the basis of the activity of party committees and organizations.

Ideology today should be perceived precisely as a means enlisting people for specific goals. We must argue less about "isms" and think more about a very rapid economic transformation of the republic, about the strategies and effectiveness of our participation in performing practical tasks.

Propaganda full of slogans that is for show and is based on imposing ideas, on a mechanical assimilation of ideological dogmas that has not been thought through, on the learning of quotations by heart, has been discredited and is exhausted. The entire system of political education has been spoiled, today, as the party is undergoing renewal, as it rejects many ideological and political stereotypes, and as its activity is applied to national interests, it is very important to find new strategies, new forms and methods of working with people. Today, when certain political forces on both the right and left are operating from extremely aggressive positions, the best propaganda is restrained, unbiased, and solid information containing the truth about the new political party, about the situation in the republic, and about real strategies for taking it out of the deep crisis. We have to go to the people with the truth, attract them with new approaches to solving the real social problems, to the development of the national culture, traditions, and language, and to strengthening the republic's sovereignty.

We have been called upon to adopt forms and methods of work based on where we live, to spend time in residential areas, housing developments, people's houses, to carry on a truthful and honest dialogue with them.

When it comes to solving the serious problems facing the Armenian Communist Party, we consider it advisable to combine the application of efforts of ideological workers and the entire aktiv along the following lines.

To fight literally for every party member, for preservation and reinforcement of the party, and for closing its ranks by every means and with every capability in an effort that includes political work with the masses, agitation and propaganda, and individual clarification.

The ideological effort, political work with the masses, must be aimed at solving the real problems of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical life of the republic, at stabilizing the situation and law and order, at combating the rise of crime and speculation and other violations of law and order, and at supplying food to the public, especially the most necessary foodstuffs.

Intensifying the ideological effort among young people, especially university students, must be at the center of attention of party committees. The problems of ethical education of young people require our constant attention. Here again it is very important to develop constructive forms of cooperation with the Armenian Youth League.

Proceeding on the basis of the new situation that has been created, we must work out principles of party work not only with young people and the upcoming generation in general, but also with women, with workers, with the rural population, with the intelligentsia, with veterans, and also with those who have low income, the unemployed, disabled persons, and other strata of society.

The times urgently require that the best forces of the republic be drawn into the effort to update the party's ideological activity: scientists, sociologists, political scientists, lawyers, and economists. The renewal of the ideological effort requires a strengthening of its material base and the use of advances in informatics and electronics. It has become an urgent necessity to create a unified system of information support of party committees and to radically reorganize the system for training and retraining of party personnel.

Political pluralism is becoming a reality of our life. Party committees must assist in every way those organizations whose program and activity correspond to the goals and tasks of revolutionary transformation of society and are aimed at remedying the situation in the republic. We also have a duty to deepen in every way the process of democratization that is developing. We are advocates of solving any problem by democratic means, and we resolutely reject the principle of coercion, of imposing opinions by forceful methods.

The republic Communist Party, Comrade S.K. Poghosyan said, considers it its duty to promote the program of national consolidation; it will advocate broad business-like development of political and cultural relations with the diaspora within the Soviet Union and abroad in order to strengthen relations with all foreign Armenian

political parties and social movements. One of the main goals of the party is to achieve international recognition of the historical and legal demands of the Armenian people—a just solution of the Armenian question and international recognition of the genocide in 1915. It seems to me that the Communist Party must show initiative in the matter of creating the nationwide movement "Ay Dat," in consolidating the most diverse social forces and broad strata of the population to resolve the Armenian question, making the movement nationwide and elaborating the conception and pattern of action of that struggle.

In developing the international contacts of the Armenian Communist Party, in countries with large Armenian colonies we must form permanent relations not only with Armenian organizations, but also with other progressive organizations. We must make effective use of technical facilities for sending information materials abroad and receiving them from abroad.

The theoretical activity of the Communist Party of Armenia is taking on particular importance in this stage. Over the decades, we have tried to find answers in the works of the classics of Marxism-Leninism to all the phenomena of life. Dogmatism in theory, the mechanical borrowing of conceptions and ideas without taking into account the realities of our socioeconomic development, our ethnic identity, and nonmaterial culture led to quite a few errors and distortions which it will be costly for us to overcome. That is why today it is particularly important in developing theory to rely on the creative approach, adopting the premise that the term "socialism" can be filled with a new content only by life, only by free national development, free work, self-government, and prosperity of the people.

The Institute of Sociopolitical Research of the Armenian CP Central Committee must do a great deal in that direction. It would seem proper in the future to use the capabilities of that institute not in work on the history of the party, but on studying and forecasting recommendations concerning the problems of present-day life. In practice, this means creating a new scientific center with a new staff of scientists.

In the very near future, the party's entire effort must be structured on the basis of a thorough knowledge of the actual state of affairs, analysis of sociopolitical processes, and an appreciation of every aspect of public opinion. Only on the basis of social forecasting is it possible to structure the party effort effectively.

We have been talking a great deal about new forms and methods of work. The party's parliamentary activity is the most important among them. Unless parliamentary activity is well-organized, well-thought-out, and purposive, the party will not be able to achieve more or less notable success in its work. Here, a task of paramount importance arises—the task of party members to master the art of operating in parliament.

The Central Committee must speed up the formation of the party group in the Supreme Soviet, support that group and its members with appropriate material, provide moral support, and fight for respect for the rights of each of them.

In work among the communist delegates, the gorkom and raykoms must draw practical conclusions from the serious mistake made by the Armenian CP Central Committee and concentrate attention on each delegate.

The effort to strengthen relations with the masses, to develop an ongoing constructive dialogue with all public organizations and movements, cannot be overlooked by any means. We need to create a sociopolitical center in which all those who wish might obtain exhaustive answers to the questions that bother them.

A set of interrelated measures needs to be carried out to improve the forms and methods of party guidance of the mass media under the new conditions so that the party press best serves the interests of the people, the tasks of the party, and the principles of humanism.

By all appearances, opportunities must be sought out to publish a foreign-language newspaper in Moscow; today, there is an obvious need for its propaganda and counter-propaganda.

The leadership of the Central Committee must be more forceful in obtaining time for its television programs. The ideology department must finally present sound proposals concerning the possibility of creating rayon (city) or regional newspapers.

Establishment of everyday communication of party committees with editorial offices and reports of senior officials of the mass media in party meetings, plenums, and bureaus must be made regular practice in party work.

The Communist Party must undertake publishing activity and develop it in every way.

Since the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, following the slogans of perestroika, we have gradually gotten away from direct guidance of the economy, stating as the motive for this the reality of the transmission of power to the soviets, that is, as though we were no longer concerned by the economic area. Upbringing, social issues, in short—"pure politics"—have remained the sphere of our activity. But we had no right to forget that politics is a concentrated expression of economics, and we should have figured out in good time that replacement of economic authorities by party authorities cannot be confused with eliminating the influence of the party on economic processes. These are different things. And if we need to renounce the former without any doubts, we should do everything to improve the latter, especially now in the period of the transition to market relations and the emergence and development of the new forms of carrying on economic activity.

I think that the idea that the party supposedly should not intervene in the solving of economic and social problems has been circulated among the people with a particular purpose. The question arises of who needs such a party, when its activity does not express the vital interests of the workers? I am profoundly convinced that the reason for the drop in the party's prestige should also be sought in the economic blind alley in which our community has been led, in the mistakes committed in carrying out economic reforms during the years of perestroika.

The political foresight of our socioeconomic program, whose main directions have been set forth in the resolution of the 29th Armenian CP Congress, entitled: "On Transition of the Republic's Economy to Market Relations," logically follows from an analysis of the situation. Unless political consent is obtained, unless success is achieved in stabilizing the economy, the crisis will very soon become a disaster.

A situation like that could aggravate social and political tension. That is why we need to get out of the crisis as rapidly as possible, without allowing disaster, and accomplishing if possible an organized transition to market relations.

It is quite obvious that there is no alternative to the market. But the trouble is that our population is neither economically nor organizationally nor psychologically ready for such a transition. And unless everything is thoroughly weighed and unless the population is given help, the worst case could occur—people would not believe in the market and would turn away from it. In that case, the market will be ruined as an unsuccessful experiment.

Today, one of the most painful issues is conclusion of economic contracts for 1991. Party committees and primary party organizations must be ready to give this real support. They should operate in all directions and exclusively with political methods, through party members.

The issues of forming a political culture, of developing public dialogue and the information situation are acute at the present time. For us who have suddenly found ourselves in political chaos, in the uncontrolled development of interethnic conflicts, as we have experienced the unprecedented heating up of passions related to the shortage of first salt, then bread, then cigarettes, then the most necessary goods in general, this question takes on paramount importance. That is why the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the party's gorkoms and raykoms must use every opportunity at their disposal to present the public broad information about the republic's socioeconomic situation and political situation. The question must be taken up of creating a republic party information agency and of undertaking to publish a reference and advertising supplement to the daily newspaper AYASTAN.

Everywhere today, Comrade S.K. Pogosyan said in conclusion, a lively discussion is taking place of the Union

Treaty. There are two sides to this question: Is the Union Treaty necessary at all, and will Armenia participate in concluding this treaty or not? Second, is the draft of the Union Treaty which has been published acceptable or not? And if the Communist Party unambiguously offers an affirmative answer to the first question, on the second one, by contrast, it feels that the draft of the treaty is in need of fundamental revision. The Communist Party is an advocate of union, of bringing together free and sovereign state structures cooperating voluntarily, but it is not in favor of a new version of the present Union.

**Department Head on Armenian CP Structure, Membership**

91US0300A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian  
15 Jan 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with Misak Levonovich Mkrtchyan, chief, Organizational Department, Armenian CP Central Committee, by A. Gurgenyanyan, correspondent: "New Approaches, New Structures"]

[Text] At the 19th Congress of the Armenian Communist Party the first Charter of the Armenian Communist Party was adopted. Its paragraph 15 notes, in particular, that the Armenian Communist Party shall be constructed using territorial and production-type criteria. Stemming from this charter principle and taking into account the decree adopted by this republic's Supreme Soviet dated 5 November 1990 and entitled: "On Depoliticizing State Organs and State Enterprises, Institutions, Organizations, Educational Institutions, and Military Subdivisions of the Republic of Armenia," the need also arises to introduce changes in the structure of the primary party organizations.

On this and other matters connected with the Armenian CP Charter our correspondent A. Gurgenyanyan conducted the following interview with Misak Mkrtchyan, chief, Organizational Department, Armenian CP Central Committee.

[Correspondent] Misak Levonovich, whereas previously party organizations were formed using production-type criteria, nowadays, after this republic's Supreme Soviet has adopted the decree mentioned above, the overwhelming majority of them will evidently be created on the basis of a territorial criterion. Is that correct?

[Mkrtchyan] Yes, this process has already begun, but I would like, first of all, to remark that there is still no mechanism for implementing the decision taken by the parliament. We should strive to preserve and maintain the existing party structures as much as possible. Naturally, this should be done without interfering in production tasks; party work should be performed outside of the plant, enterprise, institution, or educational institution during nonworking time.

[Correspondent] Does that mean that party meetings, measures, and the collection of membership dues will be

conducted outside the place of employment, whereas the party structures will be preserved and maintained?

[Mkrtchyan] That's something, naturally, which we'll have to give some thought to, and there's no need for undue haste in this matter. For example, the structure of the party organization at the Armelektromash Production Association can be retained.

[Correspondent] But wouldn't that contradict the decree adopted by the Supreme Soviet?

[Mkrtchyan] Not at all. The party organization does not operate or function during working time, the partkom [party committee] is removed from the territory, while the registering of communists, payment of membership dues, and holding of party meetings, can be carried out, let's say, in a club or at another place.

To my way of thinking, under these conditions, which are complicated and difficult for our republic's economy, party organizations can and should, with the help of the communists, work to improve the state of affairs. It's very possible that after a certain period of time we'll arrive at the point of creating new forms of organizing the party structure. That will be dictated by our economic situation as well as by political conditions. For the present, however, we should retain the party structures in all those units where this is possible, while utilizing, naturally, those new forms and methods which do not run counter to the decisions which the parliament has adopted.

And another thing. As a deputy to the Supreme Soviet, I hope that our parliament will return to this decision and revise it. In my opinion, we should not deprive the Communist Party or any other party, for that matter, of the opportunity to organize their work specifically at the production site. But, of course, not by those forms and methods which were practiced for decades. A great deal has changed in our lives. The Armenian Communist Party has also changed and been reborn. For the first time in its history it has adopted an independent Program and Charter, having thus laid exclusively nationalist goals into the foundation of its activity.

[Correspondent] Let's return, however, to the new structures of party organizations.

[Mkrtchyan] And so in those organizations which are not included within the state formations, i.e., in kolkhozes, consumer-cooperative enterprises, creative unions, and public organizations, the structure of primary party organizations remains unchanged. Nowadays the task lies in making sure that the necessary material-technical and other conditions are provided for the activities of these organizations.

[Correspondent] At the plenum of the Armenian CP Central Committee there was talk to the effect that particularly large party organizations which have been created in accordance with a production-type criterion, which are functioning and which desire to retain their



own structural integrity could operate under raykoms. Just how would that be carried out or accomplished?

[Mkrtchyan] Indeed, such a provision was made, and it has forced us to "invent the wheel all over again." This plenum's recommendations proposed that large organizations be retained under party raykoms, i.e., that communists be registered in the party raykoms and that rooms be provided for them there. This, however, is not an instruction but rather a recommendation. We still do not know how viable such a structural form would be. It could work in some places, but elsewhere it could not be justified. Time will tell.

[Correspondent] However, as shown by the letters to our editors, there's no time for shilly-shallying because in many localities the communists don't know whether their organization exists or not. A kind of vagueness has been created.

[Mkrtchyan] That's correct. I want to continue talking about the new structural system, and this will provide an answer to the questions bothering the communists.

It is also recommended that we set up territorial-type primary organizations, i.e., using the criteria of electoral districts. Any of these territories might be regarded as a primary organization.

[Correspondent] But who could be registered in the party organizations of these electoral districts?

[Mkrtchyan] Pensioners, housewives, temporarily unemployed persons living in these territories, as well as deputies elected from these territories, and communists whose work is of a nature which is connected with the territory in question. Nor is the possibility excluded that these territorial primary party organizations could likewise register communists desiring to be on the party rolls at their places of residence. Territorial organizations could also be set up at places of residence or by neighborhoods. Here is another structural variant, if I may so express it—occupational-sectorial, primary, territorial organizations.

To my way of thinking, such party organizations could be created in cities, urban rayons, rayon centers, as well as in large villages—using the criteria of the nature of work and field of specialization.

[Correspondent] For example?

[Mkrtchyan] There could be, let's say, a primary party organization for staff members in the field of education. Moreover, if in a certain rayon the number of communists employed in the field of education were large, several such primary organizations could be established.

[Correspondent] And what kinds of party structures could there be in villages or rural areas?

[Mkrtchyan] Depending upon the specific conditions, the structures which I have listed above could also function in rural areas. Furthermore, particularly in

small villages, we could form party organizations uniting all communists residing or working in such villages.

[Correspondent] Does that mean that these organizations would also register the communists from sovkhoses and individual farmsteads, educational institutions, and other institutions and enterprises?

[Mkrtchyan] That's right. Moreover, those communists in party organizations included within the agroindustrial complex of rayon centers could band together into a single territorial organization; the necessary conditions have been created for them to operate in party raykoms.

And in those villages where there are kolkhozes, as I have already remarked, we should preserve and maintain their party organizations, insofar as this does not contradict the decree of the Supreme Soviet. And the remaining communists, in accordance with their own wishes, could register in a kolkhoz primary party organization.

[Correspondent] But who would guide or supervise the territorial or occupational-sectorial party organizations? To our way of thinking, they will be quite large organizations, and a secretary, engaged in other work, could hardly manage this business effectively.

[Mkrtchyan] Agreed. We on the Central Committee have exchanged opinions on this score with secretaries of party gorkoms and raykoms. Together with the party activists, we have worked out and sent to the localities our suggestions with regard to the structural formation of urban-type party raykoms. These proposals provide for them to have an institute of responsible organizers instead of instructors. It is precisely these responsible organizers who will guide, supervise, and systematize the activities of the territorial, occupational-sectorial party organizations. Let's say, for example, that one of the responsible organizers supervises the operation of the rayon's entire teacher organizations. The work being done by the organization of another sector could be conducted by the raykom secretary or by a department chief. That does not mean, however, that these organizations will not have their own elected secretaries. In the case of secretaries working on public principles, the organizational work will also be performed by the responsible organizers.

[Correspondent] Let's return to the question which is being addressed by communists to our editors: Let's say a party organization has been abolished or disbanded; but the communist does not want to leave the party ranks; what is he to do?

[Mkrtchyan] First of all, let me say that he should be extremely careful in approaching the very matter or instance of the party organization being eliminated. We have on record numerous instances whereby, in a number of localities, party organizations have been abolished without taking into account the opinions of most of the communists. In certain cases what was taken as a justification or grounds was merely the wish of a

group of communists; sometimes the elimination of a party organization occurred with certain other goals in mind. In my opinion, the communists of the above-mentioned organizations, being guided by the Charter of our independent Communist Party, and who have expressed disagreement with the decision to abolish the party organization, have the right to create their own party organization. After the decision was adopted to depoliticize the Yerevan State University, we had meetings and conversations with communists from this VUZ [higher educational institution]. During the course of such meetings and conversations the opinion was created that many communists want to have their own organization withing the university itself. In this case, to my way of thinking, our Communist Party Charter and the provision regarding the independence of a party organization accord communists the complete right to assemble and create their own party organization. And as to where they will hold their own meetings, that is already a matter for the organization itself and the party raykom to settle. Let me repeat again: Nobody has the right to forbid communists to engage in political activity on their nonworking time and outside the territory of a given institution.

And any communist for whom it is not clear where he can go to register has the right to turn to the party raykom for an explanation of this matter.

[Correspondent] Don't you think that it would be more effective if officials or staff members of the party raykoms were to visit organizations and meet with communists, especially so in small organizations with no party staffers? They could provide on-the-spot explanations of the state of affairs with regard to registering communists and the payment of membership dues.

[Mkrtchyan] This process already began after the Armenian Communist Party Congress, when the status of the party raykom was clarified, and when it was stated unambiguously that the central core of party work is the raykom.

[Correspondent] However, it is proceeding too slowly, as attested by the letters and telephone calls streaming into the Central Committee and the editorial offices. And so we could lose quite a few communists, persons whom the party needs.

[Mkrtchyan] We have many raykoms who are actively engaged in re-registering communists and forming new organizational structures. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that there are still many party leaders who were taken quite by surprise, who panicked, and who still have not fully realized that they are members of a political organization and, moreover, its leaders. There are instances of certain party officials not making available to every communist of his organization information concerning re-registration and the new structural system. Such officials are pursuing political and, possibly, even mercenary, self-seeking goals. I think that we should be bolder in freeing ourselves from such persons and accept

for party work those communists who have a precise idea of the situation which has been created and who want to engage seriously in party work, rather than wasting time in waiting around for a new, advantageous and profitable appointment. Such a situation was frequently the case in the past.

[Correspondent] Now here's a question relating to the payment of membership dues. There are organizations which were eliminated as far back as July and August of last year. There are communists who have not left the party ranks and who have not paid their membership dues. They simply do not know where to pay them. Furthermore, the total of the unpaid dues has become so large that it could inflict a damaging blow to the family budget. What can you tell us about this matter?

[Mkrtchyan] It's true that within this republic at the present time some 40 percent of the communists have not paid their membership dues for more than three months. The reasons are varied. Some party members have not paid because they do not know where to pay. The procedure which existed for decades has been disrupted, and there are certain communists who are waiting around to see how events turn out. To put it mildly, this is dishonorable and unseemly.

But if membership dues are not paid as a result of the situation which has been created, then the raykoms are entrusted with the task of accepting or taking dues from such communists directly in the raykom. S. Pogosyan also mentioned this in his speech at the Second Plenum of the Armenian CP Central Committee. Officials or staff members of the raykoms should be more bold in proceeding to the primary party organizations and making on-the-spot decisions regarding the problems that arise there, including the matter of dues. Perhaps what I'm about to say will sound somewhat bombastic or high-falutin', but let me remark that, at the present time, every communist should work very actively and exhibit great organizational skill and conscientiousness.

As to the question of how to proceed in the cases of communists whose debt now amounts to a tangible sum, the party raykom has been granted the right to proceed individually in each case so that this may be acceptable for the communist as well—to make payments in the amounts specified by the new Charter.

In my opinion, the problem of paying membership dues will be cleared up with the formation of the new organizational structures. There is no doubt that new circumstances will arise which will require new approaches. We must be more flexible, avoid stagnation or sluggishness, make more effective use of the possibilities embodied in the Charter in order to increase the militancy of the party organizations and their viability.

For this purpose, we need to be more specific in clarifying who among the communists is with us.

[Correspondent] By the way, how many party members are now registered on the rolls of the Armenian Communist Party? There are rumors going around that tens of thousands of communists have quit its ranks.

[Mkrtychyan] According to data as of 1 January 1991, there are now 191,000 persons in the ranks of the Armenian Communist Party. In comparison with the corresponding period of last year, this is 8,000 persons less.

As you can see, there still cannot be any talk of tens of thousands of persons quitting the party. Last year about 12,000 communists left the ranks of the party, but, as I have already noted, some members of the republic-level party organization have not paid their dues for more than three months. I do not consider them to have left the party. Many of them are still weighing over their own attitude toward the party.

[Correspondent] And how do matters stand with regard to recruiting members for the party ranks?

[Mkrtychyan] Of course, it would be inappropriate to compare this situation with years past. Because, after all, the political circumstances have changed. Last year 1400 new members joined the party ranks. Such was party recruitment during this past difficult and tense year.

A tense situation is also anticipated during the current year for the republic as a whole and for its Communist Party. We must solve many problems in the economy, as well as in political life and in the social sphere. And every party organization, having undergone a purification, a renovation of its structure and with regard to the contents of its activity, must have the ability to overcome the difficulties of the transition period and direct the communists' efforts to extricating this republic as rapidly as possible from the economic crisis, to consolidate all political forces and movements for the purpose of realizing and implementing our national goals. As noted in the basic provisions of the Program of the Armenian Communist Party, under the new conditions, the Armenian Communist Party is developing a strategy to extricate the people from the present crisis. Its goal is to consolidate all Armenians, to create a system of public or social protection, a society with a high standard of living, and an Armenian, sovereign, democratic state.

### **Azerbaijan Foreign Minister Interviewed**

91UF0382A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian  
16 Dec 90 pp 1-2

[Interview with Azerbaijan Foreign Minister G. Sadykhov by S. Bazhenov, BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY correspondent: "We Are Becoming Diplomats"]

[Text] Baku—In Paris at the end of November, a meeting was held of the heads of state of European

countries and the United States and Canada on questions of security and cooperation in Europe. A representative of Azerbaijan, Guseynaga Sadykhov, foreign minister of our republic, took part in the conference for the first time as part of the country's delegation. He talks about this trip and the planned changes in the activity of the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry with a BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY correspondent.

[Correspondent] Guseynaga Musayevich, participation in such a major event for Europe as the Paris meeting was surely not fortuitous. The republics' changed status cannot fail, evidently, to influence their role in the international community also....

[Sadykhov] I should make clear right away that I was not a member of the official USSR delegation at the Paris meeting. Together with officials of the foreign policy sphere of other republics we performed a representative role. But the significance of our participation in the intermediate meeting of heads of the European countries between Helsinki-1 and Helsinki-2 was great, nonetheless. And primarily for us personally.

First, direct participation in an event of such political scale (it was attended by more than 7,000 journalists alone) was an invaluable school of diplomatic work at the highest level. Second, such activities afford great opportunities for keeping the world community abreast of the processes that are unfolding in our republic. Third, it was in Paris, however oddly, that we were able, for the first time, perhaps, to make the close acquaintance of our colleagues from other republics, ascertain in detail their understanding of the situation that has taken shape in the country and evaluate more precisely the directions of future horizontal contacts within the framework of our renewing Union.

The chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the Russian Supreme Soviet, the foreign ministers of Moldova and Armenia, and Belorussia's permanent representative in UNESCO took part in the Paris meeting. There was no representative from the Ukraine. The Georgian representative arrived at the conference late and altogether kept quite apart from the Union delegation. There were no representatives from the Baltic republics since they had sought observer status at the meeting in Paris, but the organizing committee had not supported them.

The entire two and a half days in Paris were very intense. I had interesting talks with journalists of the most diverse publications, diplomats from the United States, Germany, and Holland and officials of the UN machinery. So had the organizers of the Paris meeting not invited us on a tour of Paris prior to the arrival of the main delegation, we would most likely not have seen the capital of France. Generally, the trip was filled up primarily with work....

[Correspondent] Comparing our country's successes in foreign policy activity with the difficult situation that has taken shape within the Union has already become

the rule. Indeed, our "foreign" perestroyka has become a reality that can be perceived by all in practice. In this connection the question: Will there be any changes in the activity of the foreign policy department of our republic?

[Sadykhov] I hope that there will be very shortly. The Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry has already drawn up a wide-ranging program of restructuring its own work. It should be approved quite soon in the government of the republic and will then have acquired the legal right to implementation. I can today, therefore, speak merely of our ideas in general outline.

Our ministry recently underwent reorganization, for example: four departments were created out of the three (consular, protocol, and information). And with the change of name of the departments there also has been a change in their functions to a large extent.

Departments of information and political analysis, international economic relations, and cultural and humanitarian relations, and a consular service and protocol department have been created.

In addition, the new tasks facing the republic's diplomats under the conditions of strengthening actual sovereignty of the members of the Union of SSR are forcing us today even to think about the creation in our ministry of new subdivisions. For example, there has long been a need for the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry to have a Near and Middle East department. As you know, priorities for Azerbaijan from the viewpoint of the relations set forth above are such countries as Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Iraq. In studying in skilled manner the political processes occurring there and drawing up the corresponding recommendations for the USSR Foreign Ministry and the leadership of our republic, we will be able to play a more substantial part in the business of stabilizing the situation in this complex region.

There has been a considerable broadening and strengthening of Azerbaijan's independent ties to various international public organizations. Contacts of republic organizations and ministries and departments with their overseas partners are increasingly switching to a permanent footing. This is a natural process. We would like to create under the auspices of our Foreign Ministry a special international organizations department in order in the very near future to have representatives of Azerbaijan included in such major organizations of the international community as UNIDO, UNICEF, and UNESCO. In addition, there are no objections on the part of the USSR Foreign Ministry to Azerbaijan having its own permanent representative in the United Nations even. I am sure that we will necessarily come to this sooner or later, but it is necessary to be preparing even now.

A very necessary business in the extremely complex political situation that has come about in our region is providing the republic with full and reliable information on what is being thought and written about us overseas and also prompt notification of the world community of

the events occurring in Azerbaijan. To this end it is planned to create at our Foreign Ministry our own press center, where meetings, briefings, and news conferences with local and foreign journalists will be organized.

One further innovation, which has already obtained conclusive support in the USSR Foreign Ministry, is the inclusion as part of Soviet embassies and general consulates of representatives of Azerbaijan in countries in a consolidation of contacts with which we are particularly interested. Five such countries have already been determined: Iran, Iraq, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. Our representatives there would defend the interests of the republic directly, which should have a positive effect on the entire spectrum of Azerbaijan's ties to these countries.

In addition, in connection with Articles 7 and 33 of the Law on Citizenship of the Azerbaijan SSR, enacted on 26 June 1990, these representatives of the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry will be entrusted with duties pertaining to the solution of all questions connected with defense of the interests of citizens of the republic temporarily or permanently in these states.

And, finally, a productive initiative, in our view, of the Azerbaijan Foreign Ministry concerning the creation of an association of Caspian countries headquartered in Baku is at the development stage. Such an idea has preliminarily already obtained approval in the leadership of our republic and in Moscow and in the republics whose territory looks out onto the Caspian. We intend such an association to incorporate not only Azerbaijan, Russia, Turkmenia, Kazakhstan, and Iran but also, in accordance with the regulations defining the status of international associations, "second echelon" countries and republics, that is, associations contiguous with the principal subjects.

What goals are we pursuing in embarking on the creation of an association of Caspian countries (AKS)? First, the AKS could, in our view, play a pivotal part in the elaboration of an environmental policy pertaining to use of the riches of the Caspian uniform for all republics and countries concerned. Inasmuch as the Caspian is an inland system, we cannot on one shore perform some ecologically useful activities, and on the other, put its nature at the service of purely production needs, making it a cesspool of the plants and factories. And in the financial respect also, the problem is so serious that it is impossible to restore the waters of the Caspian to health alone.

One further aim of the creation of the AKS is the establishment of direct economic and trade cooperation among Caspian republics and states. In addition, the creation of the association will make it possible, in our opinion, to additionally attract the attention of international scientific and business circles to the development of this region to the common benefit of all the parties concerned. Azerbaijan's advantageous geopolitical location will enable us to quickly take a considerable step

forward along the path of the development of a republic transport system and the creation in Baku of a most modern communications center, satellite included.

In a word, we are hoping that with the creation of the AKS, Azerbaijan will be able to restore its historical role of connecting link between Europe, Asia, and Africa.

As you can see, big changes are planned in the activity of the Republic Foreign Ministry. Their practical realization will require much effort and, of course, money.

But it is possible to become not conditional diplomats, as was the case recently, but diplomats in practice (it is such an assignment that we set ourselves today) only via specific activity that is as useful as possible to the republic's interests. The times themselves have given us our assignments. Not lagging behind them, seeing political processes as they develop, and being prepared for them—there is no working in the Foreign Ministry today without these qualities.

### **Sobchak Claims Gorbachev Misinformed on Events Leading to 1989 Tbilisi Massacre**

*91US0268A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Jan 91 p 6*

[Article by Anatoliy Sobchak: "The Tbilisi Syndrome"]

[Text] The formation of parliamentary commissions began at the 1st Congress of People's Deputies. And finally I asked to be included in the Tbilisi commission, even though I understood full well the complicated work it faced, and how hard it would be to participate in it.

The events were still bleeding; Georgia had not come out of shock; information continued to come in on the ever-increasing number of people poisoned by the army's gases, and every word from the tribune threatened with popular explosion. The safety fuse was blowing right there in the auditorium. General Rodionov lay all the blame on extremist informants, organized fighters, and fierce opposition on the square. The general declared of the women who had died that the fighters had covered themselves with them, as a shield.

The Georgian deputies could not agree with such an assessment. They said that on that night not only had the army fought against an unarmed populace, and used entrenching tools and combat gases, but even refused to disclose what these gases were.

The situation was so acute that one deputy even stated that he saw no need to create a commission, nor for any sort of investigation. Everything was clear without it. The only answer needed was, who gave the order?

It seemed that such a statement had a purpose. After all, troops subordinate to Moscow had been used. And it was clear that such a type of command could only have been issued by Moscow.

The audience, electrified, waited for just one thing—a name.

Gorbachev did not get into the subject with the audience. He said that it was necessary to get to the bottom of it; that the issue touches upon the very foundation of the existence of our state and political structure. Meaning a commission was needed.

Here the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee made a slip of the tongue quite dangerous to him: He stated that he had just returned to Moscow from England on 8 April. Of course, no serious politician would mix up such dates intentionally. All the more so because the day of his return had already been reported in the April newspapers. We can understand Gorbachev; his plane landed at Sheremetyevo late in the evening of 7 April, so no wonder two months later a date gets forgotten and mixed up. But try to explain that to people who want to hear your name cited and are already certain that the order for the punitive expedition to Tbilisi was issued by the general secretary.

In addition, Gorbachev aggravated the situation by asking Lukyanov to read the encrypted cables sent by the Georgian Central Committee and signed by Dzhumbar Patiashvili. Yes, two encrypted cables were read and from the start they had the effect of exploding bombs: While until that time, Georgia was certain that Moscow alone was to blame in everything that had happened, it became clear from the secret cables that the troops were sent after the panicked appeals of the Georgian leadership.

But it soon came to light that Lukyanov had not read the first secret cable to the end, omitting the final point which stated that the republic leaders were requesting Moscow's consent to conduct the "indicated measures." And the congress that had up till then been certain of the center's guilt now just as wholeheartedly and trustingly believed that the Georgian leadership was to blame for it all.

The mood in the hall had been broken. No one demanded an immediate answer any more, and the congress began to form a commission.

I became its chairman unexpectedly. We met the day after the congress confirmed its membership, and the issue of chairmanship arose.

Then I said that the procedure for work must be defined before anything else, and I offered my own procedure—what questions we must answer, which documents to scrutinize, whom to meet with. We were the first parliamentary commission to begin working at the congress, and the parliament did not yet have any experience with such hearings. Then one of the commission members said, "If Sobchak has a plan, let him be chairman."

No one had yet imagined how the matter would go, and despite the fact that my election obviously did not please some party leaders, the commission did not encounter



any obstacles in the very beginning. The party apparatus still controlled everything, and an inappropriate commission chairman was small potatoes. And its composition was quite disparate. It was clear from the very beginning that it was necessary to construct the work so that people with diverse experience and political convictions come to a single opinion on the basis of many facts.

Almost the entire commission set off for Georgia (exceptions were made only for those who really could not travel). Except for General Govorov, who had his own plane at his disposal, we all flew scheduled flights. We landed late in the evening. We were taken to a suburb, to a dacha of Georgian Council of Ministers.

You have no perception of time when you work without distractions. At 9 o'clock in the morning, we were at the House of Government. Toward 7 o'clock, sometimes 8 o'clock we return to the dacha and discuss the results of the day without any outsiders. Here we viewed videos and films.

The reel taken by state security associates proved particularly valuable. We watched it dozens of times. The cameramen shot the rally without interruption from 9 PM on 8 April until 5 o'clock in the morning, when it was all over and in the frame remained only the square, dead, covered with tattered rags and shoes. The professionalism of the cameraman must be given its due; the spot for the shoot was chosen quite capably, it was set up in the House of Artists, exactly opposite the House of Government.

We studied other film versions as well, presented by cinematographers, and amateurs. Naturally, there was less visual information in these, but together with the state security film, there arose a particular stereoscope effect: It was as if you yourself were standing on that square, as if you were counting the seconds. And there seemed to be only one thing distinguishing you from the people on the square: They still did not know how this would end. They are excited; an entire palette of emotions is on their faces. And then simply horror, horror...

Polling is the most labor-intensive work. We polled both the republic leaders and the party leaders, everyone who was involved in the decisionmaking and sending the secret cables. Yet the most important thing is eyewitnesses. It was explained in the paratrooper regiment (it had participated in dispersing the rally) that yes, entrenching tools had been used. The assault troops were convinced that they had no other way to execute the order.

That General Rodionov abrogated the written directive of General Headquarters is obvious. This directive was based upon the order of the minister of defense, and stated that the troops are being allocated to protect the most important government and municipal sites. Rodionov was to have guarded the Central Committee building, the airport, the prison... Instead, he threw units at unarmed people. The general-colonel replied thus: First of all, he was senior in rank and secondly, there

took place the decision of the Georgian CP Central Committee Buro on his appointment as commander of the operation. And as a buro member he was obligated to submit. A strange argument, if we consider that along with Rodionov, General Konstantin Kochetov, first deputy defense minister, took an active part as a consultant in developing the operation. We did not exclude that it was through General Kochetov that the oral assignment of Rodionov as operation leader for dispersing the rally was reduplicated. Or Kochetov also forgot to report to his minister in Moscow that by decision of the republic buro, his order in effect had been betrayed?

Does this mean that Rodionov must bear the responsibility of a commander who violated an order?

From the transcript of the Supreme Soviet Commission session.

[Yazov] "No orders from the Ministry of Defense concerning the dispersal of the rally came from anyone."

[Sobchak] "Did comrade Rodionov and comrade Kochetov inform you on the 8th of the proposed operation to exclude the rally participants from the square?"

[Yazov] "The final conversation with comrade Rodionov took place at about 1700-1800 hours, after my return from the Central Committee. That was the evening of the 7th."

[Sobchak] "We are interested in the 8th, because it was on the 8th that the decision on the operation was made."

[Yazov] "On the 8th sometime about 1200-1300 hours, after the end of the party aktiv. He told me that the party aktiv had ended, that some sort of decision had been made. But there was no talk that they were going to clear the square. Apparently the decision about that was made later."

[Sobchak] "You mean that there was no information?"

[Yazov] "There was none."

[Sobchak] "Do you consider these actions of comrades Rodionov and Kochetov to be correct?"

[Yazov] "No, I do not. They could have informed, they could have reported..."

From General Rodionov's speech to the 1st Congress of People's Deputies:

"...the overwhelming majority of members of the city's party aktiv, the majority of people's deputies of Georgia were participants in the meeting of the city party aktiv at 12 o'clock on 8 April. The party aktiv supported the buro's decision that the situation is becoming extraordinarily explosive and unpredictable as to its consequences. All measures of influence and appeals to common sense had been exhausted; the extreme measure remained, the use of force. But when extreme measures are used, the consequences may also be the most grave."

Thus, the reader may compare for himself the transcripts and Rodionov's address. Is it possible that it is not by accident that the minister at first completely forgot about a telephone conversation with his general on 8 April? And when he did recall, he asserted that "some sort (!) of decision had been made. But there was no talk that they were going to clear the square. Apparently the decision about that was made later." What decision was it that the general reported to Moscow about if after the party aktiv it was clear to him that "the extreme measure remained, the use of force"? And can the naivete of the general be believed if even during the day of 8 April he supposed that "the consequences may also be the most grave"?

From the transcript of the commission session:

[Yazov] "I reacted with regret. I did not thank Rodionov, I said, why did you take this upon yourself when there is the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Well, a decision had been made; he was the senior head. Well, senior head indeed. I report to you that comrade Rodionov, as commander, had the right to take upon himself responsibility for freeing the square. If the commission considers it necessary to that either Rodionov or I are responsible, then neither Rodionov nor I have the right to abdicate this responsibility, neither on a moral, nor any other level. Since troops were active, that means, to a certain degree..."

"To a certain degree" the responsibility of the minister himself is also limited.

The commission began the Moscow phase by studying the documents of the Committee for State Security, the CPSU Central Committee, the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

We were permitted access to the documents. Ministry, Central Committee, and KGB officials appeared punctually for hearings with the commission. But what would it be like with Politburo members, and primarily with Ligachev and Chebrikov, who had conducted a meeting on Tbilisi on the eve of the tragedy?

I tried to get in touch with them through various channels, both through the Central Committee organization department, and through their personal secretaries... No results. I appealed to Razumovskiy, the same effect. I sat down to write a letter to Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev:

"Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich!

"The Congress of People's Deputies Commission for the investigation of the Tbilisi events has completed its work. We have familiarized ourselves with all the documents and have heard all the individuals concerned, except for Politburo members and those party and state leaders who participated in the Central Committee meeting of 7 April, at which a decision was made on sending troops to Tbilisi. In the event that the indicated

persons do not appear before the commission within the next two days, we will be forced to halt our work, complete it, and note in our findings that these persons declined to appear to give explanations to the commission, and that all the political responsibility associated with this will be brought to bear upon them."

I handed this note right to Gorbachev at the end of July at a session of the old RSFSR Supreme Soviet. An early-morning call the next day: Chebrikov reports that he is happy to make my acquaintance and that he had heard that the commission wanted to meet with him, and he is ready... We set it up on the spot that he will come to the commission at 11.

A call again 15 minutes later. Ligachev's voice on the line. An exchange of courtesies. I suggest that he come towards 2 o'clock, or even 2:30. Chebrikov is scheduled for 11 o'clock, and apparently, the conversation will be lengthy. Practically a minute's pause on the line. Apparently Yegor Kuzmich is not prepared that a conversation with a deputy commission could be thorough. The discussion with the one and the other lasted over three hours. At times, both gave not completely precise answers, and at times discussed general political subjects in detail.

Ligachev said that on 7 April he conducted a typical business meeting in the Central Committee, "simply an exchange of opinions," and that minutes were not kept. Two phrases of Yegor Kuzmich are etched in memory: "I am certain that we will have a one-party system," and "We will finally get to the point at which some few, or dozens, but no more, must absolutely be isolated in order to create a peaceful, normal life for people." Perhaps the second phrase is the key to understanding political figures of Ligachev's type—they perceive themselves to be the bearers of a higher truth. And any means are suitable for its achievement. A phrase casually uttered by Chebrikov is also etched in memory: "We gave a certain force in order that it help resolve on the scene what to do."

Perhaps there is no more precise formulation for the idea of that collective irresponsibility, which in the language of party functionaries is called "the collegiality of decisionmaking." Thus is born the notorious "collective thought," the herd thinking of a system. And I do not rule out that the Tbilisi tragedy is the result of just such an unconscious instinct of self-preservation of just such a system. On the eve of its political collapse, but already after totalitarianism had suffered defeat in the elections of people's deputies, the convulsion of events of 9 April had been pre-determined. Calculatedly (though I admit, unconsciously!), the system attempted to provoke such an exacerbation of events as would lead to the overthrow of perestroika.

General Rodionov showed the commission that Second Secretary of the Georgian Central Committee Boris Nikolskiy demanded of him 8,000 soldiers to impose order in Tbilisi even on 6 April.

From the transcript. General Samsonov, chief of the headquarters of the Transcaucasus Military District:

"On 6 April, at approximately 18:30, Nikolskiy telephoned me with a request to allocate troops to impose order. I replied that the district cannot do that...

"Then approximately 30-40 minutes later, comrade Nikolskiy called again, and said that he could not get in touch with the district commander. I reported that I had been in contact with the commander, and he supported me that it was not necessary to allocate troops to impose order. At the same time, I said that I would do nothing without a command. Nikolskiy replied that there will be a command, and about 20 minutes later, at approximately 20:00, Yazov called and inquired about the situation, and comrade Yazov said to contact and remain in communications with the republic leadership, but not to allocate troops without his command. Comrade Nikolskiy call a third time at about 20:30 and asked whether I had received a command."

[Viktor Chebrikov] "Nikolskiy came to me one time. He also came: Why doesn't the Central Committee support us in repressive measures? I told him that the Central Committee will never support him in repressive measures. Now the situation is different."

I would mention, however, that even after the Tbilisi tragedy, Yegor Ligachev was certain of the need for specifically repressive measures. Incidentally, Yegor Kuzmich resoundingly denied any sort of contact or negotiations with Nikolskiy.

A number of explanations of CPSU Central Committee Buro members state that the show of military equipment in the streets of Tbilisi on 8 April was the idea of that same Nikolskiy, although he himself called such confirmations "cunning." Supposedly he did not have the power to take such responsible measures.

(Has the reader noticed how a substitution has occurred here? After all, we are talking about an idea, and not the actual making of the decision! It is another matter that the decision was not really made by Nikolskiy himself).

Incidentally, a show of military equipment was then taking place in a number of cities of the Baltics, in Riga, Tallinn, Pyarnu, Shyaulyaye. We asked Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov what he thinks about this action. At first he replied that this had occurred "as preparation for training," and that he "does not consider this an intimidation of comrades from the Baltic republics." True, he immediately clarified: Combat equipment on the streets and squares of peaceful cities on that day was a "definite reaction" to the picketing of the general headquarters of the Baltic Military District.

Why were minutes not taken at the session of the Central Committee on 7 April 1989? We did not get an answer to this question from either Ligachev, or from any other highly placed official. Did they understand what an important decision they were making? I am certain that

they understood. I think that this is precisely why they did not leave any documents and did not take any notes.

And so that decision is not recorded anywhere, but two participants in that meeting (Trushin, deputy minister of internal affairs and Yazov, defense minister) immediately set out to implement that decision. And they do it quickly; the first units of internal and special purpose troops start to arrive in Tbilisi that same evening, and the airborne troops will arrive the morning of 8 April. No, Gorbachev was not in Moscow, yet the "session" participants did not consider it necessary to inform even head of Government Ryzhkov.

The commission also met with Eduard Shevardnadze. The sincerity and emotion of his answers made a strong impression on us. He said that the events in Tbilisi had become his personal tragedy. He described how, upon landing there, he without delay began to find out the details of the use of poisonous substances. The military asserted for some time that they had not been used. And only when the doctors proved that the people who had been on the square had obvious symptoms of poisoning by highly effective chemical substances did the military admit the use at first of various modifications of ["cheremukha"] and later of the gas "C-X".

Why did Shevardnadze perceive the Tbilisi tragedy to be his own? I do not think it is just because he is a Georgian and from Tbilisi. If Shevardnadze had been in Moscow, rather than London, on 7 April, and if on the night of 8 April he had flown to Georgia, as Gorbachev had suggested, it would seem that the slaughter at the House of Government could have been avoided. But the encrypted cable of 8 April prepared by Nikolskiy and signed by Patiashvili presented the matter in such a way that the situation was stabilizing and the passions in the square were subsiding. But at this time, the fly-wheel of the military operation was already turning.

We also met with Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov.

And later it was necessary to write a letter to Gorbachev once again:

"The Commission for the Investigation of the Tbilisi events has completed its work, has heard from all persons concerned and from persons who participated in these events, and familiarized itself with all the documentation. We arrived at certain conclusions, and prepared the findings of the commission, but we wish to meet with you once more in order that our commission not be reproached that it did not dare demand the appropriate explanations from you, nor that you be reproached that you did not give the commission the opportunity to receive the necessary explanations..."

...We conversed for about an hour. We requested an explanation as to why Gorbachev cited at the 1st Congress the incorrect date for his return from England, when and how he was informed of the situation in Tbilisi...

Gorbachev replied that he had simply made a slip of the tongue at the congress, and that the Politburo had not met on the Tbilisi issue. There was just the usual meeting in the reception hall at the airport. Here he learned that just in case, the decision to assist Georgia with troops and put strategic site and Government buildings under guard had been made. He immediately proposed that Shevardnadze and Razumovskiy fly to Tbilisi, and an airplane was even readied. But Shevardnadze called Patiashvili in Tbilisi, and the latter assured him: There is no urgency, the situation is being defused.

[Yazov] "Mikhail Sergeyevich flew in from England at 23:30. Everyone met him. After Mikhail Sergeyevich briefed us on how the trip to Cuba went, and then England, he immediately asked about the situation here. In general, he had his bearings on what was happening in Tbilisi. Comrade Ligachev said: I got this secret cable today from comrade Patiashvili: what decision? A decision was made to send comrades Shevardnadze and Razumovskiy there in order to resolve all the problems on the scene. And in the event they make the decision to impose a curfew, there will again be a decision to send one regiment of an airborne division and a number of other units to protect public facilities."

We carefully re-read these lines: "...there will again be a decision..." It is clear that the greeters were silent on the fact that internal troops had already been transferred to Tbilisi, and the airborne troops had been issued an order that they would arrive in Tbilisi in a few hours. Gorbachev gave his consent for the transfer of troops only in the event that Shevardnadze and Razumovskiy make a decision on a curfew on the scene. In other words, Gorbachev is halting the transfer, and everyone verbally agrees with him, but Yazov "forgets" to rescind the order already issued. On the contrary, everything is being done in order to force the preparation of an operation, and to not let Shevardnadze into Georgia.

From the transcript:

[Chebrikov] "A conversation took place at the airport as to what measures to take. Gorbachev gave this reply: Let comrade Shevardnadze and comrade Razumovskiy fly to Tbilisi. But consider it, think about when to fly. I agree to let them go right now. But this is such a matter... The negotiations went through the night... We met again. This was already the next day, on Saturday (that is, on 8 April; A. Sobchak). I had to conduct this meeting. A group of comrades and I held discussions. We weighed out all the 'pros' and 'cons'. We asked once again to call. Once more, the talk was about how nothing was needed, the plane was waiting at the airport, everything was normal... And that was why the decision that comrade Shevardnadze and comrade Razumovskiy were not to fly was made. It was postponed..."

Thus, suspecting nothing, Gorbachev goes to relax at the dacha, Ligachev hurriedly goes on vacation, and the spring wound up earlier has already released, and by now nothing is capable of stopping it.

Silence can be more eloquent than any other admission. I cite most important lines from the letter that I received from Ye.K. Ligachev in October 1989:

"Esteemed Anatoliy Aleksandrovich!

"I recently familiarized myself with the conclusions of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet commission for the investigation of the events in Tbilisi on 9 April 1989....

"I feel it necessary to direct your attention to the following. The authors of this document significantly assert that at the meeting that took place on 7 April of this year, chaired by Ye. Ligachev, 'they decided to satisfy the request of the Georgian CP Central Committee for assistance in military force...'

"Indeed, on 7 April there took place an exchange of opinions on the situation in Georgia in the CPSU Central Committee with the participation of Politburo members, candidate members, and Central Committee secretaries. At the end of the session, I pointed out that the request for the allocation of troops to support public order and impose a curfew had not been discussed collectively in the republic organs of Georgia, and in fact stemmed orally from D.I. Patiashvili. In light of this, I proposed recommending that the Georgian CP Central Committee consider the existing situation in the leading republic soviet and party organs, in the Supreme Soviet Presidium, the Council of Ministers and the CP Central Committee. In doing so, it was particularly underscored that in action, political methods should be used; work with rally participants and in labor collectives, rather than sitting it out in offices...

"I categorically cannot agree with the assertion of the Georgian commission... that 'the events of 9 April were no secret for the country's leadership, including Ligachev.' The country's leadership found out about the tragic events after they had happened. As for myself, I can say that I found about this from a television report.

"Strictly speaking, until 7 April and after that day I had not participated in the consideration of the issues concerning Georgia...

"Respectfully yours, Ye. Ligachev."

What is it that Yegor Kuzmich forgot to report both at the commission session and in this letter? The fact that it was after the meeting he chaired that the transfer of troops began. And here is an obvious untruth: "At the end of the session, I pointed out that the request for the allocation of troops to support public order and impose a curfew had not been discussed collectively in the republic organs of Georgia..." It is not just a matter that minutes were not taken and it is impossible to check whether Yegor Kuzmich "pointed it out" or did not "point it out"... Let us recall that General Samsonov indicated that Nikolskiy demanded of him troops back on 6 April, and that it was on the 6th that Samsonov called Yazov on this matter.

The days for the commission's report were drawing near. When we had just begun work, it seemed simply impossible to reach some sort of single opinion. But still, the commission became the only one of all the commissions of the congress whose findings were signed by all its members without exception. Well, it would seem, a general and an informal from the People's Front have something in common? Yet if both are preoccupied with establishing the truth, if both share responsibility for the result to an equal degree, there are neither generals nor privates. And when the overall conclusions became obvious to everyone, an editorial group was formed.

For 10 days, we went out of town for 15-16 hours a day; we fought over every word. We rewrote the findings dozens and dozens of times.

Even today I recall those days with gratitude, that contact with wonderful people.

When Yegor Ligachev presents at the 28th CPSU Congress his candidacy for the office of deputy general secretary of the party, I will undertake an attempt to challenge him. I will ask when it was that Ligachev spoke the truth: When he asserted before our commission that there had not been any Politburo session, or later, at the Central Committee plenum, when he declared exactly the opposite?

[Ligachev] "Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, I must answer that question for you [familiar form]."

[Sobchak] "Absolutely!!!"

[Ligachev] "And I will ask you a question, comrade Sobchak! I have your address there in my briefcase. Now I'd like to talk about this: Ligachev said the same thing both there and here. Finally, I ask both those closest here, together with me, to say even a single word that the decisions made were made by all members of the Politburo. Under the leadership of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Finally, Mikhail Sergeyevich, I ask, I can ask as a comrade and a communist (noise in the hall)... And excuse me, but I spoke the truth, the honest truth. Then I said that we, the commission, comprising Politburo members, who numbered at least three-quarters of the total membership, made the decision... The only wise decision... I am still right... I deeply sympathize, and I apologize to the Georgian comrades that such a tragedy occurred... I say this humanely, and I am suffering deeply... This will even last a whole lifetime, but we, the members of the Politburo, are not involved in this extraordinarily tragic event... We had firmly agreed to resolve the issues by political methods; we told the former leadership of Georgia about this precisely and clearly, definitively... But why did I say about the Politburo... Anatoliy Aleksandrovich, after your reported at the 2nd Congress more or less objectively about what was published in the newspaper IZVESTIYA, on what basis did you burst out in the interview? I never, never said that anywhere, but let's talk in the presence of thousands of people... You burst out in your interview 2 weeks later in OGONEK, and wrote, you know what you

wrote? I'll quote it; I want this file copied... What did comrade Sobchak write? As soon as comrade Gorbachev leaves... Where did you go, to England, was it, Mikhail Sergeyevich? (noise and laughter in the hall) To England? There is comrade Ligachev, behind his shoulders and those of comrade Ryzhkov, who was here, you understand, who began... and gathered a commission and organized a conspiracy again... That kind... That is what I objected to, so you answer, why are you doing this: on the one hand, you say one thing, and on the other hand, you do something else! (noise, shouts, ovations)."

[Sobchak] "Yegor Kuzmich, I do not aspire..."

[Gorbachev] "The third microphone!"

[Sobchak] "To the office of deputy general secretary."

[Gorbachev] "Yegor..."

[Sobchak] "Yet I contend that..."

[Gorbachev] "Again I ask that the third microphone be turned on..."

[Voice behind the scene] "Turn off the microphone!"

[Voice from the third microphone] "Gerasimov, from the Komi delegation..."

Unfortunately, Gorbachev interrupted this extremely dramatic dialogue. A pity, since Ligachev had begun to develop a third version: It turns out that the decision to send troops to Georgia was made not at a "Central Committee meeting," not at a "Politburo session," but at some sort of "commission, comprising Politburo members, who numbered at least three-quarters of the total membership..."

I will not be surprised if tomorrow the "commission" turns into a symposium with the participation of the Ministry of Defense, or some sort of practical military seminar...

#### In Lieu of an Afterword

One year ago, during a break in a party plenum, regarding the crisis in Lithuania, Yegor Ligachev said in an interview that the country's leadership has grown wiser since the time of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan, and now it understands that political issues cannot be resolved with tanks.

M.S. Gorbachev was not an accessory to the tragedy in front of the House of Government in Tbilisi. Yet what has been done in order to punish those who were guilty that night? In Baku, the troops did nothing when pogroms were going on, and only after the cessation of the pogroms did the tanks storm the city, also at night. The action was conducted by the ukase of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet...



The president, in moving to the right, has himself become a hostage of reaction. And he has ceased to be the previous democrat and reformer. Thus the general secretary has overcome the president.

Tbilisi, Baku, the Baltics. These three tragic markers have defined both the personal drama of Mikhail Gorbachev and the fate of perestroika, which he so brilliantly began in the mid-eighties.

The events in the Baltics have shown once again how dangerous it is to use the army to resolve civil conflicts. It is dangerous for the very state which undermines its prestige with such actions and loses trust in the eyes of the people. It is also dangerous for the army, which is placed in a no-win situation, executing unlawful orders and playing the role of the solitary defendant for everything that has occurred.

Thus is exacerbated the political stratification of society and thus begins tragic confrontation.

Thus trust in the army is lost and thereby security of the state and the very existence of such a society is placed in question.

I appeal to the people's deputies to demand the convocation of an Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the creation of a parliamentary commission for the investigation of the actions of state officials which led to victims in the Baltics.

### Central Asia

#### Kazakhstan, Kirghizia Presidents on Gulf War

91P50105A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian  
20 Feb 91 First Edition p 1

[Article containing statements on the Persian Gulf War by President of the Kazakhstan SSR N.A. Nazarbayev and President of the Republic of Kirghizia A.A. Akayev at a press conference in Alma-Ata on the signing of an agreement between Kazakhstan and Kirghizia; "What Is Said, What Is Written..."]

[Text] President of the Kazakhstan SSR N.A. Nazarbayev:

This war must cease. While categorically repudiating a strong state's seizure of a weaker one, we also see that the UN mandate is being exceeded. This war should not turn into mass murder. All this must not be a pretense for America to demonstrate its concentrated force to us all...."

President of the Republic of Kirghizia A.A. Akayev:

"Saddam Husayn is an aggressor and he must leave Kuwait. But it is apparent that in this war America is pursuing objectives much greater than the liberation of Kuwait. These are geopolitical objectives. We are part of the Islamic world, Islamic culture. We cannot be indifferent to what is happening in the Persian Gulf region.

The attitude in the republic to this war is also ambiguous. Iraq is indeed not only one of the powerful states of the Near East, but also one of the thousand-year-old cultural centers for Muslims.

I think that in the new Union Treaty the participation of all the sovereign republics in the development of the foreign policy direction of our union state should be clearly established. In particular, this applies to events in the Persian Gulf region. The Soviet government worked out a specific position, but in fact did not consult with a single republic on it—neither with the Central Asian Republics and Kazakhstan, nor with those situated in direct proximity to the area of combat actions....This situation must change with the adoption of the new Union Treaty...."

#### 'Glasnost' Political Portrait of Nazarbayev

91US0102A Alma-Ata LENINSHIL ZHAS in Kazakh  
5 Oct 90 p 2

[Article by Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev, president of the Kazakh SSR, first secretary of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, recorded by Burkit Ayaghanov, political scientist, candidate in historical science: "Ambassador of Sovereignty"]

[Excerpts] The month of April 1990 is of special importance for Kazakhstan. On that important date multi-ethnic Kazakhstan elected its own president. Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan CP Central Committee first secretary, was found suitable for the post. The first president of Kazakhstan is 50 years old; he is married, has three daughters. Two of them have a higher education, and have formed their own families. The youngest daughter is still studying.

N.A. Nazarbayev himself is a graduate of the Abay imeni Kazakh School located in a small village near Alma-Ata. Abish, the father of the president, was a serious and hard-working man. He was a herdsman and devoted his entire life to agriculture. His mother, Elzhan, was a jovial, open and sharp-tongued person. N.A. Nazarbayev was remembered by his teachers and classmates as follows: "The future president distinguished himself among his fellow students for his purposefulness and seriousness." His school awarded him a silver medal.

The future president of Kazakhstan achieved his maturity just as the 20th Congress of the CPSU took place. And it will not be wrong if we regard as a natural thing the active interest of the young leaders of the 1960s in the winds of change. Faith was engendered in the clever leaders who emerged from the 20th Party Congress. With the exposure of the "great leader," and of other honored policies, the faith of the Soviet people in the party and in the Soviet regime was very substantial. The people harmonized their voices with the appeals and summons. During the 1960s, the fame of Kazakhstan's Magnitka was particularly well known. The entire class of young students in the Shamalghan school unanimously resolved to go to the Temirtau. However, at the final

school bell, only two students in the entire class remained true to their original promise. One of them was medalist N. Nazarbayev. After he had completed the technical school at Dneprodzerzhinski in the Temirtau, he was placed as a worker in the "Domenstroy" Construction Administration. After that, Nazarbayev worked as an iron worker, a bellows-operator for a blast furnace, and a dispatcher and gas worker in a blast-furnace division. He had higher technical and political education through correspondence study.

If we look at the political work of N.A. Nazarbayev, we observe rarely encountered success. He was recommended for Komsomol work in central Kazakhstan on the spot. The advantage of Komsomol work in our nation is that it is one of the best paths leading to party and soviet service. If we were to review the biographies of political figures in the Soviet Union, it is easily observed that most were Komsomol workers in their time. We think, in this connection, that there is nothing wrong in our mentioning that M.S. Gorbachev devoted several years of his life to service in the Communist Youth Union. But it is also true that not all Komsomol officials rise universally to the top. We know that most of them vanish from view like shooting stars. However, N.A. Nazarbayev was very conspicuous in his Komsomol work. For example, the February 16, 1964, issue of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA published a picture of Nazarbayev together with Yu. Gagarin. Other newspapers wrote about him. He also appeared in books, and his pictures were published. He was elected to congresses and conferences. Thus he became secretary, then second secretary of the Karaganda Oblast Party committee, and in 1979 secretary of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee. During the fateful days of December 1986, N.A. Nazarbayev was serving as chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers. Since 1989 he has been first secretary of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee.

A great many problems face the first Kazakh SSR elected president. We will touch only on some of the most important:

**1. The state of nationality relations. But it must properly be stated that the problems did not arise out of the December 1986 incident. The events of the incident are associated with problems already existing in Soviet society.**

**2. Social questions needing a final solution, but which have been gathering dust unresolved for decades.**

**3. Environmental questions, above all the location of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Testing Zone within the territory of the republic, and the condition of the Aral Sea, which is now drying up...**

**4. The sovereignty of Kazakhstan.**

To us it appears that the chief secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and all the presidents who now exist in the USSR are all-powerful and potent. To be sure,

there is no doubt that they have a lot of power in their hands. Thus the burden being taken up by the first president of Kazakhstan is a weighty one. But the truth of the matter is that the people of Kazakhstan have great hopes in their president. This is because it cannot be denied that the fate of the peoples of the republic for too many years has been decided by the above-mentioned "leaders," the likes of Stalin and his group, Khrushchev, Brezhnev and Suslov. The people have been deprived of their freedom, and have begun to become groups suited only for work and eating food. The people are in a dangerous state, but those speaking the truth are persecuted. The fat bureaucratic faction has divorced the Kazakh people, along with other peoples of the USSR, from their history, mother tongue, ethnic self-determination, even their own fate. Leading citizens of our people, men like Saken, Beyimbet, Iliyas, Sayitqali, Turar, Temirbek, Sanzhar, Akhmet, Maghzhan, Zhusipbek, Shakarim and others, have been persecuted as "people's enemies," and shot. In place of those punished and persecuted, monsters such as the harsh and tyrannical Goloshchekin and Belyayev came, men knowing nothing of national history or language, and who had no respect for the people. An attack on the spiritual life, culture and customs of our people began. Some 800 Kazakh schools were closed. People from outside colonized Kazakhstan forced the distribution of land to themselves without considering local people. Under such difficult conditions, our people began to be deprived of their national unity, and fell prey to a serious plague, a spiritual illness.

During the 1980s and 1990s, the social circumstances of the peoples living in Kazakhstan have gotten into a very bad state. The central authorities have been doing anything they please. They have established military testing areas and have robbed the earth.

In comparison to G.V. Kolbin, who was more inclined to slogans, N.A. Nazarbayev makes clear the primary directions and goals of his administration. At the same time, it is no secret that he is ready to discuss openly various questions which come up from time to time and trouble the people of the republic. He has discussed again and again in depth all the above-mentioned problems at meetings and plenums. In his evaluation of the 1986 December Incident at the CPSU Central Committee September Plenum, N.A. Nazarbayev took a different stance and said openly that the primary cause of the incident lay not in the nationality of an entire people, but in central voluntarism. Likewise, the republic party chief shared his ideas on republic sovereignty, and about pressures exerted by the central authorities. In the process of discussing old illnesses, particularly in the ethnic relations area dominating the sociopolitical and economic life of the republic, N.A. Nazarbayev strove to be very cautious and careful. Making known a unified point of view on social questions, he took various views on solutions to the nationality problems of the peoples of Kazakhstan, more specifically on the question of further development of the Kazakh language. The problems of

the millions of people in Kazakhstan, of the Soviet Germans, the Turk-meskhetsins remain unresolved. The problem of the nationality relations of the Kazakhs, and of the Russians, the two largest nationalities of the republic, are viewed in various ways. Certain things must be mentioned in this regard in particular. Under the slogans "internationalism," "assimilation and unity of the peoples," and "help for backward peoples," experiments too big for the Soviet people have been carried on. With these slogans as the background, various customs appropriate to the peoples have been deformed, nationality schools have remained closed, and population movements of millions of people have taken place. In a word, much work lies before the president who will have to carry out many measures to develop nationality relations further, in the cultural and language sectors in particular.

For a number of reasons, preservation of the Russian language by Russians living in Kazakhstan is hardly a problem. The well-known reason is that the Russian language continues to find wide use in all sectors. In the case of the Kazakh language, however, for a 40- or 50-year period, it has been nothing more than a language used at home, a second language. In essence, in the 90s of the 20th century, the problem of further development of the Kazakh language has become serious. However, when the issue was raised of what language should become the official language of the republic, the controversy became extreme. From time to time even contradictory views have been expressed on the language issue. The energy of N.A. Nazarbayev added a resolute and heroic voice. The draft of a Law on Language was quickly prepared, and then managed to be approved at a session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. In this connection it should be mentioned that the Kazakh SSR Law on Language was noteworthy for its democratic qualities, and satisfied the vast majority of the inhabitants of the republic. The Kazakh president became known for his competence, capability and knowledge under all circumstances; for example, at the mentioned session of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet. The following incident, for example, is recalled by the masses.

At the beginning of 1990, there was a great deal of dissatisfaction among Alma-Ata city youth on account of the slow pace of reform in the area of social plan problems and nationality relations. At the suggestion of Nursultan Abishuly, a meeting with youth, and with activists of various unofficial organizations was organized in the Palace of Culture of the Alma-Ata Cotton Fabric Combine. The conversations were open and honest. After the meeting the two sides separated with no hard feelings or dissatisfaction. This approach of the leadership to young people created trust in the hearts of many.

At the present time, it is well known that the opposition of members of the party leadership to one another is primarily a matter of cultural figures. As a matter of course, such persons openly and honestly express the side of the people. If we look carefully, the base of any

social movement is formed by the creative and technical intelligentsia. The Kazakhstan intelligentsia, however, is still unable to organize itself properly after the various Stalinist purges. Its role in political events is nothing like the role of party functionaries. For this reason, most republic and USSR people's deputies are oblast or rayon party committee secretaries, or other nomenclatura persons.

Since N.A. Nazarbayev was previously in Moscow, Leningrad, Sverdlovsk and Volgograd, he has had no reason hitherto to defend his point of view. On the contrary, it has seemed as if he speaks the same language as the others. However, he knows how extremely difficult it is to work with the working class in particular, and among them with Karaganda miners. Why this is so, no one knows, but one difference of Karaganda miners compared to other worker groups, oil workers or construction workers, for example, is that Karaganda miners have known how to preserve major qualities associated with their class, qualities of good organization and solidarity. For example, it was at their request that Karaganda Oblast party committee secretaries were reelected, and it is these miners who struggle actively for regional environmental cleanliness. M. Nurtazin and M. Tinikeyev, Karaganda representatives, were known for their activities at the First Session of Kazakhstan People's Deputies. During the session, miner M. Tinikeyev was elected chairman of a Supreme Soviet Commission in place of a nomenclatura person suggested from above. My purpose in mentioning all of this is as follows: at the time of the summer 1989 Karaganda miners' strike, N.A. Nazarbayev knew how to bring the workers over to his side. Judging by facts available to us, Nazarbayev refused to take the podium, and went directly to the workers. He is said to have introduced himself to some of them, told them about himself, and to have exchanged views. The strike of the miners was halted after that meeting. In my view, the first secretary of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee did not achieve success on this occasion solely because he established a one-to-one relationship with the strikers. At the same time the interests of the first secretary of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, and of the Karaganda miners were of one accord on the issue of independence. As a result Nazarbayev gained the strong support of the miners. This was something very special illustrating the truth of the Soviet era. N.A. Nazarbayev understood and knew how to express the demand of the miners. It is struggle with bureaucracy, and with pillaging of the natural riches of the republic. Let us offer the following facts by way of example: in terms of manufacture and processing of the various nonferrous metals, Kazakhstan stands in first place in the Soviet Union. The republic produces 40 percent of the Soviet Union's zinc, 60 percent of its lead, 90 percent of its phosphorus, and 95 percent of its chromium ore. Kazakhstan provides the nation something like 80 percent of its pure gold, silver, lead, oil and gas. The Karaganda Metallurgical combine produces high-quality rolled metals in tens of varieties. These metals are much in demand by Western firms. However, there is left over

for those producing these riches only a small fraction, and an ecologically polluted environment. It is no secret that central government ministers have continued to think of Kazakhstan as a nationality region with which they can do as they like. And what makes the president different from the strike committees, and from the rank and file citizens, is that he knows how to understand the complex situation he finds before him intelligently, and that he is disturbed by the fact that the greatest hindrances in the way of reform, plans and undertakings lie in the administrative-governmental system. It is well known that, a few months after the strike of the Karaganda minsters, the president offered the following explanation in a speech given to an Alma-Ata Oblast party conference: "Under the present system, at a time when the bureaucracy controls everything, there is absolutely no way to improve the life of the people of the republic." The answer he gave to a delegate to the 17th Congress of the Komsomol who asked, in this connection, "do you feel pressure from the Central Committee of the CPSU," was right to the point: **"The pressure I feel is not so great as before, but I still feel it."**

N.A. Nazarbayev's openness and his efforts to solve a given problem above all in terms of the interests of the republic have met the approval of the inhabitants of the republic. These things have also been noticed by foreign politicians. Marta Brill Olcott, U.S. political science professor and author of the major monograph "The Kazakhs" issued in the United States in 1987, evaluated Nazarbayev as an open and just economist. Exactly the same evaluation of the chief of the republic was given by David Lasselz (FINANCIAL TIMES, on the Soviet Union, February 1990). "In as much as M.S. Gorbachev thinks of N. Nazarbayev as his own man," writes D. Lasselz, "he has expressed the need to give great economic independence to the Kazakh republic. N. Nazarbayev turns out to be a very prudent man able to soften his own supporters with his guarantee that Kazakhstan will not leave the Soviet Union." However, Nazarbayev knows how to express the mood and feelings of the 16 million people of his republic perfectly. It is well known that dissatisfaction with food shortages and poor housing have resulted in strikes and disorders in some places (Karaganda, Zhanga Ozen, Tengiz—B.A.).

The president has issued several decrees with the intention of overcoming the social crisis in a short time. More specifically, these are: "On Additional Facilitations to Invalids and Veterans of the Great Patriotic War, to Internationalist Warriors and to the Families of Fallen Officers," "On Swift Measures To Strengthen State Labor Discipline," "On Measures To Bring to a Healthy State the Children Living in Aral and Qazaly Rayons of Qyzylorda Oblast, and in Shalqar Rayon of Aqtobe Oblast." The satisfaction of the inhabitants of the republic with all of these decrees has created trust. However, we cannot hide the fact that while we can say that these measures were enacted in good time, and are forceful, crisis conditions in the economy have put all but a complete halt to the efforts and work of the

president in this area. As has been the case before, prices are rising, a shadow economy is developing, labor productivity is falling and living conditions are worsening. Social difficulties have worsened along with republic economic problems, and the earthquake in Eastern Qazaqstan Oblast. Without being more specific, the following conclusion can be drawn: There will certainly be many problems and difficult decisions when Kazakhstan has obtained its state sovereignty. Only then, when the republic has become the complete master of its territory, will it become possible to solve swiftly and independently all the many important questions. N. Nazarbayev has understood how to evaluate and concentrate on the situation in good time, and has begun to set in motion purposeful measures of importance if sovereignty is really to be gained by the republic. One advantage of Kazakhstan compared to the Ukraine or Georgia, where a large part of the intelligentsia and of the people is more active than the party apparatus and its leadership, is that here everything is the opposite. At a time when social pressure from below is not felt to the same degree in Kazakhstan, the issues of freedom and independence are frequently and resolutely placed before the party leadership, and subsequently before the republic presidential center. We still remember how Nursultan Abishuly spoke openly of his frustration at the XVII Congress of the Kazakhstan Komsomol: **"Sometimes the ministers in Moscow say to me that it is not the people of the republic who need sovereignty, but Nazarbayev himself."**

In his struggle against bureaucratic aggressiveness, N. Nazarbayev has received help from an unexpected place. For well-known reasons, decisions of newly elected governments of republics situated along the Baltic cannot find very much support in Kazakhstan. However, the election of B.N. Yeltsin to the chairmanship of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and, most important, the sanctioning of declarations of sovereignty by first the Russian, and then the Ukrainian and Belorussian parliaments, have helped N. Nazarbayev and his supporters greatly in their struggle against central pressure. This has provided the stimulus leading to the organization in Alma-Ata of a conference of the leaders of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

I think that the question of sovereignty for Kazakhstan raised by Nursultan Abishuly is something for the rejoicing of every citizen of the republic, whoever he is. However, it will not be easy to carry out this goal. It is only one circumstance, and does not take into account various factors such as republic demographic realities, the still low level of the political culture of our people, timidity within the governmental apparatus towards Moscow, and its subservience. In these and other areas (for example in ratifying the "Law on Language"), the president of Kazakhstan has known how to display his own special approach. As we see it, Nursultan Abishuly has spoken openly at all past meetings, plenums, sessions and assemblies about republic sovereignty, and about the sabotage of the bureaucrats. These questions have

also not remained out of view in the interviews Nazarbayev has given to national publications. Secondly, there has taken place a conference of the heads of the Central Asian Republics, and of Kazakhstan in Alma-Ata at the initiative of Nazarbayev. It is no secret that each of them up until the time of the conference communicated with one another through Moscow, were dependent upon the central authorities, and were unable to solve their own problems themselves. For that reason, we have confidence in the brilliant future of resolutions made in the conference of the heads of the Central Asian republics, and of Kazakhstan.

Since N. Nazarbayev is a political realist, he cannot help but notice the harmfulness and inefficiency of the political system which has hitherto existed. He has striven to change and refine this system. But while he has planned to carry out major reforms, one problem prevents him from achieving his goals: this is the so-called all-union system which exists above the republics. In principle, all-union organs are needed. However, these organs are needed as a coordinating system, not as an utterly rigid, bureaucratic system. In the time of "the Father of the Peoples," the all-union organs held all control functions in their hands, were little, if at all, responsible for their decisions, and obstructed any initiatives from "below." As a matter of policy, the decisions were made by the central authorities. However, those in local areas were responsible for the deficiencies.

As a product of the Soviet party-state system, N. Nazarbayev has chosen to make gradual changes in the system rather than destroy it completely. The carrying out of such gradual changes in multiethnic Kazakhstan has now become a guarantee of the restraint of its citizens, and makes possible swift resolution of established nationality and social questions. For this reason as well, it is beneficial to employ real trust, and gradual ideas, rather than swift steps for Kazakhstan at this time. However, fundamental reform must remain on the agenda and cannot be put off.

A politician who seeks to reform society must, above all, know well how to work within the system. In this respect, N. Nazarbayev has many advantages. For example, we are not incorrect in saying that N. Nazarbayev came to us already formed as a politician, and very knowledgeable about all aspects of working within the system, and with the internal structure of the political apparatus. And at the decisive moments his strong organizational efforts have been evident. For example, there were many expressions of this at the time of the election of the republic president, during the session of people's deputies, and at the 17th Congress of the Kazakhstan CP.

G.V. Kolbin and his allies carried out major organizational efforts prior to the 8th Plenum of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee. Members of the Kazakhstan CP Central Committee were assigned a specific task: "to expose the veneration in which D.A. Kunayev and others were held." Some members of the Central Committee, more specifically, V.P. Demidenko, then first secretary

of of the Qostanay Oblast Party Committee, and others, absolutely refused to do what they were ordered. Some dwelt on the mentioned subject in their speeches. As for N.A. Nazarbayev, he further developed in his speech criticism of his compatriot Kunayev expressed at the 16th Congress of the Kazakhstan CP. First and foremost, N.A. Nazarbayev said that he was a supporter of D.A. Kunayev, and criticized himself. He spoke about the fact that due to the bad situation in the Central Committee Bureau nothing was being done, and about how many abuses now giving rise to dissatisfaction and accusation could be handled. N.A. Nazarbayev in a 1987 issue of DRUZHBA NARODOV stated in detail how he himself and his family were pressured by former protege D. Bekezhniov when he mentioned D.A. Kunayev, and those about him. In a youth meeting held in Alma-Ata in November of 1989, Nursultan Abishuly placed special emphasis on the fact that D.A. Kunayev was not of one mind with Churbanov and his people, Shchelokov and his people, and Rashidov and his people.

In an interview published in PRAVDA (February 23, 1990), N. Nazarbayev again touched on this contentious theme and stated: "I drew conclusions from the open criticism of Politburo member D. Kunayev and myself at our party congress. [There follows discussion of the 16th Congress of the Kazakhstan CP]. Let me say openly: I did this after thinking about the matter carefully, but with confidence, knowing well who the criticism was directed at, and with the belief that time would judge him properly in everything. I advanced constructive, effective criticism..."

To evaluate the political activities of D.A. Kunayev, it seems as if one must understand his times. The gentleman shaped the governmental administrative system of our country, and repeatedly served in it. For that reason, it is very difficult, for example, to attribute to him, even in the broadest sense, struggle against Moscow bureaucrats, or the problems of the Era of Stagnation. If D.A. Kunayev had somehow drawn a conclusion about the imperfection of established circumstances, he would doubtless have assigned the blame to such things as "nationalism," or "separatism," etc., and quite likely have gone about suppressing it. This would have been a natural expression of his times.

The question may arise of how we rate N. Nazarbayev politically these days. In this regard we can say that the president enjoys great authority not only in the republic, but in the entire Soviet Union. For example, 2066 delegates to the 28th Congress of the CPSU, or about 40 percent of all delegates to the congress, answered as follows the open question: "what individuals do you suggest as leaders of the party?" More than half named M.S. Gorbachev, but 8.2 percent of those questioned choose the leader of Kazakhstan communists. As we can see from the answers to the poll, Nursultan Abishuly received a very high percentage of the votes. He received more votes than E.A. Shevardnadze (6.9 percent), B.H. Yeltsin (4.3 percent), I.K. Polozkov (3.2 percent) and Ye.K. Ligachev. N.A. Nazarbayev has been nominated



several times as a candidate to the post of deputy chief secretary of the Central Committee CPSU. However, he declined for good reasons. He fully justified himself in an interview given to SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN. He stated that the republic president could not give up the republic at the difficult time when he had just begun reform.

To tell the truth, it seems as if reformer-politicians such M.S. Gorbachev and N.A. Nazarbayev are today taking vengeance for times past, against Stalin and his cohorts. The reason is that the state created by Stalin, Kaganovich, Beriya, Voroshilov and Budennyi, and the others like them, while in theory a union of democratic republics, was in fact nothing more than a continuation of the Russian empire. After the death of the leader, there was clumsy distortion of the ideal of nationality structure, of a union of equal republics advanced by Lenin. The idea of sovereignty of nationality republics went unfulfilled, and remained on paper only. For that reason, the struggle of persons such as N. Nazarbayev, Landsbergis, Pruskene, Gumbaridze and Karimov towards sovereignty has been extremely difficult. Kazakhstan is altogether different in its demographic structure, topography and expanse.

The 28th Party Congress, convened under difficult and interesting circumstances, gave the victory to forces which have saved our nation from the great perplexity from which it had been suffering. However, the victory was not an easy one. Conservative groups led by Yegor Ligachev, which have not given up the imperial idea, were able to strike at the democratic forces of the party at the congress. Some of them are military people, marshals and generals. For example, Sh. Murtazayev, chief editor of SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN and a delegate to the 28th Party Congress, has related the following incident: "We found ourselves sitting with a lieutenant-general. I was very close to the general, and showed him the articles by Olzhas Suleymenov and Colonel Petrushenko, printed side-by-side in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. He read unhurriedly. 'Petrushenko is right,' he said. That is what he said. Are the environmental conditions about the Semipalatinsk Test Zone truly like a paradise? Did not Petrushenko become a general for that deception? What of it? It is fine with me. He should have...., said the lieutenant-general almost too emphatically." (SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN, June 17, 1990). At that time, it turned out that the reformists led by M.S. Gorbachev, A.N. Yakolev were very much in need of help from the nationality republics.

Looking at my political portrait of N.A. Nazarbayev, I am far from idealizing him. Just as any person has his shortcomings, he has, in addition to his good qualities, his shortcomings too. He is, to a certain degree, a representative of the Soviet political school. However, whatever changes are taking place today in the republic, Kazakh SSR President Nursultan Abishuly Nazarbayev will make his contribution. Time will judge his achievements and results.

### Controversies Around Former First Secretary Kolbin Examined

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[Article by Zhapsarbay Qwanyshev, candidate in historical sciences: "Kolbin: Brush Strokes of a Political Portrait"]

[Excerpts] On 17 December 1986, the official statement about the December 16 5th Plenum of the Kazakhstan CP devoted to organizational questions was published in all republic newspapers. In it, it was stated that, in connection with the retirement of D.A. Kunayev, the Plenum had relieved him of his post of first secretary, Kazakhstan CP Central Committee, and appointed in his place G.V. Kolbin, first secretary of the Ulyanovsk Oblast Party Committee and member of the CPSU Central Committee.

We found out from the biography of Kolbin printed with the announcement that comrade Kolbin was born 7 June 1927, in Nizhniy Tagil City in Sverdlovsk Oblast, that he was Russian, had a higher education, and was a 1955 graduate of the Oral Polytechnical Institute. He has been a member of the CPSU since 1954, and has been involved in party work since 1959: Nizhniy Tagil Factory Party Committee secretary, rayon committee first secretary, from 1962, second secretary of the city party committee, from 1964, city party committee first secretary, from 1970 to 1975, secretary of the Sverdlovsk Oblast Committee, and after that, between 1975 to 1983, second secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee, and from 1983, first secretary of the Ulyanovsk Oblast Party Committee.

He has been awarded the following orders and medals: the Lenin, Kazan Revolution, two red banner of labor and labor glory.

Today, when we look at the fading pages of those newspapers from 1986, we cannot help but recall an event which occurred a year ago. This was the decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet to name G.V. Kolbin chairman of the USSR People's Control Commission. Why it is I cannot say, but there is somehow a proper connection between these two events. There are two reasons I say so. First of all, while thanks were expressed at the 1986 Kazakhstan CP Central Committee 5th Plenum to D.A. Kunayev for his many years of work, and for the things accomplished by Kazakhstan during those years, it was also pointed out that many problems had accumulated and were still unresolved. Thus, the person to solve these questions was, to be sure, G.V. Kolbin. Secondly, the major post in Kazakhstan was used in the customary way as a stepping stone to a future post in the central authority. There are reasons why I feel this way. Our history up until now is proof. Only three Kazakhs have held the party leadership in Kazakhstan in the Soviet period. There would seem to be many explanations for this. However, we are far from denigrating the work of persons of other nationalities who have

become party first secretary in Kazakhstan. This would be contrary to historical fact. But fact is fact. We cannot avoid facing it.

Thus this last fact strengthens my feeling that comrade G.V. Kolbin exploited his service in Kazakhstan as a step along a ladder of promotion. This is not to denigrate or depreciate the work of G.V. Kolbin, or to cast stones at him. As N.A. Nazarbayev has said, G.V. Kolbin performed much and honorable work in Kazakhstan. However, we will take a detailed look at the two and one-half year service of Kolbin in terms of the unity of word and deed, and of consistency of policy. This, in our view, is not just a political problem. It is, whether one realizes it or not, a matter of morality and principle.

In discussing the service of G.V. Kolbin in Kazakhstan, it would seem proper to discuss this basically in terms of republic nationality problems, the 1986 December Incident, and such vital questions as language, cadres, housing and the supply of food to the people. Needless to say, it is certain that the nationality question has been distorted in the Soviet Union. Improper circumstances which are clear indication of the great harm done by comrade Kolbin, in a word, to Kazakhstan and to interethnic relations, and which have found their expression in the republic, have in fact come into being based upon old boy networks, the moral decline of some cadres, racial and individual discrimination, etc. And all of this, we think, led to the 1986 Alma-Ata December Incident.

It is known to us all that the language question was most conspicuous among the many problems of the republic during the time that Gennadiy Vasilyevich was first secretary. Comrade Kolbin devoted a great deal of attention to it, and forwarded resolutely the ideal of bilingualism. And what was at stake was Kazakh and Russian bilingualism. While in the beginning G.V. Kolbin stressed the need for all those working as leading officials in the republic to know the language of the people, this more properly meant that republic bilingualism was only for Kazakhs and other minorities while the Russian majority did not have to know Kazakh. In truth bilingualism is one-sided with us. Those Russians knowing Kazakh comprise less than one percent. There is no parity between the Russian and Kazakh languages. Under such circumstances, insistence upon bilingualism has only developed and strengthened the Russian language. Even now, when Kazakh is honored as an official language, it is true that there is no doubt whatever about the superior position of the Russian language.

That is to say, one question which cannot be put off until tomorrow is the need to make efforts to restore the balance between the Russian and Kazakh languages. However, comrade Kolbin on the contrary, backing off from what he said at the 1987 7th Congress of Kazakhstan Journalists (LENINSHIL ZHAS January 18, 1987), said in 1988 that there was no need to make Kazakh an official language (LITERATURNAYA GAZETA December 12). But in 1989 he said that,

relying upon public opinion surveys, he was tending towards the view that both the Kazakh and the Russian languages should become official languages under conditions whereby the free development of the languages of all other nationalities and ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan would be guaranteed (SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN April 2). This was a matter of simultaneously using power while exercising pressure on public opinion. But while Kolbin remained first secretary only until October of that year, the two languages are now official languages. Is not the Kazakh people now as a consequence without hope, remaining something other than a real nation or people. Whereas there has been so much hope in bilingualism (in Kazakh's official status), we are making no haste to keep the promise that Kazakh will be taught on a compulsory basis, and have even forgotten about it entirely.... There are reasons for this. To Kolbin, not knowing Russian is not a linguistic question, but a political one (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA April 26, 1988). On the other hand, not knowing Kazakh is not important. In Gennadiy Vasilyevich's view it is not a political question. These same views and policy have given life over there to the "Edinstvo" and "Kazachestvo" movements. In short, the real meaning of the one-sided policy of bilingualism now being put forward is movement towards Russian-speaking. Our bilingualism is one-sided in that it makes it necessary only to teach Russian. The Kazakh language fulfills only 10 of the social functions which a language must fulfill to live. Some 60 percent of Kazakhs know Russian. But the number of those knowing Kazakh among Russians is less than one percent. If such conditions persist (linguistic chauvinism), nationality languages will not just be destroyed locally, but utterly. The ranks of those 98 languages which have vanished during the last 50-60 years will no doubt be expanded. Is not the destruction of a language the destruction of a people? Wherever a people is, its language must also be. It is as natural as the rising and setting of the sun. But it would appear that the real meaning of the language question raised today is altogether different. This is because there lies behind a language a complete people, its customs, way of life, that is to say, its national essence, peculiarities and culture. This being the case, stealing the future of the Kazakh language is the same as casting doubt on the Kazakh people as a nationality. As can be noticed, the entire republic system for educating children, other areas of the education system, geographical, hydrological and settlement names etc. (leaving aside entirely the question of ideological education, propaganda and agitation) have all been put to work to carry out the policy of standardization on Russian which we have just been discussing.

Every people is eagerly interested in its national language, culture and history. Our superior qualities, our future, our strength lie in our ability to preserve and develop as much as possible the national peculiarities of the peoples. Unfortunately, this fact is not always taken into consideration. Raising the false flag of internationalism, we pay no attention to the national peculiarities of the peoples living in the Soviet Union. In fact we almost

go so far as to avoid saying with feelings of pride at all that "I am a representative of a certain people." What kind of internationalism can there be where there is no nationality, where nationality peculiarities and feelings do not exist? Not only that, but it has recently been observed that Kazakh nationhood has been stolen through transfer of the principles of classical democracy to the soil of Kazakhstan in a mechanical way to establish a civil society. The actions of the group of deputies called "Democratic Kazakhstan" are proof of this.

As a result of the "beneficial" application of Kolbin's false internationalism, in order to solve the problem of the Kazakhs in the republic we seem to be using methods of calling to account Russians and Germans, and in order to solve the problem of the Russians and Kazakhs, of calling Kazakhs to account. This shows clearly that "friendly relations have been strengthened among the nationalities" (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA June 3, 1988). This is on purpose and is nothing more than the promotion of centralized control and demonstration that "new approaches" are being used in the Soviet Union in efforts to solve its many questions. A people which has remained forgotten by all, deprived of hope, has been expecting changes from perestroika. It is working for the good life and wishes to believe in something. But this was all carefully exploited by Kolbin. Offering smiles, he occasionally put meat, milk and butter into the stores. He organized the public markets which today stand desolate and empty, and took stock of the people. And one thing I have noticed: Kolbin said one thing on one occasion and another on another. That is to say, he changed his position frequently. (For example, the position of Kolbin in connection with Kazakh State University Teacher Q. Asanov).

Thus, according to Kolbin, the problem of the Kazakhs must be solved by persons such as Solzhenitsyn, Vasilyeva, Petrushenko, Sobolin, Vodolazov and Zhukov. Let us listen to public opinion on this matter. In a review of letters published on 17 June 1987, in SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN, Gennadiy Vasilyevich distorted the conclusion from the letters, and stated that, after thinking over the problems, he had concluded that the "great people" (Russian people) is ready, if we ourselves are not working together to save our own language, to impose solution of the problem on the family alone. One must thus conclude from this that there are no common interests of Kazakhs and members of other nationalities living in the republic, or no problems to be solved jointly. There is in fact a great deal we must do in common. However, when we come to the nationality question, bearing in mind how much he distorted the issue, we must pay attention. If we must get involved in the internal affairs of other nationalities, it is appropriate that we not wound their national sensitivities. To be sure, it is not relevant in this case whether it is the right of every nationality to know its language, and whether the language of the people which gives a republic its name has the right to become an official language of that nation or not. This is the national right

of that people, one that is totally in accord with international law. G.V. Kolbin, at the time of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, in answer to the question of a journalist about "what kinds of difficulties you encountered during the time immediately following your move to Kazakhstan," gave the answer: "violation of principles of social justice" (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA July 3, 1988).

In this connection let us examine two facts. First, the interview with USSR People's Deputy and noted poet Mukhtar Shakhnov published recently in LENINSKAYA SMENA (November 2, 1990). The person conducting the interview came to the following conclusion: "...We have, for example, the following piece of information. Kolbin, using his 'old connections,' forced the Ulyanovsk Flight Training School to dispatch two airplanes from Ulyanovsk to Alma-Ata to move his family and his furnishings to Alma-Ata. On February 7, 1987, two flights by Il-76 transport aircraft loaded with Kolbin's furniture were made as training. For this he paid a total of only 150 rubles. But the cost to the state reached 29,700 rubles. In fuel alone, 90 tons were expended. On that same day, Kolbin's wife, children and two dogs flew to Alma-Ata on another, special Tu-134 aircraft. They paid 192 rubles for five tickets. But the state paid up to 7,700 rubles for the trip. If Kolbin was a totally principled communist, would he do such things?"

Second, look at another on Kolbin published just recently in the paper DEMOKRATICHESKAYA ROSSIA (1990, No 2). According to the information contained in the article, when Kolbin moved to Moscow, his married daughter was transferred from the (Kamenykh M.G.) Alma-Ata Pedagogical Institute to the Academy of Social Sciences Institute under the CPSU Central Committee and given an apartment in a good building. Where were the people's controllers when this was taking place?

There is another question creating great difficulty for the people of the republic. This is the statement of G.V. Kolbin that: "Kazakhstan can only develop as a result of assistance (aid) received from All-Union funds" (LENINSKAYA SMENA March 15, 1987). To be sure, we have received funding. But the question is, in my view, how those funds came to Kazakhstan. Has the republic produced no product, has it not contributed its share to national riches? Kolbin's view takes money which we have made ourselves as aid and assistance to ourselves, granted to us here from the central authority. What is taken with the one hand is redistributed to the republic with another demanding thanks in return. At the same time, this circumstance makes possible strengthening of means of rule and of control. As a result, Kazakhstan, like some other republics, remains until this day a source of raw materials only, and an object of quite open robbery by central ministries and authorities. The structure of the people's economy is not designed for the production of consumer goods. The principle of the leftover dominates the social sector. As a result, the tendency is for standards

of living of republic citizens to be low. The only way to free ourselves from such injurious fact is republic state sovereignty.

Assignment of the stigma nationalist to the entire Kazakh people in the resolution ratified in 1987 by the CPSU Central Committee: "On Work of Kazakh Republic Party Organizations To Provide Internationalist and Patriotic Education to Workers" justly created dissatisfaction among the people. During the period of Kolbin's rule, demands were advanced for the review of the December Incident, and for getting rid of the assigned stigma of nationalism. However, G.V. Kolbin paid no attention and said, in opposition to those making the demands: "A resolution of the CPSU Central Committee is a powerful weapon for us. It is a principled device of general party significance. It helps us receive a political lesson which we have learned" (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA April 26, 1988). What kind of political lesson is he talking about? Was it that of 1987, or that of 1990?

During the years 1987-1990, until the aforementioned resolution was reconsidered, there was a drastic deformation in cadre policy in the republic. Comrade Kolbin was very successful in his use of the "powerful weapon" everywhere. G.V. Kolbin openly expressed the idea that one of the legal goals of cadre policy was maintaining proportions (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA April 26, 1988). Thus the so-called "precentomania" campaign began in the republic. This policy was largely aimed at Kazakhs. They were by and large removed from leadership positions in party, soviet, Komsomol, enterprises, court, procurator, higher education and large industry organizations.

We must mention the (March, 1987) 8th Plenum of the Kazakhstan CP in this regard in particular.

In 1987 alone, according to what Kolbin told a PRAVDA reporter, 1200 person were removed from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and 12 rektors from higher educational institutions. Some 28 percent of responsible officials of oblast party committees and more than 33 percent of those in rayon committees were moved. Up until June 1988, some 78.2 percent of party workers, 98 percent of Soviet officials, 94 percent of union officials and 66 percent of Komsomol officials had been certified (KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA June 5, 1988). Needless to say, the reputations of many honorable and active persons suspected of Kazakh nationalism, or strongly supportive of the Kazakh people, were destroyed.

I cannot say today, looking at cadre work, that things have become any easier after the departure of G.V. Kolbin.

Thus, the two and one-half years of service of G.V. Kolbin, which began with the December Incident, has now begun to be evaluated. We have begun to discuss openly the many gross political mistakes made by him. It is now not difficult to say that Kolbin was better fitted to

be the chief of an oblast, and that he lacked the capacity to administer a republic such as Kazakhstan. He appears to us as an unprincipled fast-talker.

### **Kazakh SSR Law on Recalling People's Deputies**

91US0279A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 11 Dec 90 p 2

[Kazakh SSR Law: "On Procedures for Recalling a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy"]

[Text] The right to recall a Kazakh SSR people's deputy guarantees the voters and public organizations effective control over the deputy and responsibility on his or her part.

### **Article 1: Grounds for Recalling a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy**

A Kazakh SSR people's deputy whose actions are not in accordance with the fundamental principles and program statements of his or her campaign platform, who has lost the confidence of voters or public organizations, or who has systematically failed to perform the duties entrusted to him or her by the Kazakh SSR law: "On the Status of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies" may be recalled at any time by decision of a majority of voters or by the public organization which elected the deputy according to the procedures outlined in the present law.

### **Article 2: Proposal To Recall a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy Elected From an Electoral District**

A proposal to recall a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy elected from an electoral district may be submitted in the presence of the deputy by meetings (conferences) of labor collectives, collectives of students at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, military personnel in their units and members of public organizations if no fewer than 300 voters are in attendance, or by workers, students and service people in the aforementioned collectives and organizations and by voters' meetings at places of residence if they are attended by no fewer than 300 voters who live within the electoral district in question. Enterprises, institutions, organizations, higher and secondary specialized educational institutions and military units whose collectives submit a recall petition regarding a Kazakh SSR people's deputy should be located within the territory of the electoral district in question.

The proposal to recall a Kazakh SSR people's deputy is submitted to the district electoral commission on the election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies, which if the proposal is justified resolves within 30 days to convene a conference of the district's voters to decide whether to request recall of the Kazakh SSR people's deputy.

**Article 3: Proposal To Recall a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy Elected From a Public Organization**

A proposal to recall a Kazakh SSR people's deputy elected from a public organization may be submitted by a republic, oblast, rayon, city or city rayon elective organ of the organization in question.

A proposal to recall a Kazakh SSR people's deputy elected from a public organization is to be submitted in written form to the electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies from the public organization, which if the proposal is justified must within 30 days from receipt of the recall proposal resolve to consider the matter of recall at a congress or conference of the public organization or at a plenum of its republic organ.

**Article 4: The Right To Raise the Issue of Recalling a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy**

The right to raise the issue of recalling a Kazakh SSR people's deputy elected from an electoral district belongs to a conference of the district's voters convened by the corresponding soviet of people's deputies or its presidium and the district electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies.

Delegation of representatives to this conference is carried out in accordance with standards established by the district electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies or by the corresponding soviet of people's deputies proportionally to the number of voters living in the population centers which comprise the electoral district.

The decision to raise the issue of recalling a Kazakh SSR people's deputy is made by a majority vote of all conference delegates on a secret ballot, unless another procedure is established by the conference. The decision reached is to be reported in the press.

The right to raise the issue of recalling a Kazakh SSR people's deputy elected from a public organization belongs to a congress or conference of the organization in question or a plenum of its republic organ.

The issue of recalling a Kazakh SSR people's deputy may be brought before the voters of a district or the organ of a public organization by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet.

**Article 5: Guarantees for the Rights of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies**

A district electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies or the electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies of a public organization must notify the Kazakh SSR people's deputy in question within five days regarding the receipt of a petition requesting his or her recall, as well as the manner in which the petition will be considered.

A Kazakh SSR people's deputy has the right to submit to the district electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies or a public organization's electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies a written statement, as well as the right to address meetings (conferences) of voters and to speak via the press, television and radio regarding the circumstances serving as grounds for the recall proposal.

If the circumstances serving as grounds for the submission of a proposal to recall a Kazakh SSR people's deputy are the subject of inquiry by a court then the corresponding soviet of people's deputies, public organization elective organ or electoral commission must table consideration of the recall proposal until the court has handed down a final decision on the matter.

The heads of state, public or other organizations, official and other individuals who knowingly provide false information which serves as grounds for a proposal to recall a Kazakh SSR people's deputy are liable under criminal law.

A Kazakh SSR people's deputy has the right to legal protection from intentionally falsified information used as grounds for a proposal to recall that deputy.

**Article 6: Purpose of Voting on Recall of a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy**

The decision to raise the issue of recall is sent by the district electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies or the corresponding public organizations' electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies or by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet within a period of five days to the Central Electoral Commission on Election and Recall of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies.

The Kazakh SSR Central Electoral Commission on Election and Recall of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies must send the recall material received to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Credentials Commission within 10 days for the purpose of it reaching a conclusion on the legality of and justification for the request for recall.

Upon confirmation of the legality of the recall request the Central Electoral Commission on Election and Recall of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies schedules a vote which should be held no later than two months from the date a conclusion by the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Credentials Commission is received.

**Article 7: Authorized Agents of a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy Against Whom a Recall Petition Has Been Filed**

A Kazakh SSR people's deputy against whom a recall petition has been filed may have up to five authorized agents to represent his or her interests in relations with voters, state and public organs, members of public organizations, electoral commissions and the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Credentials Commission.

The right to select authorized agents belongs to the deputy.



The powers of the authorized agents are confirmed by the issuance of identification to them following their registration with a district electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies or a public organization's electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies. The powers of authorized agents terminate upon completion of voting on the matter of the Kazakh SSR people's deputy's recall.

#### **Article 8: Agitation for or Against Recall of a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy**

Following scheduling by the Central Electoral Commission on Election and Recall of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies of a date for voting on recall of a Kazakh SSR people's deputy by voters, labor collectives, collectives of students at higher and secondary specialized educational institutions, public organizations, voters' meetings at places of residence and military personnel in their units the right to free and comprehensive discussion in connection with the recall of a Kazakh SSR people's deputy is guaranteed, as is the right to unhindered agitation either for or against recall of a deputy at meetings, in the press and on television and radio.

The Kazakh SSR people's deputy against whom the recall petition has been filed as well as his or her authorized agents have the right to agitate freely via the mass media.

Agitation on the day of a recall vote is not permitted.

#### **Article 9: Commissions and Precincts for the Conducting of Voting; Lists of Voters**

Organization of work to recall a Kazakh SSR people's deputy falls to the district electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies or the appropriate public organization's electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies.

In order to organize and conduct voting on recall of a Kazakh SSR people's deputy voting precincts are to be established throughout the electoral district within 35 days prior to the vote, with precinct commissions to be formed no later than 30 days prior to the vote.

The formation and activities of commissions for the conducting of recall voting, formation of voting precincts and compilation of lists of voters and persons voting on behalf of a public organization are to be carried out according to procedures established by the Kazakh SSR law: "On Election of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies."

#### **Article 10: Ballots**

The ballot for a recall vote should indicate the surname, first name and patronymic of the Kazakh SSR people's deputy, his or her position (or profession), and the deputy's places of work and residence.

The ballot for a vote to recall a Kazakh SSR people's deputy is to be printed in Kazakh and Russian, or in the language used by the population of the electoral district in question, and is to be delivered to precinct commissions no later than three days prior to the vote.

#### **Article 11: Voting and Determination of the Outcome Thereof**

Voting on the recall of a Kazakh SSR people's deputy is to be secret and arranged in accordance with the Kazakh SSR law: "On Election of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies."

During voting the voter leaves the deputy's name on the ballot if the voter favors continuance of the deputy's powers, or crosses it out if the voter favors recall of the deputy.

A Kazakh SSR people's deputy is considered recalled if over one-half of the voters or delegates to a congress, conference or public organization plenum who took part in the vote voted for recall.

Recall is considered rejected if fewer than one-half of the individuals who took part in the voting were opposed to recall, and also if fewer than one-half of the eligible voters or delegates voting for a public organization participated in the vote.

In the case of a tie the Kazakh SSR people's deputy retains his or her mandate. In that case filing of a second recall petition on the same grounds is not permitted.

The outcome of the vote is to be determined at a session of the district electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies or a public organization's electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies, entered into the minutes and sent to the Central Electoral Commission for Election and Recall of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies.

The Central Electoral Commission for Election and Recall of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies then registers the outcome of the vote on the basis of the minutes received from a district electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies or a public organization's electoral commission on election and recall of Kazakh SSR people's deputies; in the event that a violation of the present law is discovered and the outcome of the voting is declared invalid a new vote is to be scheduled within a period of two weeks.

#### **Article 12: Liability for Forgery, False Vote Counts and Violation of Ballot Secrecy**

Forgery of documents or knowingly false vote counts, as well as violation of the secrecy of the ballot during the conducting of a recall vote regarding a Kazakh SSR people's deputy, committed by a member of a commission on election and recall or other official is punishable under Kazakh SSR criminal law.

**Article 13: Reporting of the Outcome of a Vote To Recall a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy**

A report on the outcome of a vote to recall a Kazakh SSR people's deputy is to be published in the press by the Central Electoral Commission for Election and Recall of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies within a 10-day period following the vote.

The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Credentials Commission considers the outcome of the vote and submits them to the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet for approval if requested to do so by the Central Electoral Commission for Election and Recall of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies.

**Article 14: Expenses Stemming From the Conducting of Voting**

Expenses stemming from the preparations for and conducting of a vote to recall a Kazakh SSR people's deputy are to be paid by the state.

The Kazakh SSR people's deputy against whom a recall petition has been filed is exempted from his or her ordinary work during meetings with voters at voters' request, as are his or her authorized agents; with expenses thus incurred to be paid by the state.

**Article 15: Protesting Violations of the Kazakh SSR Law: 'On Procedures for Recalling a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy'**

Statements and complaints regarding violations of the present law are to be considered by the Central Electoral Commission for Election and Recall of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies, which will make a final decision in regard to them.

*N. Nazarbayev, president,  
Kazakh SSR  
Alma-Ata, 13 November 1990*

**Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Resolution**

**On Procedures for Implementation of the Kazakh SSR Law: 'On Procedures for Recalling a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy'**

The Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet hereby resolves:

1. to implement the Kazakh SSR law: "On Procedures for Recalling a Kazakh SSR People's Deputy" beginning at the time of its publication;

2. to repeal a Kazakh SSR law of 19 November 1959 entitled: "On Procedures for Recalling a Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet Deputy" as amended by a Kazakh SSR law of 7 June 1979 (see: VEDOMOSTI VERKHOVNOGO SOVETA KAZAKHSKOY SSR, No 25, 1979).

*Ye. Asanbayev, chairman,  
Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet  
Alma-Ata, 13 November 1990*

**Ownership of Kazakh Tengiz Oil Fields Questioned**

91US0171A

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN in Kazakh carries on November 13, 1990, on page 3 a 1500-word article by SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN reporter Q. Qabdelov entitled: "Who Owns Tengiz Oil Fields?" Much of the article is devoted to a consideration of the slow pace of Tengiz development in spite of 15 years of efforts, although Qabdelov does, at the end of his article, also consider the broader question of in whose interests planned developments are to take place. According to Qabdelov, the primary problem encountered in developing the Tengiz oil fields has above all been the difficulty of bringing into being a major production base in an isolated area with limited resources. Thus, although to date some two billion rubles have been spent on oil field development, much has gone into creating an infrastructure (e.g. housing, schools, roads, electrical transmission lines etc.), with little apparent return in the form of oil produced. The fields themselves are in any case problematical, not only because investigation of oil resources is still incomplete, but also due to the high sulfur content of Tengiz oil, and the environmental danger this constitutes without sophisticated production and refining methods (but technical problems are being solved, he reports). Because of the special nature and problems of the fields, creation of a special economic zone has been proposed to push through Tengiz development, and more recently cooperative development of the fields with the American company Chevron, to achieve a major export potential. However, Qabdelov goes on, such proposals have met with considerable opposition and raise the issue of how republic and local authorities will participate in Tengiz development (and share Tengiz profits) if purely national and export aims are pursued. To whom, Qabdelov asks, do the fields in the end belong? To national authorities, or to the Kazakhs?

**Turkmen Prime Minister Views Perestroika in Republic, Goals for 1991**

91US0276A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA in Russian 1 Jan 91 pp 2-3

[Interview with Kh. Akhmedov, prime minister of the Turkmen SSR, by N. Charukhcheva under the rubric: "Timely Interview"; place and date not given: "What Does the Coming Year Have in Store?"]

[Text] We have endured another year of perestroika, one filled with events and changes, perhaps the most difficult year on the economic level. "Collapse, ruin, impasse"—these are the words used most often to describe the situation. Is it that bad? Who is to blame for our misfortunes? Will we find a solution to this crisis? These questions concern everyone. Our correspondent asked Kh.A. Akhmedov, prime minister of the Turkmen SSR, to answer them.

[Correspondent] Khan Akhmedovich, at least three hypotheses exist. The economists are to blame for everything because they did not know how to present society with a program of radical reform. Or the politicians, because they did not find a way to stabilize the situation. Or, finally, the administrative command system. What is your opinion?

[Akhmedov] The situation in the country is genuinely complicated. However, it should not be viewed so pessimistically. We have not yet undergone a collapse, and we have already determined a solution to the crisis. I believe that common sense and progressive forces will carry the day over ambition. According to all predictions, a year of stabilization is ahead. Of course, it will be difficult and we will all have a lot of work to do.

Concerning those who are to blame. Economics, politics, and the system do not exist independent of one another. No one has disproved Lenin's definition that "Economics is the concentrated expression of politics." I reject the first version. In fact many programs were proposed by the economists. Some were radical. But economic programs do not work by themselves. They need a favorable sociopolitical situation. This is why politicians have entered the political arena, each insisting on his own solution to the crisis. And each has his own strategy and tactics. Unfortunately they have not managed to unite behind a single plan.

We are very much in need of an all-Union treaty and a common strategic concept as a stabilizing factor. S.A. Niyazov, president of the Turkmen SSR, set forth the position of the republic in a concise and considered manner at the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies. And it has gained the support of the entire population of the republic. Republics cannot pull themselves from the crisis individually. We are too dependent on one another. This dependence has arisen over decades, and it would be rash to tear it apart in one moment.

[Correspondent] We are already convinced that this is true. The center is no longer carrying out its functions as we are accustomed to understanding them. Each republic and region has begun to resolve its problems independently. And there have been more losers than winners. Does it seem that politics has nonetheless delivered the final blow to economics?

[Akhmedov] More accurately, it is the absence of unified politics and a lack of understanding of the situation. And mistakes. The process of the breakup of administrative structures and the introduction of democratic institutions is underway. But we still do not have enough experience, and no one is insured against mistakes. But we have the conviction that the democratic way is the only true way. That is something substantial.

[Correspondent] But the people are tired of waiting for results, and now they are increasingly hearing that perestroika is to blame for all the negative processes. That our old system had its own logic. Even though it worked

poorly and people were not rich, they were satisfied. And there was stability of a sort...

[Akhmedov] I would emphasize that it was relative stability. And our notorious confidence in the future no longer existed. As a result it was perfectly clear that the administrative command system was doomed. The people no longer wished to live the old way, and sooner or later a renewal was to begin. And then perestroika did not give birth to our defects but only exposed them. It would be naive to count on a "revolution without losses." But we must do all we can to ensure that deep political and economic reforms take place with the fewest losses.

[Correspondent] Analyzing last year, do you believe that it was a success for us? After all, the situation in the republic was worse then in previous years.

[Akhmedov] But better than in other republics. On the whole, there was a high rate of increase in social production in our economy. Much higher than for the country as a whole. We have an indisputable advantage in the fact that under conditions of general destabilization we have managed to preserve positive tendencies in the development of the economy and the social sphere and maintained the level of the preceding year in many indicators. According to preliminary data, the national income produced will be almost 5.5 percent for the year. On the average, for the past five year period this indicator was lower by a factor of 2.5. This year national income utilized is growing even more—by 12.2 percent, and we will direct more than 86 percent of this income to increase the living standard of the people. Let us go further. The volume of industrial production grew by 2.8 percent. Consumer goods worth more than R180 million were produced over and above the five year plan. An unprecedented harvest of cotton was gathered this year. Retail commodity circulation in state and cooperative trade increased by more than 14.1 percent. We fulfilled deliveries at a level of 99 percent, that is, we did not break our ties. That is also very important.

[Correspondent] There is no arguing that the statistics are favorable. But after all, the shelves of our stores should be a mirror of the statistics. And they are poor. How do you explain this lack of correspondence?

[Akhmedov] There are many reasons. Some enterprises have achieved an increase in the volume of output for the most part at the expense of an increase in prices and not by increasing the stock of goods. The plan was underfulfilled and volumes declined for production of meat, sausage, animal fats, and other goods. There are also objective reasons. The republic's status in raw materials cannot ensure us full prosperity. We are dependent. And our partners let us down more than once last year. We have been looking for a solution and trying to level the situation on the consumer market. The effort has not gone well—at times it has been agonizing. It continues even now. We have signed intergovernmental agreements with almost all the republics for mutual

deliveries of raw materials, industrial output, consumer goods, and food. The agreements specify conditions ruling out delivery shortages and interruptions inasmuch as our partners are interested in our raw materials. This year, for example, for an equivalent amount of barter we will be receiving 60,000 tons of meat, which is 10,000 more tons than last year; milk and dairy products, 15,000 more; flour, 35,000; sugar, 16,000 tons; and we plan an increase in practically all products. In addition, we are planning to increase production in the republic of meat, milk, eggs, vegetables, melons, and grain by 10-20 percent.

[Correspondent] The population of our republic did not starve, of course. We did not even have to introduce a ration card system. But people often had to be "supplied" products and goods via speculators. There was a noticeable increase in crime and the trade mafia flourished. Is that an outcome of the socialist system?

[Akhmedov] Not by any means. Everyone knows about the Western mafia, flourishing under conditions of a capitalist system. The problem is something else. As a rule, revolutions and abrupt changes in history are accompanied by negative phenomena. Appropriately, perestroika could not be an exception either. After all, not everyone has adopted it. There is active opposition and a difficult struggle. But presently in the republic, especially after implementation of the edict of the president of the Turkmen SSR: "On Temporary Regulation of the Exit From the Turkmen SSR of Goods, Products, Raw Materials, and Output," all forces and means have been mobilized in the fight against crime and black market processes. The operations of trade enterprises are being strictly monitored. Attempts to take goods and products out of the republic are being halted.

[Correspondent] The fight against crime has undoubtedly been intensified. But for the time being it is only being conducted by administrative methods using law enforcement organs. Individual cases are uncovered, but the phenomenon is not rooted out.

[Akhmedov] Naturally the struggle against a phenomenon originating in social and economic disorder can only achieve success under conditions of effective measures to improve all spheres. The market will bring an improvement, but for now we need containment measures. They will bring results and lead to a certain stability.

What else has been emptying our shelves? Panic buying of goods. People have been trying to exchange "hot" money for any product, even unwanted ones. But the ready money here is less than 50 percent backed by goods. At present the population has R1.6 billion in cash on hand. The same amount exists in the savings banks as well, and that is almost the annual volume of commodity circulation for the republic. In addition, about R2 million—the remnants of the republic's fund of economic stimulation—may also splash out onto the consumer

market. This is why it is very important today to "tie down" this money and as quickly as possible flood the market with goods.

[Correspondent] How can this be done if our republic's industry is only able to cover one-third of each ruble in circulation with consumer goods? That is the lowest indicator in the country.

[Akhmedov] The development of interregional and foreign economic ties and the development of our own industry. I already spoke about agreements concluded with the republics. The number of our foreign partners who will help us saturate the market with goods has increased. On the governmental level alone negotiations have been conducted to conclude agreements on broadening economic cooperation with the Republic of Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran, India, Italy, France, and the United States. Furthermore, we have registered more than 50 participants in foreign economic ties among our enterprises, organizations, and associations. On that level there is still much more to work out, questions of licensing and quantitative regulation of export have to be devised, and new capacity for processing has to be created. Much will be done by attracting foreign capital. But the main path for resolving this problem is a transition to a market. For example, to speed up the creation of new capacity we will develop small enterprises. This process is already underway in the republic, and it must be continued.

[Correspondent] We are relying on the market, but we still have not approved a program for the transition to one. Incidentally, what is your opinion of programs that are alternatives to the government's plan?

[Akhmedov] In general, my view is a positive one. Where there is an alternative, there is a choice. So long as, of course, its authors are professionals. Otherwise we only lose time on debates. So that does not happen, we have taken another road: All who have proposed their own variant to the program have joined a working group. "Plod" has been taken seriously. I believe that at the coming session the program will receive the support of the people's deputies.

[Correspondent] What are the most important tasks at the initial stage of the transition to a market? And is economic efficiency clearly outlined in the program for the transition to the market?

[Akhmedov] The main tasks are developing entrepreneurship on the basis of a variety of forms of property ownership, creating conditions for healthy competition, and providing any entrepreneur with freedom, the right to choose his own form of economic activity, sources of financing, and access to resources. Denationalization and privatization of the republic's economy will begin this year. And that will affect, first and foremost, the sectors working to satisfy the demands of the population. It is most important that this process occurs without pressure from above on the labor collectives. Furthermore, a market envisages a repudiation of traditional

directive-style planning. We will coordinate our program of action with economic predictions. Now—about social justice. It is time to quit confusing social justice with parasitism. All who are able to work should live by their labor. And they should receive according to their labor. That is unambiguous. And where there are people who are genuinely in need of the help of the state—the disabled, retirees, students, and families with many children—they will receive it. Payments and grants to this category of people from the funds of social consumption will increase by more than 15 percent in comparison with last year. That is stated in the draft of the plan for 1991—the main criteria in the drafting of the plan was to increase the living standard of the population and provide a comprehensive resolution of social tasks.

[Correspondent] Does the execution of what you mentioned depend on any outside factors?

[Akhmedov] Of course, one must take into consideration the possibility that the situation in the country will remain tense. That was demonstrated by the Fourth USSR Congress of People's Deputies, as well. But I stress once more that the country should come to an accord and put an end to confrontation. Politicians do not have the right to ignore the interests of the people.

I wish to congratulate all the residents of the republic on the new year. I wish them health, personal happiness, and endurance. A difficult year lies ahead of all of us. Each of us will have to work and to learn.

[Correspondent] Khan Akhmedovich, permit me a question off the subject: Do you believe in horoscopes?

[Akhmedov] I have never had much interest, but I noted lately that when the astrologers predict positive changes for people, it generates positive emotions and improves the mood. And it is easier to work and live with a good mood.

[Correspondent] Then I will take the liberty of reading your horoscope. The Year of the Goat will be complicated for everyone, but in the end equilibrium will be restored. That corresponds to your prediction, as well. For you personally it will be happy and successful in business. After all, our welfare depends on the successes of the head of state. I hope that the prediction will come true.

[Akhmedov] Thank you, and I hope that each person will make his own contribution.

### **Uzbek Communist Party Program of Action**

91US0282A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian  
26 Dec 90 pp 2-3

["Program of Action of the Uzbek Communist Party: 'For Political and Economic Sovereignty, Spiritual Renewal, Social Justice, and Dignified Living Conditions for the Population of Uzbekistan'"]

[Text] The Uzbek Communist Party, based upon the principles of the creative development of Marxism-Leninism and stemming from the program goals proclaimed at the 28th CPSU Congress, sets as its chief goal the renewal of society on socialist principles, in the name of the good of man, his success, the affirmation of the principles of morality and humanism.

The Uzbek Communist Party sees the highest meaning of its activity in the achievement of political, economic, legal, and social conditions under which the development of each person would be ensured comprehensively and harmoniously.

Acting within the framework of the Uzbek SSR Constitution and Soviet laws, the Uzbek Communist Party takes upon itself full responsibility for the programs of the republic's development adopted at its recommendation by the organs of state power. At the same time, it reserves for itself the right to hold its own position, critically evaluating the activity of both the legislative and the executive-administrative power, the political and other decisions made by them which touch directly upon people's vital interests.

The Uzbek CP program of action is aimed at ensuring the republic's political and economic sovereignty, social justice, spiritual renewal, and dignified living conditions for all the nations and nationalities of the Uzbek SSR.

### **For the Genuine Political Sovereignty of the Uzbek SSR**

Based upon the Declaration of the Republic Supreme Soviet, the Uzbek Communist Party promotes ensuring the genuine political sovereignty of the Uzbek SSR. The party feels that the republic, based upon democratic principles and the free expression of the people's will, must resolve independently the issues of its national-state structure and administrative-territorial division.

The Communist Party stands firmly on the positions that the land, its mineral wealth, natural riches, flora and fauna, created economic and scientific potential, the results of the labor ensuring the material basis of its political sovereignty and economic independence must belong to the republic's property.

The Communist Party favors the consideration in the Supreme Soviet in legislative procedure and the adoption of the appropriate acts aimed at the realization of these fundamental principles, the defense of territorial integrity, and the inviolability of the republic's borders.

As an equal sovereign state, Uzbekistan must act as an independent subject of international relations, determine foreign policy in its interests, enter into relations with foreign states, conclude treaties with them, exchange diplomatic and consular representatives, implement foreign economic activity, independently resolve issues of quotas, licensing of products made in the republic, the registration of joint enterprises, and the creation of concessions and free trade zones. The



republic has the right to representation in the UN and its specialized institutions, and other international organizations.

As a political organization of a sovereign republic, the Uzbek Communist Party independently realizes contact with foreign parties and public organizations of socialist and democratic orientation. It also favors the development and the strengthening of humanistic relations and mutual understanding with compatriots abroad, grants them the right to participate in the republic's cultural life and the realization of economic and social programs.

The Uzbek Communist Party favors the expansion of horizontal ties, the conclusion of treaties with other sovereign states, and will persistently strive that these relations be built on the basis of equal and mutually advantageous cooperation in the resolution of economic, social, ecological, and other issues. The party is for the new Union Treaty of sovereign states, the fundamental base principles of which are equal rights and the defense of the interests of each person, all nations and peoples, the voluntary expression of their will in state self-determination, including in questions of entering and leaving the Union.

The Communist Party feels that within the territory of the republic, republic laws must have command in all issues with the exception of those voluntarily delegated to union-republic and union jurisdiction.

The Uzbek Communist Party supports the proposal for state sovereignty of Karakalpakia, its transformation into the Republic of Karakalpakistan, voluntarily in the body of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics within the Uzbek SSR, and will strive that this republic possess within its territory the fullness of state power, with the exception of those issues voluntarily delegated to the jurisdiction of the Union of SSR's and the Uzbek SSR.

The communists of Uzbekistan will promote with practical causes the establishment of a sovereign rule-of-law state in which democracy and legality are ensured by a separation of power into legislative, executive, and judicial power. To pursue a consistent course toward improving the presidential form of administration, strengthening the executive and administrative power, defending citizens' constitutional rights, and ensuring legality and law and order.

Under conditions of a multiparty system, the Communist Party rejects the substitution of organs of state and economic administration and authoritative empowerments; it favors increasing the role and fortifying the soviets as the efficacious organs of people power. The party organization will interact with the soviets of people's deputies on all levels, exert political influence on their activity through communists elected as deputies and working in the elective organs, and broadly utilize its right to legislative initiative. Communists will assist in all possible ways the effective activity of village, kishlak, and aul soviets, makhallin [neighborhood] committees, and other echelons of residential self-management,

strengthening their independence in issues of the socio-economic development of the territory if their actions do not contradict the principles of social justice and the democratization of society.

Today, the association of the efforts of soviet, law-enforcement, and economic organs and the public is acquiring great significance in the strengthening and strict observance of socialist legality and law and order. Communists are decisively against any manifestations of chauvinism and nationalism, and will achieve state guarantees of the honor and dignity of each citizen, his constitutional rights and freedoms regardless of nationality and religion. Any encroachments upon these rights must be put to a decisive stop, and their organizers and participants must be held accountable in accordance with the law.

The Communist Party favors rapid institution of reform in the USSR Armed Forces, culminating in the creation of a professional army and the introduction of alternative service, the realization of the call to military service on the basis of contracts with the republic government. Communists will also strive for all possible strengthening of discipline and order in military subunits, and the eradication of non-regulation relations shameful to the army. Communists are resoundingly in favor of increasing the responsibility of the command personnel of the Armed Forces in matters of providing security, protecting the rights, national, and personal dignity of those called into the ranks of the Soviet Army.

#### **On the Paths Toward Strengthening the Economic Independence of Uzbekistan and the Principles of Entering a Market Economy**

The Communist Party is convinced that the republic can achieve prosperity and well-being only when prosperity and well-being are ensured in the lives of each individual family, kishlak, rayon, and city.

A most important condition for achieving the set goal must be the provision of complete independence in the utilization, first and foremost in the interests of the people residing within the territory of the republic, of its natural riches, created potential and manufactured production.

The decisive condemnation and elimination on all levels of administration of the faulty administrative-command system and the departmental dictatorship, as well as the policy of the center ignoring the interests of the republic obtains principal meaning. One of the concrete manifestations of this was the republic-binding policy of "winning the country's cotton independence," the complete rule of the cotton monopoly, and as a result, the hypertrophied and one-sided development of the economy, its transformation into primarily a raw materials base, the enormous damage done to the natural and ecological environment, the low level of national income and low standard of living of the republic's populations with all the ensuing consequences.

It is necessary to begin without delay the elimination of the existing disproportion in the development of the republic's productive forces and its economy. The conditions for this do exist.

On the one hand, there are available diverse and rich natural, mineral-raw material and agricultural resources which can and must be the sources of the accelerated development of modern effective production, the basis for receiving national income and a growth in people's standard of living and welfare.

On the other hand are the growing labor resources who have inherited the enviable historical and national traditions of the people such as tremendous industriousness and work capacity, patience, and an ineradicable desire to know and learn.

The main task of communists and of all healthy forces of society is to unite as one these most important and mandatory constituents of our advancement forward, to decisively eliminate all the existing obstacles on this path.

And, of course, to work assiduously on raising the qualifications of the cadres, the creation of an army of modern-thinking specialists who have mastered advanced production and technology, first and foremost specialists from the local population, to create all conditions to stimulate and motivate their productive labor. All existing resources must be given for the realization of this strategic multi-goal task, and all the potential of the best centers of the country and foreign countries must be utilized.

The Uzbek Communist Party sees as its most important task the mobilization of communists and all workers in a phased realization of the Fundamental Trends of the stabilization of the national economy of Uzbekistan in a market economy, adopted by the republic Supreme Soviet.

The main thing under the conditions of a transition period is consideration for the specifics of the socioeconomic, historical, and demographic development of the region. In doing this, the fundamental principles of the traditional tenor of life and the personal existence of the majority of those people inhabiting the republic, their high moral principles, acquires important meaning.

A transition to market relations cannot be correctly implemented without consideration for the starting position of the republic, the employment level and the population's provision with social life facilities, consumer goods and services, and the standard of living of various social strata.

The Communist Party favors independent foreign economic activity, the expansion and strengthening of the republic's positions on the world market, the creation of the necessary conditions to attract foreign investment and advanced technologies. The republic must have direct links with foreign countries, and resolve on a

mutually advantageous and equal basis the issues of science and technology, trade and economic, and cultural cooperation, and the creation of joint enterprises, concessions, and free trade zones. To these ends, we favor the creation of our own banking system, capable of accumulating free monetary resources, and stimulating the attraction of the capital of interested foreign countries.

Communists are convinced that the formation of market relations requires a well-balanced, a most complete consideration of the natural, demographic, socioeconomic, and national features of the republic. Here are permitted neither excessive delay nor forced introduction of market elements without consideration for the specifics and the real possibilities at each stage.

In the realization of investment policy, it is necessary to give priority above all to the development of the branches that provide a sharp increase of the volume of national income, comprehensiveness in the development of the economy, and the fullest employment for the able-bodied population. Only highly productive labor at modern enterprises outfitted with advanced equipment and technology, turning out well-prepared products, first and foremost goods for the people, will create the foundation without which the successful development of the production and social infrastructure and the provision of growth for the people's welfare is impossible.

The Communist Party deems it necessary to relegate the following to the priority tasks in this field:

- overcoming territorial disproportions, effective placement of production forces, accelerated cultivation of the industrial economic potential of rural populated points, villages, small and medium cities;
- the early introduction of the achievements of scientific and technological progress, transition to assimilation of science-intensive production and computerization of the national economy;
- the implementation of a range of measures for the most complete and effective work employment of the population, professional orientation, training and retraining of personnel, and reduction of unemployment;
- the normalization of monetary circulation and the consumer market, guaranteed provision to the population and above all the socially disadvantaged strata of the basic types of foodstuffs, much needed goods and medications;
- the priority allocation of material and financial resources to resolve social problems and preserve the environment.

The general line in solving these problems must become the creation of compact, flexible production lines with modern technology at maximum proximity to areas with surplus labor resources, geared primarily toward the production of consumer goods, resources for small-scale mechanization for peasants and individual personal

plots, processing of agricultural raw material and semi-finished material into finished products. It is necessary to create everywhere the conditions for the construction of enterprises in conjunction with foreign partners, permitting assimilation of advanced technology, to master the organization and management of farms through world experience, to train a corps of national cadres. To distribute primarily those enterprises which respond to the immediate and long-term interests of the people.

The party organizations will, by all political means accessible to them, support the work of the organs of power and administration in the rebirth of folk crafts and artistic trades, the unique nature of the culture embodied in the wares of popular masters and craftspeople.

Communists feel that under modern conditions, the most promising path to the development of the republic's economy is its great diversity, based upon the great labor discipline and economic responsibility. State property must take the predominant position in the base branches of industry, air and rail transportation, communications, and main line communications. In other branches, stock cooperative, collective, personal, and private property must be under equal conditions with state property. The Uzbek Communist Party will insist that this process be implemented on the principles of economic expediency with consideration for the interests of the members of labor collectives, the development of initiative, and entrepreneurship.

Issues of modern agrarian policy are central for the Uzbek Communist Party. The main thing here is the stimulation of labor of all producers of goods and raising their interest in the final results of labor, strengthening the independence and material base of both the collective farms and the family personal farms.

We consider it necessary to achieve an increase in investment in the agrarian sector, the establishment of economically-based purchase prices for products turned out, mechanization and automation of agricultural processes, the introduction of advanced agrotechnical methods, increased yield and improved irrigation-reclamation status of lands.

Taking into consideration the limitation of land and water resources, as well as the historically based tradition for community collective farming, communists consider the introduction of private property on the land to be impossible.

The future belongs to cooperative, collective farms, where forms of labor organization such as leasing, contracting, and the peasant farm will receive prioritized development.

The Communist Party stands firmly on the position of careful and effective utilization of land and water resources. It will simultaneously strive for the adoption of the decisions of the union state organs concerning supplemental water resources for the Central Asian

region. In rejecting the cotton monoculture, communists favor granting such opportunities when the producers of agricultural crops are able to choose for themselves what they are going to sow and when. In the sown area, those crops which would yield the greatest income and ensure high employment for the rural population must be developed above all. The problems of introducing scientifically based crop rotation, mechanized cultivation and harvest of agricultural products must be resolved on a new economic basis.

It is necessary to strengthen the material-technical basis of the fruit and vegetable branch of agriculture, the processing industry, the creation of storage and networks of quality stores not only for the purpose of providing for the republic's population, but for increasing sales in the union and world markets. The feed basis of the personal and public sector of stock raising must be strengthened.

A most important task set by the Communist Party is the issues of the further strengthening of personal plots. In light of this, it is necessary to bring the size of farm parcels up to 0.25 hectares throughout the republic. The expansion of personal plots will allow for a resolution of the issue of housing construction and the population's provision of housing, and the employment of mothers with many children who do not have the opportunity to work in the public production sphere, increase foodstuffs for families' self-provision, and fill the foodstuffs market. The Communist Party views this as an important element of the social defense of the rural population.

Party organizations will actively support the activity of associations of personal plot owners to defend the interests of the peasantry, lending them actual assistance in supplying equipment, providing construction materials, young animals, seed, feed, and other resources necessary to villagers. These associations are called upon to take up issues of the social defense and support of the dekhkanin [peasant] during the period of transition to a market.

The Communist Party sees one of the main tasks of agrarian policy in the social restructuring of the countryside, the improvement of labor and living conditions of the rural population. It will support an investment and credit policy directed toward strengthening and developing the social image of the countryside, achieving channeling of additional capital investment, material resources for the cardinal solution of the problems of providing water and gas to rural homes.

The Uzbek Communist Party feels that the realization of the measures noted will make possible the provision of genuine economic sovereignty for the republic, raising its prestige as a reliable economic partner, and strengthening its role on the all-union and world markets.

#### **Raising the Population's Welfare, Providing Dignified Living Conditions for Each Person Is the Main Goal of the Uzbek Communist Party**

Our strategic line is to provide a radical turnaround in the economy toward the needs of man, an affirmation of

the principles of social justice. Party organizations will completely support the labor initiative and entrepreneurship of workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia. Communists will strive to strengthen the stimuli of productive labor, introduce reliable guarantees to ensure the right to labor, recreation, free education, and medical service.

The Communist Party will strive to conduct an active social policy. Communists see the role of state organs as not allowing an acute division of people according to living levels, doing this through a system of distributional relations, taxation policy, privileges, earmarked investments, and other economic levers. It is important to exclude the ground on which the enrichment of certain strata of society would take place at the expense of impoverishing others.

Communists consider it necessary to provide strengthened discipline and order based on people's high consciousness and responsibility, to wage a decisive struggle against speculation and corruption, protectionism and seniority, and the "shadow economy," using for this all the possibilities of the rule-of-law state.

Under the conditions of a transition to a market, the Uzbek Communist Party will strive to implement concrete measures for the social defense of the population, above all the low-income strata. At the basis of these must be laid state guarantees permitting the population to be provided with the necessary subsistence minimum, to be compensated for increases in the cost of living by providing people with basic needed goods, introducing indexed income, including pensions, allowances, stipends, and savings.

The resolution of the problems of the population's employment has enormous significance under the conditions of a transition to a market. A component of this work is the realization of the state republic "Employment" program, developed at the initiative of the Communist Party.

In resolving the problem of creating work slots, it is necessary to develop those production lines which would take into consideration the national-cultural structure of the local population, the traditional large family, its devotion to the historical places of residence.

The Communist Party feels that the state must introduce a system of employment guarantees for women, their professional training, improvement of working and living conditions for the successful combination of the chief function of raising children with labor and public activity, and a sharp reduction of female labor in heavy and dangerous work, the development of home-work, and, in the long term, granting mothers a shortened work week. Particular attention must be directed toward the protection of maternity and childhood, and the realization of measures to reduce mortality among children.

In many ways, the future of Uzbekistan depends upon youth. Taking into consideration that many problems

have accumulated in the youth sphere, the Communist Party favors the early adoption of the law on youth policy, and providing social defense and equal opportunity for all groups of youth in education, labor, professional growth, and living environment. Communists will completely support the creative search, initiative, and entrepreneurship inherent in young people, and assist in establishing youth enterprises, cooperatives, science and technology and cultural centers, and in the organization of full-fledged recreation and leisure for youth.

Communists attach great significance to the creation of favorable conditions to establish and strengthen young families. We favor expanding privileges to young families, granting them advantageous credit and loans, accelerated expansion of the network of families dormitories, the development of youth housing construction complexes.

The Communist Party considers it necessary to review the basis of the existing state system of cadre training. The early trade orientation of school students, the creation of education institutions for the most gifted students, the fortification of the material-technical base of secondary and higher schools, the introduction of economic accountability and cadre training must become priority trends. In doing this, particular attention must be directed to the accelerated formation of qualified working cadres and specialists from among individuals of the local nationalities, training them beyond the borders of the republic, including training in the most economically developed countries.

The Uzbek Communist Party attaches significance of the highest order to the issues of improving the population's housing conditions. Particular attention must be directed toward the development of individual housing construction with the corresponding range of state measures for advantageous credit, providing the builders with construction materials, and creating systems of engineering communications. The allocation of land parcels to mother-heroes, and veterans of war and labor within one year of eligibility seems necessary. It is necessary to implement in the republic a developed program of reconstruction of the urban economy and social amenities of the rural areas, taking into consideration national architectural traditions and the demands of modern building construction.

The Communist Party will persistently strive toward a radical improvement of the entire cause of maintaining people's health and the physical upbringing of workers. There is a demand for the radical reform of the health maintenance system, a major strengthening of material-technical base of treatment and prevention facilities, conducting complete prevention among the population, creating a network of centers for newborn intensive care, patron services, and assistance to pregnant women. The party organs will fully propagandize a healthy life style, and strive for an intense expansion of the network of

sports facilities, and a review of the organization for providing physical culture and sports for children and youth.

The party organizations will intensify work to realize the "Charity" program, adopted at the initiative of the Uzbek Communist Party, and will fully support from their own funds the initiative of the labor collectives for patronage of old-age homes, stipends to pensioners, mothers of many children, and people employed under unfavorable working conditions. They will strive for the persistent following of the course to introduce free breakfasts for schoolchildren and low-income students.

The Uzbek Communist Party feels that the solutions to the economic and social problems facing the republic are inextricably linked with the need to adopt immediate measures for the radical improvement of the exceptionally tense ecological situation in the region. And the Uzbek Communist Party views their implementation as its duty to the current and future generations.

We are for a comprehensive program of effective utilization of nature and the preservation of the environment, providing a scientifically based utilization of natural resources on the basis of modern technology, and high quality for man's environment. The introduction of ecological technological certification for enterprises must become the basic formation of such a program, transferring environmental protection policy to a new level.

Communists must put all efforts into saving the Aral Sea, now threatened with destruction, and the recovery of the ecological and sanitation situation in the Aral region, and will strive that these problems be resolved in close interaction with neighboring union republics, with the help of the entire country, and with the participation of the world community.

#### **For the Spiritual Renewal, the Full Revelation of the Intellectual and Cultural Potential of the Peoples of Uzbekistan**

The Uzbek Communist Party considers one of the main trends of its activity to be concern for the intellectual and spiritual development of each individual and the people of the republic as a whole. Communists promote access to cultural treasures for all citizens, and elimination of the deficit in the spiritual sphere. They are for the development and enrichment of modern art, Uzbek national culture and folk creative work, a caring attitude toward traditions, preservation, and restoration of historical monuments, and the realization of the "Meros" program.

Party committees at all levels are prepared to assist in an unbiased study of the "blank spots" in the history of the region, and in continuing work for the political rehabilitation of illegally repressed citizens of the republic.

We feel that all works of art and manuscript treasures created by the genius of our people and illegally taken beyond the borders of the republic must be returned to it.

The Communist Party favors the development of a network of national cultural centers of the nations and nationalities living in the republic; one of the important tasks of this network must become work in international education, mutual enrichment and expansion of the spiritual exchange among all the nations of the country. The party supports the rebirth of indigenous folk traditions, holidays, and rituals regardless of national affiliation.

Communists decisively oppose the noted process of the commercialization of art and culture, and are prepared to collaborate with all sociopolitical formations in order to protect the population, particularly the young generation, from the propaganda of pornography and the cult of violence, and the pernicious influence of low-quality culture, from everything contradictory to the spiritual morals and national concepts of propriety, the principles of humanism and morality. Issues of the formation in youth of qualities such as industriousness and charity, respect for elders, patriotism and internationalism, and elevating the role of the family, school, and all society in this cause remain at the center of the attention of the party organizations.

The Uzbek Communist Party highly values the priceless contribution being made by the republic's intelligentsia, its talented representatives in the spiritual and moral renewal of our society. Party organizations will also further develop and deepen constructive contacts with the creative and scientific intelligentsia, and will promote in all ways the growth of youth's gifts, revealing their talents and creative possibilities.

We favor the effective utilization of the existing scientific and technological potential, the creation of associations for the introduction of advanced research and development in the shortest possible period, of a system of legal defense of the republic's intellectual property and copyrights, and revision in light of the effective legislation. We consider it necessary to confirm in people's consciousness the profound and clear understanding that without the advanced development of intellectual potential, it is impossible to ensure the republic's genuine sovereignty and prosperity.

In order to achieve these goals, the Communist Party assumes the necessity of striving for the development and improvement of scientific cooperation with other republics and foreign countries, increasing the number of gifted young scientists and specialists being sent to the leading scientific and academic centers of the country and abroad. The resolution of these problems must be reinforced by the creation of an independent republic hard currency fund for the support of science and creative associations.

Party organizations and committees will support measures taken at the state level and will directly participate



in the re-education of the engineering and economic corps of the republic in accordance with the demands of the market economy.

The Communist Party deems necessary the implementation of restructuring of the social sciences, raising their role in the determination of the prospects for the development of the republic and individual regions, forecasting socioeconomic and political processes. The party proposes an initiative for the creation of a Republic Center for the Study of Public Opinion for the manifestation and calculation of the interests of various social groups.

In the area of public education, the Communist Party is for profound reform of the general education and higher schools, pre-school education, the development of national traditions and the utilization of world experience in educating and training in the growing generation. The party will support and encourage the development of independence of educational institutions and scientific institutions, the diversity of their organizational forms, the expansion of the rights of trainees and students, and their aspiration to self-management. At the same time, the party is decisively opposed to transforming educational institutions into a field of political passions, obstructing the solution of educational and training tasks. The party also considers it impermissible for the teaching of social sciences to be used as a tribune for the propaganda of antisocialism, anticommunism, falsification of history, and political speculation.

The Communist Party favors the elimination of the remainder principle in financing the development of culture, science, and public education, and will strive toward their priority investment from republic and local budgets, attracting the resources of enterprises, cooperatives, public philanthropic, and other foundations. It will fully promote the improvement of the material status of the workers employed in these spheres, raising their public authority and social defense.

The Communist Party deems it necessary to introduce to the republic Supreme Soviet as a legislative initiative the draft Law on Science, the Law on Public Education, and the Law on Culture and Moral Upbringing.

While defending the scientific-materialistic world view, the Communist Party dissociates itself from the voluntaristic actions toward religion which were permitted in the past, and supports the adopted USSR Law on Freedom of Conscience. The party is open to cooperation with religion organizations in the cause of affirming common human values, and promotes their participation in sociopolitical and cultural life. At the same time, it condemns attempts to use the religious feelings of believers for antisocial, antistate purposes.

The Uzbek Communist Party fully realizes that in many ways, perestroika of all spheres of society's life, security, success and peace of all the people living in the republic depends upon the harmonization of interethnic relations. It proceeds from the deep conviction that any issue

of interethnic relations in the republic must be resolved only within the framework of the USSR Constitution, the Uzbek SSR Constitution, and the Karakalpak ASSR Constitution, by political methods, by means of persuasion and direct dialogue. The party favors the systematic and unconditional realization of the Law on the Uzbek SSR State Language, and a respectful attitude and the development of the languages of all peoples of the republic, the use of the Russian language as the language of interethnic intercourse and cooperation of the peoples of the USSR. It considers necessary the creation of all conditions for the implementation of the state program for the study of the Uzbek language. It will promote the study of Old Uzbek literature and foreign languages for the purpose of bringing the masses to the best examples of patriotic and world literature.

The firm principles of mutual respect for interests and the cooperation of people of all the nationalities living in Uzbekistan must be laid in the foundation of the nationality policy. The solid guarantee of civil peace and harmony is the recognition of the right of all the people of the republic and national minorities to preserve their national-cultural uniqueness, language, culture, traditions, historical memory, and natural environment, and education of the growing generation in the native language.

Consolidation of the citizens of the republic is one of the main goals of the policy of the Uzbek Communist Party. We are for the priority of human rights, against privileges for some people and infringement of the rights of other people on a national or linguistic basis, for provision of legal defense of people's rights and dignity. We favor active participation in the political life of all citizens of Uzbekistan, the representation of various nationalities in party organs, institutions of state power and administration of the republic. The party organizations will wage an uncompromising struggle against manifestations of nationalism and chauvinism, against those who propagandize separatism and national isolation, or who discredit our international achievements.

#### **For the Renewal and Democratization of the Uzbek Communist Party**

The renewal of the Uzbek Communist Party is inextricably linked to its democratization, the goal of which is to place the communist at the center of party life, to ensure direct participation of the party masses in the development of the party's policy and in its realization.

In its intraparty life, the republic's Communist Party will be guided by the principle of democratic centralism, which ensures self-management, the combination of the interests of the party and the individual communist, freedom for expression of opinions, the opposition of different views, open criticism and self-criticism, and conscious discipline.

The republic's Communist Party will direct particular attention to expanding rights, raising activity and the

independence of its foundation, the primary party organizations. We firmly support the preservation of the territorial-production principle of their structure. At the same time, considering the particular urgency to the republic of residence-based political work, we consider the unification of those residing within a population point, neighborhood [makhalli] or micro-precinct of communists into a strong, active territorial party organization to be necessary.

Particular attention will be directed to the renewal of the forms and methods of work of the reliable echelon of the party: rayon and city party organizations, to the expansion of the rights and independence of the Karakalpak republic, oblast party organizations in resolving issues of their internal life.

The new political situation presents high demands to the central organs of the Uzbek Communist Party. The atmosphere of open and principled exchange of opinions, broad glasnost, genuine collegiality in decision-making should continue to be affirmed in their work. It is necessary to raise the role of the commissions of party committees for priority trend work to a qualitatively higher level.

The Uzbek Communist Party recognizes the right of communists to create horizontal structures: soviets of secretaries of party organizations, party clubs, sociopolitical centers, soviets of veterans and other forms of association of party members according to interests and problems.

A particular concern of the Uzbek Communist Party is the influx of fresh forces into its ranks, first and foremost of people of labor, youth, active supporters of perestroika. Through committees, organizations, and the party mass information media, the Communist Party will explain to the broad strata of the population its own program goals and tasks, their attraction, and form among the people who support them the need to unite their fate with the party.

The authority of the party lies in the realization of the main principle: The interests of the people are the interests of the party. The party sees its strength above all in the support of the working masses.

The Communist Party calls upon all its members to become proficient in the art of political work among the masses, in holding a dialogue with diverse strata of the people, in the ability to attract people with the force of truth, arguments, and concrete deeds.

Issues of cadre policy remain principal to the Communist Party. In this situation, new to the party, its committees and organizations not only must not refuse the right to recommend worthy communists and non-party members holding Communist Party position, but are obligated to fight for their election or appointment to key positions in organs of state power and administration, in

ideological institutions, to give their evaluation to officials of state organs, to oppose bureaucratism, protectionism, and seniority.

In accordance with the Law on the Press, the Uzbek Communist Party will improve its interaction with the mass information media. We favor the further democratization of the activity of the press organs, television, and radio broadcasting, highlighting the diversity of opinions and evaluations, with a simultaneous increase in the responsibility of journalists for the contents and veracity of their publications and programs. The Communist Party proposes to raise as a legislative initiative in the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet the issue of intensifying the moral principle in the mass information media.

The Uzbek Communist Party opposes the ideas binding society of "depoliticizing" state and law enforcement organs, educational institutions and the Armed Forces, and feels that prohibiting the activity of party structures within them infringes man's constitutional rights to association in accordance with his political views.

Rejecting intolerance of other views and ideas, communists decisively oppose anti-Sovietism and extremism in any form, and will resist attacks on V.I. Lenin, the CPSU, and the Uzbek Communist Party by all legal means.

The republic Communist Party is open for cooperation with sociopolitical organizations and movements recognizing its constitutional rights, holding views of democracy and social justice, and acting on the basis of and in accordance with constitutional norms. At the same time, it opposes extremist, anti-social forces inflaming national discord, opposes attempts to cause tension and destabilize the situation.

Based upon the extra-party and extra-governmental nature of the trade unions, and promoting their independence while viewing them as the direct expressors of the interests of their social base, the Uzbek Communist Party will build its relations with the trade unions on the principles of mutual understanding, interaction, and partnership.

Interrelations of party and Komsomol organizations will be built upon the principles of political partnership, ideological community, recognition of the independence of the Communist Youth League of Uzbekistan, and on mutual respect and trust. The Communist Party views the republic Komsomol as the closest reserve for the filling its ranks.

The Uzbek Communist Party favors active cooperation with veterans organizations. It favors constitutional support of the women's movement, granting women the right to free choice of their social role, for women's participation in making and implementing decisions on all levels, for their broad representation in state and public organs.

The Uzbek Communist Party calls upon communists and nonparty members, all the workers of the republic to be energetically included in the practical work of bringing this Program of Action to life; to lend their

strength, knowledge, and capability to the realization of the tasks of socioeconomic, national, and spiritual development, and strengthening the sovereignty of the Uzbek SSR.

### Appeal to Republics To Overcome Interethnic Discord

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[Article by G. Nikerov, candidate of juridical sciences, under the rubric: "Discussion Forum": "Let Us Live Together: Is It Not Better To Unite Than To Perish in Ethnic Strife?"]

[Text] The Soviet Federation is in a difficult situation, on the verge of falling apart. The Baltic republics want to secede from the Union. There is a powerful secession movement in Moldova and in the Caucasus as well. Even among our brothers in the Ukraine, with whom we have ties of language and history, there is a rather large number of separatists.

The secession of any ethnic groups means a sizable loss for the country; for without it the country will be poorer in spirit as well as in political power. Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians—obviously, a great deal in terms of economic ideas, the reversion to historical values, and generally high level of culture comes to us and from them. Their absence would slow down the process of perestroika, it would strengthen conservative tendencies, and in the long run it could have an unfavorable effect on them if, let us say, conservative forces should gain the upper hand among us.

Naturally, each people as a right to decide its fate for itself—whether to live in a union with others or to form a fully independent state of its own. All this is true. But to live a separate existence may turn out to be not so easy as it might seem to be at first sight. Of course, when the people themselves are in charge of their fate, that might seem to speed their development. But it is possible that the opposite might happen—that is, a slowdown could result owing to the rupture of long-established ties.

The peoples of the USSR generally have lived for many hundreds of years around a Russian center. Central Asia was the last area to become a part of Russia, but even that occurred more than a hundred years ago. In the course of time a distinct community of social, economic, and political interests came into being in the country, together with long-standing commercial ties. Often the peoples so intermixed that by now it is impossible to set any clear-cut boundaries between them. In Estonia, for example, Russians live not only in the North-East but in Tallinn and elsewhere in the republic.

What does it mean in actual practice for people to exercise their right of self-determination through separation and division? It means nothing but an endless disintegration of territory. Say, Estonia secedes from the Union. Does this mean that the nationality issue is resolved once and for all? By no means. Estonia has a large Russian-speaking population (about 40 percent). You will see that it, too, will demand that the territory it inhabits should either become an independent state or join that of the RSFSR.

Of course, the Russians in Estonia are recent arrivals, and they have a republic of their own. But in accordance with rules of law that are recognized throughout the world, no people may be forced to move out of its place of residence if it settled there originally without resorting to the use of force—no individual even.

Here, in our country, as throughout the world, an objective process of intensive integration among peoples is in progress. More and more, this process makes it increasingly difficult to resolve the issue of nationality in the way that was chosen here in the 1920's. The intensification of contacts between peoples, together with increasing population migration, demands not disunity among peoples and states but, on the contrary, unity. On the way to unification, for example, are the developed nations of Western Europe. Here, a United Europe is coming into being. As a result, the standard of living of all the nationalities is rising. They are becoming more prosperous through closer community ties; they are helping each other, and as a result all together stand to gain.

And what does the formal implementation of the right of peoples to self-determination lead to? Theoretically, and even from a practical standpoint, it means that some of our oblasts, rayons, cities, and villages may demand secession to form their own separate "states." Such a thing has already occurred in human history. We may recall, for example, the enormous number of principalities and kingdoms in Europe during the Middle Ages, and particularly in Germany, which was united by Bismarck only rather recently.

Moreover, many cities and villages similarly may become divided into separate national quarters and ethnic enclaves. And what is to become of these bits and pieces? Quarters will be divided into rooms, and rooms into corners, depending on nationality—whether the members of a family are, or are not, "pure-blooded." All this, of course, is absurd.

The disintegration of a country along national lines—the demarcation of boundaries between peoples, their consignment to ethnic quarters, and the elaboration of relations between them (who must live where, what belongs to whom)—is ultimately, I believe, ruinous. It threatens endless conflict, even warfare, the sole outcome of which is a common awareness that what is needed is not disunity but unity.

The resolution of the nationality issue among us like much else has been extraordinarily aggravated by ideological thinking. Some of our national formations were therefore drawn up without proper consideration being given to their ethnic composition. In the 1930's, for example, when the Kazakh SSR and the Kirghiz SSR were formed as autonomous republics, neither the Kazakhs nor the Kirghiz constituted a majority in their own republics. According to the 1979 population survey (data on the 1989 survey on the ethnic composition of the territories is yet to be published), the Kazakhs and

Kirghiz remained, as before, in the minority in these republics. In some places, as in Fergana, for example, single geographical and economic regions are divided by national boundaries that form purely arbitrary configurations.

Autonomous areas were likewise often created without a suitable ethnic basis. The Crimean ASSR, in which the Tatars made up about 25 percent of the population at the time of its creation in 1921, provide an example of this, and there are a number of others.

Ethnic territorial composition is continually changing, and sometimes it no longer corresponds to its original designation. For example, the Yakuts in 1979 comprised 36.9 percent of the population of Yakutiya. A. V. Vlasov, former chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, is therefore able to represent Yakutiya since most of the local population are Russians.

In the days of Stalin neither the indigenous population nor other peoples who settled in an autonomous region were taken into consideration. The former could simply be moved out by force if the autonomous region was eliminated; and the latter were officially designated as a minority, although they often made up a majority of the population.

Our Constitution grants the Union republics the right to secede from the Union. This right was especially widely advertised during the Stalinist period. Then it was a mere formality since there was no possibility of exercising it. In the developed capitalist states of the federal type the right of secession is not provided for, although in most cases it is not explicitly denied. In fact, bearing in mind the general rule in effect there that "everything is permitted which is not prohibited," the subjects of a bourgeois federation do have the right to secede. Their constitutions, however, are silent in this respect. Why? Because they have a different approach to federation. Briefly, it may be summarized as follows: A federation is not formed so that it may be easily taken apart. This is the approach of the developed nations. The more successful federations abroad are the ones that are not organized along national lines. In the United States, where there are densely populated areas with large numbers of people of Mexican extraction, or Negroes, Poles, and so forth, there are no national boundaries. There are no states for special ethnic groups. And an effort is made to downplay the importance of national origin.

Our division of land into national territories, it has now become apparent, has been far from ideal, as is our entire approach. Moreover, some of the steps being taken to deal with the nationality issue should be subjected to critical scrutiny and carefully reconsidered. The territorial divisions now in effect, particularly the ones drawn up in the era of Stalin, which so often have proved to be unsuccessful, one might suppose, do not provide grounds for justification of further attempts to improve them.

Let us suppose, for example, that all the autonomous regions are converted into Union republics—that is,

instead of having 15, we have 53 Union republics. What does this actually mean? It means that to the two republics, already in existence, in which the indigenous population does not constitute a majority, shall be added a few dozen other such areas. Take, for example, the Chukchi, who in 1979 numbered 14,000. Even if they all lived in the Chukotsk Autonomous Okrug, they would make up only about 10 percent of the population, which totals 139,000.

Another example. The entire population of Taymyr (Dolgano-Nenetskiy) Autonomous Okrug is 55,000. The territory of the okrug wraps around the city of Norilsk, population 174,000, which is not a part of the okrug, but is directly under the jurisdiction of Krasnoyarsk Kray. If the new republic is to include the population of the city (which it should, so as neither to "impoverish" the territory nor make the city an anomaly in its own region), then why will the new republic be Nenets? By the same reasoning, why should not more than 70,000 peoples who are indigenous to the region, as well as many who are not indigenous, some of whom are many times more numerous than the Chukchi or the Nenets, have republics of their own? Does this mean that we are going to have to devise national state formations for these people as well?

And what is to become of the RSFSR as a result of the "unionization" of the autonomous areas? Will it be turned into a patchwork quilt? And, obviously, without any hope of success; for to draw up accurate boundaries between nationalities in our mixed-up country is simply an impossibility.

In the exercise of self-determination, peoples and nations may elect the path of unification, which is more in keeping with the spirit of the times. The peoples of our country could successfully develop a distinctive sense of national identity as successfully, or more so, within the framework of national and cultural autonomy as set forth in the Treaty of the Union. In my view, to ensure equal rights for all peoples, and to eliminate existing tensions, we must not make a fetish out of boundaries. Generally, boundaries should serve to unite people—not to divide them.

It is better for all to unite by bridling national pride than to perish in ethnic strife.

### Results Of Latvian Survey On Emigration

91P50090A Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in Russian  
14 Dec 90 p 1

[Report by BALTIYA, Estonian News Agency: "Is A New Emigration Possible?"]

[Text] The association of Latvian sociologists' Center for Sociological Research conducted a survey among 100 Latvian residents in which they were asked to respond to the question: "Have you considered leaving Latvia?"



Among those Latvians surveyed, no one considered emigrating to the USSR. However, five percent responded that it is possible that they would leave for some other country. Seventeen percent of those surveyed, representing other nationalities, considered leaving for the USSR, and ten percent, for other countries.

The majority of those surveyed cited the following reasons for a possible departure: uncertainty of the future (51 percent); nationality problems (35 percent) and economic difficulties (21 percent).

### **SOYUZ Ethnographic Dictionary: Kurds**

91UN0852A Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 52, Dec 90  
p 19

["Ethnographic Dictionary" series edited by Doctor of Historical Sciences M.N. Guboglo and Doctor of Historical Sciences Yu.B. Simchenko]

[Text] Self-Name: **Kurmandzh**.

According to the 1989 census, about 153,000 Kurds live in the USSR.

The Kurdish language belongs to the Iranian group of the Indo-European family of languages and is subdivided into several dialects. The Kurds of the Caucasus speak the Kermandji dialect, as well as the languages of peoples in whose territories they reside—Azeri, Armenian, and Georgian.

The bulk of the Kurds live outside the USSR—in Turkey, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The total number of Kurds exceeds eight million. In our country, the Kurds live in Armenia in Talinskiy, Echmiadzinskiy, Izhdevanskiy, Sevanskiy, Artikskiy, Abovanskiy, Ashtarakskiy, and Oktembryanskiy Rayons; in Azerbaijan in Lachinskiy, Kelbadzharskiy, Kubatlinskiy, and Zengelanskiy Rayons, as well as in a number of Georgian cities.

As early as the 10th through 12th centuries, the Kurdish Sheddadi dynasty ruled Transcaucasia. It may be deduced that the Kurdish population already resided in this territory at the time. However, the main stream of Kurds came from Kurdistan when Transcaucasia joined Russia. The Kurdish population became the densest in

the areas of Azerbaijan adjacent to Iran, and from there the Kurds migrated to Armenia and Georgia. The Yazid Kurds also migrated to Eastern Armenia directly from Turkey. The most significant wave of resettlement of the Kurds to Armenia coincided with the periods of the 1853-1856 Crimean War and the Russian-Turkish war of 1877-1878.

In the past, the Kurds used to be nomads migrating along certain routes annually with their herds. Their migrations were vertical: In the summer, they went to the hills, and in the winter, to the plains. The Kurds kept sheep, horses, and a small number of cattle.

In Transcaucasia, some of the Kurds engaged in farming, cultivating either the lands of the tsar or the lands of rich fellow Kurds who had acquired them in Elisavetpol Province. Since the 1920's, measures have been taken to provide a settled way of life for the Kurds. During the Soviet period, the Kurds have begun to engage in cotton and rice farming, gardening, and vine-growing. Local strains of livestock were replaced with fine-fleece merinos and pedigree cows.

Rug weaving was a craft common among the Kurds. Kurdish rugs were known for their exceptional colorfulness and quality. They were made both with and without pile. Pictures of the sun and horns, the symbols of an ancient cult, were mandatory elements of Kurdish rug designs. All Kurdish women also possessed the perfect skill of manufacturing thick felt products with the rug designs.

Traditional dress is represented most completely by the folk costumes of women. The women wear wide pants, blouses with sleeveless jackets over them, skirts, aprons, armlets, and wool belts. The headgear of the girls and the women differs. Wool socks and leather shoes complement the costume. Previously, women used to wear silver or gold disks in one of the nostrils. At present, they wear brooches, beads, rings, and bracelets. The men used to wear homespun wide pants made of wool, blouses, short wool caftans and Circassian coats. Felt caps with colored scarfs tied over them were used as headgear.

Prior to the socialist reconstruction, large patriarchal families were common among the Kurds.

The Armenian Kurds practice Sunni Islam and the Azeri Kurds, Shiite Islam. The Yazid Kurds live in Eastern Armenia and Georgia.

### Gorbachev's Proposed Use of Court Praised

91UN0866A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Feb 91  
p 1

[Article by Yuriy Feofanov under the rubric "Political Diary": "Believe It or Not, We Have Courts... It Would Be Good if the President's Action Reaffirmed the Rule of Law He Himself Proclaimed..."]

[Text] A few days ago a statement from the press service of the USSR president appeared in the press; it could not have gone unnoticed. Artem Tarasov, an entrepreneur widely known in our country, stated that the head of state ostensibly had made a secret deal with the Japanese Government: \$200 billion for the four Kuril Islands. The press service denied this "fact," and called it a political provocation. It is, of course, a high level scandal: an RSFSR people's deputy accuses the president of the country... It is no joking matter.

I was, however, more surprised and flabbergasted by the other part of the official protest. As was announced, Mikhail Sergeyevich intends to go to court unless he receives a public apology. I am afraid this part of the announcement did not receive the attention it deserved. That is a mistake. I saw in it an event: The very fact that the first person in the state declared his intention to seek redress through a regular rayon people's court. Nothing close to it has happened in the Soviet country. Not only the first person, but the second, the third, the tenth—none from the nomenklatura brass, in my opinion, never knew there was such an institution as the court in the state they ruled. That is, of course, they had heard about the organ that passes down prison sentences. But to think of the court as a place where one might go to seek justice, to protect his good name... First, nobody had dared to assail names above a certain level until the "people became loose and got out of hand"; second, there had been enough simpler and more reliable means available to deal with those who did dare... "The sense of justice" among nomenklatura brass had simply become atrophied.

Let us recall the fairly recent Ligachev affair. He, a Politburo member, and a second person then, was accused by audacious prosecutors Telman Gzlyan and Nikolay Ivanov of being part of a grave felony. By the way, this accusation was directed at other people as well, but it just happened that all the attention focused on one person. So what did Yegor Kuzmich do? He wrote an indignant complaint to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum; he demanded that the procurator general's office conduct an investigation and punish the "slanders"; the Congress of USSR People's Deputies (!) spent a whole meeting sorting out this matter; commissions of all possible levels were digging—"Was there or was there not?" And what was the result? It was not proved that Ligachev had anything to do with the transgressions; however, the stain of accusations were not washed off him, either.

There was, however, a most simple, most reliable way to protect his honor—to file suit in the rayon court. They would not have listened to the flaming speeches there; they simply would have said: Show us the cause, prove it by documents and facts. And the respondents would have to either present the evidence, or offer public apologies. By the way, I wrote about it then; it was published. I was surprised then: All right, Ligachev himself may not have thought of that, but his aides should have advised him. Such a simple thing, known to every citizen.

One may, of course, suspect that Yegor Kuzmich had reason to be wary of the court. But I do not think this is the case: After all, no proof was presented to the congress. Most likely it was something else: The "second person" did not feel himself a citizen who was on equal foot with other citizens in the eyes of the law. For too long, he had been above the law. Therefore, even if his aides did advise him to do so, Ligachev would have to overcome himself, the habits and traditions, and his own "leader's ego." Is this easy?

A long time ago, during stagnation times, the then chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Court, A. Ibragimov, told me this. Once, during criminal proceedings, it was necessary to call one of the secretaries of the republic Communist Party Central Committee as a witness. A common happening in a normal state. "But what a storm it caused," the republic's supreme judge told me. "I nearly got expelled from the party." A colleague of mine recalled a case when the full court arrived at the office of an obkom secretary to hear his testimony as a witness.

Now the "order" is being broken. Frankly, I am not very anxious to see this matter go to the level of court proceedings. Although what journalist would not dream of being present at such a sensational action. But I would rather see things smoothed out between two respected people without the court. By the way, I have heard that Tarasov has already said that he had been misunderstood and is ready to apologize. But, completely on "the other hand," I would like our president to visit our rayon court. Let him see at least once in what misery the "third power" of the state huddles.

Before starting this entry in the diary, I kept doubting my choice: Do I blow things out of proportion? Big deal. But still, I am writing it... Not only is it for the first time in history of the Soviet State. I want to see in the president's action the reassertion of the rule of law he himself declared when he started the reform of the totalitarian system in which the court as an institute of justice has had no place. They say that example is the best enforcement. One may deliver a dozen fiery speeches about the supremacy of law, about a law based state, and respect for the courts, and all of this will just go in and out of everyone's ears. One concrete personal action can provide proof that not all words are just words. By the way, when it comes to words, we have always had plenty of those.

A long time ago, when a state apparatus functionary, Drozhzhin, was facing an unfounded accusation, Lenin was asked to protect him. The reply was: "If Drozhzhin is brought to court, it is done precisely with the purpose of showing that he is innocent... Gossip and accusations happen quite often; to show in this way that they are false is quite correct." Unfortunately, a "quite correct" way did not become a common practice. The courts became more of an organ of reprisals than justice.

We have to, we must give the courts a place that is appropriate for them in a civilized state. Words and preaching will not accomplish this. That is why I was so happy to see that the president of the country chose the court as an extreme measure to protect his honor.

#### **Kazakh SSR Official on Crime Rise in Republic**

91US0287A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA  
in Russian 8 Dec 90 p 3

[Interview with Kazakh SSR Procuracy senior procurator-criminologist and senior legal counselor E.M. Smirnov by correspondent A. Zhevlakov; place and date not given: "Without Apparent Motive"]

[Text] An increase in crime has been seen throughout the country in recent years, including serious crime. Many of these crimes are being committed for no apparent motive (that is, when the criminal is not known, and sometimes even the victim) and remain unsolved.

The state of affairs with respect to public safety in Kazakhstan was the subject of an interview conducted by our correspondent with E.M. Smirnov, senior procurator-criminologist in the Kazakh SSR Procuracy and senior legal counselor.

[Smirnov] To be accurate, the sharp increase in the crime rate here started in the latter half of 1988. Let me cite some figures to clarify this.

In 1989, the total number of recorded crimes rose 31 percent to a total of 135,000. They included 19,500 serious crimes, an increase of 40 percent. This year, the number of premeditated murders alone was 1,549, and cases of serious bodily harm doubled. This increase has continued this year.

A change has also occurred in the breakdown of murders. Murders resulting from motives of hooliganism and for mercenary and sexual motives, and armed attacks on cashiers and drivers by psychologically disturbed persons and minors, have increased. What is particularly alarming is the fact that a number of these crimes are being committed by organized groups in a daring way and after careful preparation. Steps are taken to disguise them, and this hampers the detection and solving of crimes.

[Correspondent] Eduard Mikhaylovich, it seems to me that when we talk about the increase in crime we cannot

avoid the question of the reasons for it. What are they, in your opinion? And can crime in general be eradicated?

[Smirnov] Crime increases whenever destabilizing processes are taking place in a society or state. It was similar here in the country in 1953-1954 and the early 1960's. Similar phenomena were also seen in postwar Japan when the economy was being restructured. It is specifically economic instability that causes criminal instability.

The years of stagnation engendered double standards, lack of spirituality, and indifference in people. An attitude of self-seeking took hold, and aggressiveness, domestic conflict, and parasitism became widespread. As a result, on the one hand, what we see is degradation of the top people in social leadership, corruption, and their fusion with the criminal world, and on the other, moral degradation and licentiousness among the lower strata, culminating in the process of lumpenization of society.

I underpin my thesis that fewer serious crimes are committed in a "satisfied" society with a high level of culture by the following example.

In 1980, one London newspaper called the death of the popular singer John Lennon "a purely American murder." In that same year, there were eight(!) murders in England and more than 10,000 in the United States. To the point, in the Soviet Union 25,000 were recorded while we were carefully calculating how many crimes per minute were being committed in "rotten" countries of the West.

Unfortunately, there are also purely subjective reasons resulting from the incompetent policy on criminal law in the state itself. They may include the methods of extensive use of campaigns, when we go from one extreme to the other: first, we engage in a laudable humanitarian approach, and then, we do an about face and make punishment much more severe.

A good example of this is the adoption of the new law on speculation. Already it can be said that there are no more goods and fewer speculators, and prices in the black market have doubled (because of the risk). In general, I do not understand how this law can be compatible with the declared switch to normal market relations. And on a grand scale, the first speculator is the state itself, which buys goods abroad at lower prices than it sells them in the domestic market.

In the economic sphere, crime must be fought with economic means, not repressive means. But it is precisely in the latter that our state places its greatest hopes. There was the unsuccessful (but "socialist") approach: There may be crime but it is a remnant of the bourgeois past and pressure must be applied with the help of the law enforcement agencies and it will become just camp dust. It did not, although one cannot deny the zeal of the enthusiastic executors.

Finally, we must understand that the law enforcement agencies cannot eradicate crime, they can only contain it.

[Correspondent] The investigation of murders is the prerogative of the organs of the procurator's office, which you represent. I would be interested in knowing how the work is organized to solve these very serious crimes...

[Smirnov] A considerable proportion of them are obvious murders, when we have a criminal, his victim, and eyewitnesses and other evidence. As a rule they are domestic crimes and are committed against close acquaintances and relatives, often after drinking together, and in one case in five the victim himself provokes the situation through his behavior. We are still a long way from finding gentlemen's agreements to domestic conflicts. What they do most often is snatch up a knife, an axe, or a firearm.

These kinds of cases do not usually present much difficulty. Murders committed without apparent motive are another matter. They are investigated by workers from standing operational investigation groups made up of experienced and skilled investigators in the oblast procurators' offices and operatives in the criminal investigation departments. The procurator-criminologists give them a great deal of assistance.

We first set up these group here in Kazakhstan and they have been operating since 1979. They have been extensively used throughout the country as the most progressive form of interaction between the procurator's office and the militia.

Whereas 10 years ago four or five murders were occurring in the republic, during this last period about 200 have been detected, and more than 70 in the last two years alone. They include sensational criminal cases, like the murder of the gypsy family of Petrov-Lebedev's in Petropavlovsk, the militia worker in Tselinograd, a number of murders committed by the gangsters Mozhayev and Sorokin, the murder of a female student on the grounds of the Kazakh State University campus in Alma-Ata, and, of course, the rape and murder of 15 women in East Kazakhstan. These last crimes, committed by one man, were solved 10 years or more after the event.

[Correspondent] Eduard Mikhaylovich, is it possible to solve all premeditated murders?

[Smirnov] In theory, yes. In practice, in most cities and rayons they are solved. For some years all murderers in Kzyl-Orda, Kokchetav, North Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk, and Taldy-Kurgan Oblasts, and also on transport, have been found.

[Correspondent] How many in the republic remain unsolved?

[Smirnov] For 15 years the number of unsolved murders averaged two percent of the recorded murders (the Union figure is five percent). In 1988 this percentage

doubled, and in 1989 it trebled, despite the fact that the total number of murders without apparent motive solved increased.

[Correspondent] And there are obvious reasons for this, are there not?

[Smirnov] There are many reasons. Let me deal with some of them. First, it is not possible to halt the overall increase in crime, which has outstripped the ability of our investigators and the operational services of the militia. There are shortages of experienced personnel, and retraining for investigators takes up much of the time of practical workers. Let me state candidly that our universities are turning out poor specialists, and I have had more than one occasion to be convinced of this, during my work with the Kazakh State University state examinations board.

Working conditions are abnormal, there is no standard work day, virtually no days off, and the salary is poor, and, as if to make up for this, there is a high level of nervous and physical stress and the prestige of this profession is falling. This is by no means a complete list of the reasons for which more than one-third of investigators leave the procurator's office each year. In addition, they must work up to age 60, on par with engineering and technical workers, in contrast to the MVD and KGB investigators and the military procurator's office, who receive a long-service bonus.

Technical support for investigation work is poor. Even if we have the money we cannot acquire equipment for criminal investigations by written order—the State Bank forbids it. I make no mention at all of transport.

Without all this it is impossible to talk about a real fight against crime.

[Correspondent] Perhaps all these issues will be resolved with the creation of an investigations committee as they are about to do in the RSFSR. And when will the debate on the subject of delineation of functions between investigation and supervision end?

[Smirnov] I do not believe that the fact that procuracy investigators and their supervisors are located under the same roof is the main reason for forensic and investigative errors. This is largely an invented problem. By the way, let me make reference to experience gained abroad, to which we are turning with increasing frequency. In the United States the country's attorney general simultaneously heads the Justice Department and leads the activity of the FBI. However, I do not recall that anyone in America has raised the question of delineation of those posts. So does that mean that this really is the crux of the matter? Now the subject of an investigations committee. In general, I approve of steps aimed at making radical improvements in investigative work. Removing the investigating apparatus from the subordination of the prosecuting organs (the Ministry of Defense, MVD, and KGB) is also important. However, this plan for investigative reform is imbued with a

"military" spirit and is aimed at creating yet another essentially military organization that deprives the investigators themselves of protection and independence. Is it advisable for a rule-of-law state to have a single, monopoly organ of investigation? This is not an idle question. It is apropos here to recall the United States once again, where preliminary investigations are conducted by about 50 different agencies, including the Department of the Treasury, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Internal Revenue Service, the Coast Guard, and others.

I am convinced that it is impossible to abolish the investigative organ within the procuracy. It is essential to retain investigators in the procuracies of the republics and oblasts. Why? In order to investigate crimes committed by high officials, deputies at all levels and

workers in law enforcement agencies, and crimes committed against them, that is, as it is in all civilized countries.

Otherwise, there will also be a significant weakening (I am not as importunate as some naively suggest) in supervision by the procurator's office. For then we would be deprived of skilled workers with a definite seniority in investigative work. For example, you can yourself imagine the competence of a procurator who has not independently investigated a single criminal case.

No matter how attractive the idea of setting up an investigations committee may seem at first blush, there is no need to rush to realize it. Otherwise, we shall once again be placing the cart before the horse.



**Party Raykoms Lose Control of Press**

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[Article by PRAVDA Correspondent K. Aksenov:  
"Without a Struggle"]

[Text] Krasnodar Kray—Some time ago almost 19,000 readers of the newspaper ZORI OKTYABRYA had a surprise. The place where that publication usually stated that it was a publication of the Severskiy CPSU Rayon Committee [raykom] and the Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies in Krasnodar Kray was left blank.

Some subscribers thought that it was an inadvertent slip by the typesetter or a chance line drop, while others who were more alert started to telephone the rayon leaders and the editorial offices trying to find out the reason for the unusual "inaccuracy." Then it became clear that there had been no mistake at all. It was simply that with that issue of the newspaper the editor, A. Ignatkin, had removed the "sign," and the rights of the lawful founder of the rayon newspaper, which had been publishing it for almost 60 years, were, as they say, taken out of its hands.

A sharp turn of events, you will agree. Even in our stormy times of perestroyka it is by no means everyone who takes it into his head to try to "steal" a press organ so unceremoniously in broad daylight. This legitimate question arises: What was it that prompted the newspaper people to take this step? After visiting the editorial offices and listening to almost all the editorial associates, who, I note, are mainly young people, I found out that the collective had used this unusual method to "save" the editor, Ignatkin, over whose head the storm clouds were gathering. They say that the raykom was applying pressure and not allowing him to say anything.

It must be owned that there is more to it than that. And not long after a discussion in the editorial offices the desire arose to defend the interests of colleagues and help them to extricate themselves from the petty tutelage and absolute power of the local leaders. True, facts were needed to fill out my contention. And then suddenly, the unexpected happened. Neither the editor nor his subordinates were able to cite even one worthwhile example to show that the raykom and rayon soviet leaders had imposed a ban on contentious pieces that revealed negative phenomena in the rayon, or demanded that certain materials being prepared for publication should be agreed before they were typeset, or created zones in which criticism was prohibited. Moreover, the first secretary of the Severskiy Party Raykom and chairman of the rayon soviet, V. Solyanik, publicly asked the editor who specifically was stopping the journalists from writing the truth and acting in the role of the person imposing any prohibition. But even there, at a joint plenum of the CPSU raykom and a rayon soviet session at which the conflict situation was discussed, A. Ignatkin also said nothing reasonable.

Instead there was sometimes else. For some time readers had started to notice that ZORI OKTYABRYA was, as it were, having its coat turned. Now and again pieces appeared on its pages stirring up public opinion and giving rise to rumors and idle talk. But not because the journalists had "dug deeply" and revealed some emerging fact. The reason was inaccuracy, prejudice, and strained assessments. They were not taking the trouble to check the facts: They could even publish a letter without checking its authenticity or whether or not its author actually existed. They could themselves compose an anonymous letter about "persecution" of newspaper people and comment on it. And the aim? To blacken, or at least "pinch," the CPSU at any price and sow doubts about the competence or decency of local leaders.

I, who have spent almost 30 years in newspaper work, was simply astonished by one piece that readers sent to PRAVDA. Under the headline "Results Cause for Doubt" was a letter from retiree S. Losov. What was it about? The author wrote that he did not trust the results of the election of delegates for the 28th CPSU Congress, and that in his view the raykom first secretary, V. Solnyanik, had gained a very "unconvincing victory."

A serious charge, say what you will. And the proof? To judge from everything, no proof was required for A. Ignatkin. For he also knew that the first secretary had been elected as a congress delegate in accordance with all the rules, and that ZORI OKTYABRYA had published material on this in some earlier issues. This means that it was still important somehow to discredit the first secretary by casting a shadow over him and showing the power of the newspaper and its independence vis-a-vis the party committee and the rayon soviet.

The latest instance of the demonstration of power was removing the line showing whose organ the newspaper is. "To regard the collective in the editorial offices of ZORI OKTYABRYA as the founder of this newspaper"—that was the everyday and simple decision—a decision that left no room for doubt—reached by the journalists at their own meeting, when resolving the issue of to whom the rayon newspaper belonged.

But this is what alarmed me during discussion of the really acute conflict, and forced me to take up my pen. It goes without saying that here, in Severskiy Rayon, the rayon soviet and the CPSU raykom are operating in close unity, not striking poses for one another. The question of who is the authority in the rayon simply does not arise: it is the soviets, of course. There is no dispute here about the newspaper. The deputies and the members of the raykom have discussed it soberly: The idea of publishing two newspapers in the rayon simply has not arisen. And so the majority favor that it remains with two founders.

This is not the case everywhere, however. Passions on the question of who should be the boss of the rayon newspaper are rapidly heating up. Every now and then information arrives from various parts of the country

that although small, these essential newspapers are being taken from the raykoms and given to the soviets. Often the justification for this is the fact that, they say, the raykoms and city committees are not investing the assets to publish those newspapers and are not concerned about developing the printing base.

In fact, the economic fate of a rayon newspaper is unusual today. As a rule they have been founded by party committees and city or rayon soviets but are now financed by the State Committee for the Press. The "triple" subordination that results from this makes the creative collective largely impotent. Commands pour in from all sides and each "boss" regards himself as the chief boss. As a result, it is a case of too many cooks spoiling the broth. I know for myself that all the time the wages and honoraria of the people in the rayon have been and remain low, and economic independence is essentially out of the question.

Of course, in some places in the depths of Russia the rayon newspapers are unprofitable. What what if we take the Kuban? Here, of the 51 newspapers, 41 make fine profits. In short, it is not so much a question of money but of the traditions that have been shaped over the long decades. And now, when the party committees are being unceremoniously squeezed out of their own newspapers and when in a demonstration of power some soviets are taking them over, the question arises as to whether or not these actions are lawful.

To judge from everything, the dual subordination to the founders—the party committee and the soviet—is coming to an end. And already today it is necessary to start organizing purely party newspapers—look for a publishing base, for paper, train strong cadres. If we give total independence to the editorial offices, including with respect to advertising, searching for sponsors, and commercial activities, then new publishing houses will soon appear and spending will be recouped with interest.

But these kinds of possibly controversial ruminations led me into conflict in the Cossack village of Severskiy. And it ended up with a session of the rayon soviet and raykom plenum reaching a serious decision after they had set their tasks for the future.

As far as the editor is concerned, the session and the plenum decided that they no longer required his services on their newspaper.

It would seem that the conflict in Severskaya was ended. A new editor arrived and the newspaper continued to come out under the "sign" to which readers were accustomed. However, after suffering a defeat, the activists in the struggle to wrest the newspaper from the party committee did not lay down their arms. So when the chairman of the rayon soviet and first secretary of the CPSU raykom (now V. Solyanik is only the rayon soviet chairman) was on vacation, the executive committee registered the newspaper, excluding the party committee from among its founders. It is understandable that the members of the raykom perceived this as a direct attack

against the party organization and decided to oppose this unexpected turn of events. And the struggle continues...

And not only here. Conflicts are arising in many cities and rayons. The result of these fights has been that more than a dozen party committees in the kray have found themselves in a joyless position: They have been left without their own press organs. Moreover, in some places they have yielded them up without a fight and without hesitation.

I note that many rank-and-file communists are concerned about the loss of influence in the local press more than other comrades who occupy leadership posts. At a party conference that I attended recently in Kanevskiy Rayon I heard sharp criticism of the first secretary, A. Yakovenko, for the fact that he had simply "given away" his rayon newspaper for fear that he would be drawn into a conflict to preserve its party status. This is another case in which yielding does harm to the party. And, indeed, there is no need to "dispense" with the rayon newspapers. The CPSU Central Committee has allocated the necessary subsidies to the publish these newspapers.

Meanwhile, the process of surrender, whose adverse consequences for the party committees at all levels is not difficult to guess, continues. Is it not time to stop it?

#### Newspaper Editors on Press Freedom

91UN0900A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA  
in Russian No 6, 13 Feb 91 p 3

[Statements by six editors in chief: "How Do They Assess Current Press Freedom"]

[Text] Vitaliy TRETYAKOV, editor in chief of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA:

The current status of glasnost in our country may be assessed as ambiguous. For example, there are no restrictions on the expression of views in our newspaper; there is an absolute level of freedom. So far, no pressure has been brought to bear on us. As far as other publications are concerned, many of them are under attack. IZVESTIYA is the most instructive case... It appears that similar attacks on new publications are being prepared. However, I am sure they will not succeed but the attempts themselves are dangerous.

Our political leadership has but two accomplishments: Its foreign policy and glasnost. If the president surrenders glasnost foreign policy will inexorably follow. This will be a tragedy both for him personally and, most importantly, for our entire people.

Valentin CHIKIN, member of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, editor in chief of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA:

As his assistant Viktor Shestopalov communicated, Valentin Vasilyevich has neither the desire nor the time to discuss such issues. He also asked to tell us that he, an editor in chief, has very much work to do, as well as the

entire collective of the newspaper, especially at present, at a critical time for our country. V. Shestopalov stated that theirs is perhaps the only editorial office where idle talk is not the custom, "their work is cut out for them," all the more so because, as he communicated, there are vacant staff positions at the newspaper, in a majority of their departments.

**Yegor YAKOVLEV, editor in chief of MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI:**

At present, attempts are being made to establish control over the mass media, which have become free in the six years of perestroyka. It is being done in different ways: Either direct pressure is being brought to bear, as in the case of IZVESTIYA, or indirect. For example, how can something be dictated to our newspaper, which personally sets its policy and elects its editor in chief? For example, raise prices for newsprint, printing services, and distribution. Is this not pressure; is this not an attack on glasnost by our totalitarian state?

All of us should take into account the fact that glasnost may only be eliminated together with the destruction of all democratic structures. Therefore, bans on the operation of parties and public movements may follow...

**Aleksandr PROKHANOV, editor in chief of the USSR Union of Writers newspaper DEN:**

As I respond to this question, I fear to be accused of banality. Of course, I am in favor of freedom of the press. At present, we should not grumble, we should take advantage of the freedom and glasnost secured. After all, they were but a dream previously. However, it would be better to adhere to the ethics of freedom because an increase of the freedom potential will bring about lack of control and will pose the threat of an outbreak of impropriety and enmity, or even plain bad language, in mutual relations between publications.

Unfortunately, freedom of the press is concentrated in the hands of narrow intellectual political groups. They have seized the display of freedom. I mean democrats, representatives of the liberal intelligentsia. An imbalance has developed because quite a few people do not own freedom. However, this is not to say that I am in favor of clamping down on the democratic press.

**Igor YAKOVENKO, editor in chief of the newspaper GOSPODIN NAROD:**

Can the head of Professor Dowell [severed head of a scientist kept alive artificially in a 1925 science-fiction novel by A.R. Belyayev] be free? It seems it can. It may say what it wants, but actually an attendant (or a jailer) may cut off its oxygen supply at any time. There can be no freedom of the press in a society devoid of the individual human foundation, namely, private property.

**Lidiya KALININA, editor in chief of the international newspaper DOMOSTROY:**

It is not all that easy to find the signs of a free press in an avalanche of current periodicals. Freedom of the press is more than just the absence of censorship. It is first of all the existence of people in society who are capable of thinking independently.

At present, we do not have censorship. However, it is for the most part conformists whose packages of opinions and views are always put together depending on the "climate" who fill the pages newspapers and magazines.

In a word, freedom is hard to come by! It is worse yet with independence; self-proclaimed independence of a number of publications is nothing but a joke. Some pluralist publications have only succeeded in organizing a "fraternity," and then on this principle: All means are acceptable.

Will we have genuine freedom of the press? My prediction is a pessimistic one.

**New Moldavian Paper Appears**

91P50001A Kishinev MOLDOVA SUVERANA  
in Russian 30 Aug 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "A Word to Our Readers"]

[Summary] The first supplemental digest, Kishinev MOLDOVA SUVERANA [SOVEREIGN MOLDOVA] in Russian 30 August 1990 will henceforth appear as a weekly insert in the Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDOVA Russian newspaper. It will act as a supplement to the vernacular Moldavian newspaper, also titled MOLDOVA SUVERANA. The following epigraph is included in the masthead: "Truth is the most valued of all things." In a statement to its readers on page 1, the 4-page publication notes that it will "feature the most important material from the Moldavian paper, MOLDOVA SUVERANA." It also states that it has begun publishing this digest "at the request of those readers who, because of a language barrier, are unable to familiarize themselves with the Moldavian language newspaper."

**VOA Report on Strike Call Labeled 'Canard'**

91UN0875A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA  
in Russian 5 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by Yu. Petrov under the rubric "Canards Are Flying": "Time To Stock Up on Dried Bread?"]

[Text] The Voice of America aired the following information: NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA published in Moscow came up with a very interesting initiative. It became known that the ideological department of the CPSU Central Committee is working at present on the USSR president's draft decree declaring temporary suspension in the permissive part of the Law on the Press. In this connection, NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA called

on the journalists of the Soviet Union to respond with a political strike the day after such a decree is published.

Thanks to the Voice of America for the instruction, but it would be better to receive the information from the horse's mouth. Whatever you say, the CPSU Central Committee is a founder of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA and it is not nice to give such sensational news to competitors. After all this talk about privileges for the party publications...

I called G.V. Pryakhin, CPSU Central Committee ideological department deputy chief. The secretary took some time putting me through—Georgiy Vladimirovich must be working his head off on the draft decree.

I read the Voice of America information to him.

"A canard," was the short comment by the ideological department deputy chief. "A malicious falsification."

I can add on my part: It seems that somebody wants to stir our emotions up to the boiling point by turning our pens against the president. It is not hard to guess who profits by this. Moreover, they do not mind making decisions for all of us, even though we never gave such powers to anyone. The Voice of America ends its information with tasteful simplicity: "Thus the journalists of the Soviet Union are now in a state of strike readiness also."

The word "also", emphasized by me, is interesting here. We clarified the fact that the CPSU Central Committee ideological department is on strike and does not want to prepare the draft decree. Who else is "also?" It is not the President himself, is it?

#### Future, Direction of Central TV Analyzed

91UN0860A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 7 Feb 91  
Second Edition p 3

[Article by Lev Strzhizhovskiy, doctor of historical sciences, under the rubric "Notes of a Political Scientist": "On Critics, the Cook, and Modern-Day Versions of Thersites: Who Is Attacking Central Television and Why"]

[Text] *Everything is "mixed up" in the mass media in our country. As scholars tell us, the information explosion has been "directed" and has spawned an abundance of new printed publications. The reader has frankly become lost amidst the journalistic fireworks. He continues to "digest" information: He buys first one newspaper and then another. But it is difficult to choose: The publications are changing not only their typographical appearance but also their political leanings. So far one thing is clear. They have broken down the stereotype of domestic reading established in society long ago—namely, that each reader has his own selection of newspapers. It is not only the customary range of reading that has changed: The circulation of the information supply has been violated, and this means the entrenched way of life as well.*

This is why our gazes have been fixed on television. While previously it was one of a number of equal means of mass information, now the screen represents and largely replaces almost all of them. Speaking of information processes, this is the most important peculiarity of political life in the country. For both journalists and for readers.

This kind of communication is not customary for us. We became convinced of this, in particular, when we saw the extraordinary all-Union press conference: Central Television leaders answered questions directly on the air. The viewers were demanding, precise, and severe. The leaders responded sincerely and with conviction. It would seem that the new concepts have won over new advocates. If such meetings were more frequent, there would be fewer rumors and fewer dissatisfied citizens.

But if one subscribes to L. Tolstoy's idea that every family is unhappy in its own way, then Central Television is unhappy in its own way in its information family. Having ended up on top and a popular source of information, it experiences the readers' sympathies and antipathies before others do. People who have become accustomed to "their own" newspapers, "their own" range of daily reading, want to see and hear information in the format and perspective to which they are accustomed. But the parties and schools—which are socially more experienced and understand before others do the "primacy" of Central Television under the conditions of the developing crisis—try to take charge of it and openly deform it. We are seeing before our eyes the birth of the phenomenon of that same cook who was supposed to learn how to run the state. It seemed that her long-lived image had disappeared from the political lexicon. But the time has come when the cook is needed again. This time she is needed by the present-day "democrats." On her (supposedly the ordinary Soviet person) behalf one can hear demands for objectivity and freedom of information. In the current situation, state Central Television does not suit the "democrats." They need open air waves, unlimited time, and free information. They operate sharply and categorically, exactly according to the grievous formula of GULAG times: "A step to the right or a step to the left and I will shoot without warning..." With a political pistol in the hands of the "democratic" cook, one must proceed in one, firmly specified direction. The skillfully directed and well organized campaign of "viewer dissatisfaction" serves as the main justification.

Of course, today the steady gaze sheds light on the sore spots of Central Television, where one far from always finds erudition and accurate reporting. During a day spent in front of the television set it is possible to pick up a goodly number of mistakes and blunders. Thus during the first day of the battle for Kuwait the political observer "transferred" the combat activities from the Persian Gulf zone to the vast Near East and gave an imprecise list of the participants in the conflict. A staff correspondent in India assured the viewers that [American] "Indians" live there, and so forth. The placement

of comments leaves something to be desired as well. It is artificial to attempt to interrupt the entire program at some point where related pieces of news come together, as they try to do.

It would seem that the wave of advertising that has engulfed Central Television is tactless as well. It is not intended for any potential mass consumer and has only one aim—"getting the client's money away from him in some way that is not dishonest." This is candidly announced to us with repeated segments that say, "Your advertising is our independence!" One must congratulate Central Television on its new discovery. So far, nobody has tried to refute the old axiom: "He who pays the piper calls the tune."

The list of disturbing mistakes, inaccuracies, and slips of the tongue could be continued. But they do not determine the nature of today's Central Television and they are not written about in today's publications or shouted about in rallies. It is not Central Television's political stance that people are dissatisfied with. The upstart democrats who are in favor of "a step to the right, a step to the left..." give it the same score and demand that it take "a different path." Stereotypes extracted from the past bear within themselves today a call for the destabilization of society, extreme politicization of broadcasting, and the possibility of manipulating events.

Oh, immortal gods, we have already seen all this, we have seen it! Which of us, after reading the great "Iliad" has not retained in his memory the image of Thersites—the first "propagandist and agitator" in human history. "He kept a multitude of indecent words in his head in order to offend the rulers," is what Homer said about him. Thersites sows discord and dissension. It is symbolic that for a correct depiction of the war Homer could not leave him out. But the author's attitude toward his character is also typical: "He was the ugliest of all who appeared at Troy..."

More than two millennia have passed since that time. Propaganda has become a science and it is possible to evaluate its purposes in different ways. De Gaulle's two outspread fingers became a sign of victory. The swastika (an ancient Hindu symbol) was the curse of the peoples. The new political thinking has singled out from the alphabet of human relations the inflammation of hatred and the propaganda of evil and violence. The art of propaganda is being purged of military dress and again they are trying to impose on us the "mastery" of Thersites.

I have in mind the wave of hatred that has swept over Central Television, its reporters and correspondents, and the independent journalist Aleksandr Nevzorov, who once again has had the courage to present his viewpoint and reveal what the nationalists and "democrats" tried to conceal during the events in Lithuania. Much here is still unclear and the official investigation will have something to add. Central Television discussed the events while they were still hot. Nevzorov wrote a report

on what he himself saw. One can argue about the "composition" of the piece but one cannot deny that the segments that were shown are documentary. It is necessary to clarify how the whole situation looks in the overall context of events—the violation of the rights of the non-Lithuanian population of the republic, the highly publicized flouting of the USSR Constitution by the Lithuanian Government, and the president's ukase concerning fulfillment of the order on the military draft. We needed a political commentary which presented the situation as a whole. But, unfortunately, we did not hear anything like that in those days.

But this commentary was to be heard on "another screen"! Incidentally, I do not like to use that word. The viewer-reader has been offered numerous variants of "propagandistic coverage" of the events taking place. It has consisted of a set of stereotypes from past wars—both "hot" and "cold." It explains little and it appeals directly to the human emotions, translating political events into the category of emotions. This kind of "coverage" exists in its own right and can be superimposed upon any kind of program for viewing. "Fascists," "fascist putsch," "Russians (Yankees) go home," "for our freedom and yours," "today us, tomorrow you," and the like—they sound the same in Nicaragua and Ireland, Czechoslovakia and Lithuania, even though the political situations in these countries are not comparable. Such stereotypes are intended to have a warning effect and, by preceding an objective evaluation of events, they guide the viewers' attention and their appraisals of what is going on into the desired channel.

After this kind of emotional preparation the audience becomes an ally and it is easy to impose on it one or another political interpretation of events. There is no longer any doubt about the fact that on Central Television nowadays everyone is "lying." Nevzorov "sold out," Baghdad and Moscow are "acting according to the same scenario," and the entire world is "condemning the actions of the USSR president." The "volume" of the propaganda campaign is also essential. If Central Television comments on events in a news summary, even if it is only several times a day, the flow of information in response is inexhaustible.

Perhaps one should not go into such detail about what is happening, but this kind of analysis makes it possible to clarify what the critics want to see on Central Television today and what place is assigned to it in the model of social life. "A step to the right, a step to the left..."—the "democratic" cook dictates to it. On her behalf the "democrats" demand information about everything and anything, right down to the events taking place in the higher echelons of power. How good it is that we have color television and everyone can see that Gorbachev is wearing a red (the most fashionable color) tie. And here an explanation would be necessary. I can see it now: Pierre Cardin and the press secretary are discussing the color of the president's tie. And the journalists from "Vzglyad" comment on the dialogue, discussing, of course, everything red.



Behind the dispute as to whether "Vzglyad" is to be or not to be in its customary form, of course, there are more serious issues. For example, who will explain to the viewer who he is seeing on the television screen: professional journalists or people's deputies. The distance between professional disinterestedness and political involvement, as they say, is immense. In propaganda theory the question of the source of information is considered to be the main one. This source should be known, accessible, and independent. This is why they do what they do in the West (to which opponents of the present Central Television leadership likes so much to refer). Rudolph Augstein, the founder, publisher, and a writer for the well-known West German DER SPIEGEL (news magazine), having become a deputy of the Bundeswehr from the party of free democrats (what a coincidence!), gave up his mandate. He considered it impossible to combine the profession of a journalist with active political work. Why should we not adopt a similar interpretation of the bourgeois "free press"? But there is not even any discussion of such an approach. All we can do is "thank" the journalists for wearing deputy regalia when on the air.

I recall a headline from a newspaper article: "A Country Without a View [Vzglyad]" (this apparently implies "poor country"). Without what kind of "Vzglyad"? The very one in which, on one program, V. Mukusev told his guest: If I had known you were a communist I would not have invited you to the studio. Such sectarianism is intolerable in public life. No state television company anywhere in the world, or even a channel or program claiming to "cover sociopolitical life in the country," would be placed in the hands of one political grouping. No program producer would allow one-sided political statements. This is the reason for the program, the contract, and, finally, the position of the journalist, which are known to the public. The leaders of a television company, when conducting a policy of pluralism, have a right to accept or reject this kind of activity.

State television, which now exists in the majority of countries of the world, has a special socio-legal status. It guarantees all political parties equal access to the air, thus providing for pluralism and precluding extremism. As long as nothing like this is happening in "Vzglyad," it seems, the criticism to which it is subjected is basically correct. For the list of what is missing from this interestingly conceived program is much longer than the list of what it has offered the viewer so far.

But let us not make unfounded statements. The last "Vzglyad" (which is already prepared for export, with foreign-language captions and pictures of tanks on the cover), which was shown on Leningrad television, clearly demonstrated how the modern-day Thersites operates. For an hour and a half on the screen we accused the

system, the president, and the Army of everything that has happened in the Baltic region. Viewers were forced to listen to the self-advertising monologues of people leaving the political scene or rushing toward it. None of them clearly stated that the impetus for the disturbances in Lithuania was the violation of the rights of many people, the sharp increase in prices, the fall of the government, and the retirement of Prime Minister K. Prunskiene. Oh, that magic word "retirement"! How variously it is perceived by journalists! E. Shevardnadze's retirement aroused all of "Vzglyad" and, as we are told, was the subject of almost an entire program. And yet they did not even take note of K. Prunskiene's retirement; they simply remained silent about it. It would seem that an interview with her could have told us just as much as all the others we have seen or not seen. And this is precisely why she was not granted a television viewing.

But, in the words of the great poet, there is divine justice! In the program there was a glimmer of the truth, for the sake of which it would probably be worthwhile to sit in front of the television set for this hour and a half of requiem liturgy. The wise and calm B. Oleynik finally said what needed to be said: "To speculate about the national problem is the very last resort. It is like putting your mother up on the auction block."

Esteemed Boris Ilich! Thank You on behalf of those of us who spent the evening in front of the television set. Your words turned out to be prophetic. The "Vzglyad" firm is prepared for the sake of its political ambitions to put more than its relatives "up for auction"...

But let us ask ourselves once again: Do we want this kind of television? This question, which sounds purely rhetorical in ordinary life, becomes political today. Our position depends on our evaluation of the situation in the country. People need peace and quiet, which enables them to collect their thoughts, figure out what is happening, and understand where the country is going. Our warmth and goodness originate at home, in the family circle in the evening in front of the television set. What we see here we take into our lives tomorrow. When the television Thersites, brought to life by our present-day "democrats," manipulate the events of the past and present, they take away our future. Frightened and worked up, the viewer is prepared to subscribe to any political concepts that inspire him from the screen. This is how "protest rallies" and "demonstrations involving thousands" originate, and then they are moved according to the law "a step to the right, a step to the left..." in a given direction.

Is it not finally time to listen to the opinion of the wise Homer, who considered it "the greatest valor" that Odysseus excluded the garrulous slanderer Thersites from the meeting?

**USSR Goskomstat Data On Deaths From Unnatural Causes**

91P50088A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Feb 91  
Second Edition p 2

[Article by A. Sashin: "How Many People Are Perishing..."]

[Text] Everyday people are born, and everyday they die. If they die a natural death, this is normal. Such is life. But it is unnatural if they perish at the hands of others, or kill themselves. The USSR Goskomstat attests that in 1989 in our country 88,000 people perished from murders and suicides. It is significant that 80,000 of these deaths were self-inflicted.

Statistics, by the way, present other similar facts for reflection. In the last 10 years, the peak period for murders and suicides occurred in 1980 and 1984. For example, in 1984, 24,000 murders took place, and

81,000 persons committed suicide. At the onset of perestroika, these figures dropped. Thus, in 1985, 21,000 murders were committed, and in 1986, 16,000. Correspondingly, the number of suicides decreased to 68,000 and 53,000. However by 1987, the curve began to crawl upwards. Unfortunately, 1990 did not bring about a turning point since, in a nine-month period, 24,000 murders were committed and 47,000 persons killed themselves. Out of a population of 100,000, there were 11 murders and 22 suicides.

The death rate from murders and suicides was 3.3 and 3.7 times greater for males than for females.

What age is subject to the greatest danger? Among 100,000 persons, 29.6 percent of the men perish in the prime of life, from 30 to 39 years; from suicide, 79.3 percent at the age of 70 years and older. Women perish, most of all, at the hands of others (7.8 percent) from 40 to 49 years. Moreover, they most often commit suicide in old age (28.2 percent). These facts, evidently, do not require explanation. Our elderly live extremely badly.

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